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 ABSTRACT 
 
Research was conducted to design an active neutron interrogation system to search for 
conventional explosives. The work began with a review of the current methods for explosives 
detection, with a particular focus on active neutron interrogation. The next step was to design a 
layered shield for an isotopic neutron generator that limited the influence of unattenuated 
neutrons at undesirable angles. The final shielding design was then adapted for neutron and 
gamma ray detector collimation in an active neutron interrogation system, and a modular 
shielding arrangement was proposed. Focus then shifted to improving the flexibility of the active 
neutron interrogation system via introduction of a method to reliably vary the energy from nearly 
monoenergetic sealed-tube deuterium-deuterium or deuterium-tritium neutron generators. This 
was accomplished through single neutron elastic scatter off a target of known composition, 
resulting in neutrons with predictable energies that can be adjusted through manipulation of the 
interrogation target location relative to the scatter target and neutron generator. This neutron 
elastic scatter system was optimized through the adoption of a neutron time-of-flight (TOF) 
method, where the hydrogen nuclei in the start detector (scatter target) also served as the 
scattering medium, signaling neutron scatter and allowing for discrimination of neutrons that did 
not interact in the scatter target.  Laboratory measurements and simulations were performed to 
characterize the new variable energy neutron elastic scatter (VENES) system and evaluate its 
effectiveness in performing fast neutron resonance radiography. Preliminary investigations on 
the application of VENES to fast neutron analysis and neutron backscatter were also conducted 
to direct future work. There was a particular interest in combining all three active neutron 
xviii 
 
 interrogation methods with the VENES system and proposed shield designs, allowing for 
investigations across multiple different neutron energies in the MeV range. The VENES system 
permits for reliable alteration of neutron energy in active interrogation systems, using relatively 
cheap, portable, and easily operated components that are either currently, or soon-to-be, 
commercially available. The improvements on current active neutron interrogation sources 
should result in its eventual adoption to a variety of applications. 
 
xix 
 
 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Motivation 
 Conventional explosives present a serious security threat domestically and 
internationally. This situation results from the fact that relatively cheap and accessible materials 
can cause significant damage. Not only are lives and property at risk, but the economic and 
psychological consequences can also be severe. When searching, it is important to locate and 
identify all explosives before they can be used. Even a single undetected explosive can have 
grave consequences. Therefore, continued improvement of the explosives detection systems is 
critical. 
 There are several established methods to search for explosives, including trace chemical 
detection and the employment of canine units to search the air near objects of interest. These 
have both proven effective, but are generally deployed for spot-checking, not comprehensive 
investigation. Traditionally, x-ray machines have been used to search through a large number of 
objects relatively quickly for various types of contraband. Although efficient, this method has 
several drawbacks when searching specifically for explosives. As opposed to weapons, 
explosives can have their shape manipulated, allowing them to be disguised as innocuous 
objects. Additionally, dense, heavy materials can be used to shield the x-rays, obscuring the view 
within the objects being investigated. 
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  Active neutron interrogation addresses all these issues. Conventional explosives have 
unique chemical compositions, which usually includes a high percentage of nitrogen compared 
to hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen. The distinctive ratios of these elements can be discovered 
during neutron interrogation through a variety of signatures, including characteristic neutron 
inelastic scatter gamma rays, elastically scattered source neutrons, or unattenuated transmission 
neutrons. These phenomena are not strongly affected by the shape of the material, rendering the 
disguising of explosives ineffective. Furthermore, compared to x-rays, neutrons can more easily 
penetrate dense shielding materials such as lead, providing a complimentary approach to more 
traditional screening methods.  
Common features in all active neutron interrogation systems are the neutron source and 
detectors that identify the particles of interest, whether those are gamma rays, scattered neutrons, 
or unattenuated source neutrons. Improvements to these elements can potentially have far-
reaching effects. The solutions presented in this thesis are not meant to stand alone as an entirely 
new method. Instead, they serve as general, yet significant, improvements to the active neutron 
interrogation systems that can be applied across a variety of different methods that search for 
conventional explosives.  
Current State of the Art 
 Presently, there are several active neutron interrogation approaches to search for 
conventional explosives. In general, all of them require a neutron source be directed at the target 
and attempt to detect the relatively high concentration of nitrogen in common explosives. They 
can be differentiated based on what is ultimately detected. Thermal neutron analysis, fast neutron 
analysis, and pulsed fast/thermal neutron analysis methods take advantage of the gamma rays 
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 that result from inelastic neutron scatters. Hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen, all of which 
maintain unique ratios in explosives, can be observed using these methods. Similarly, fast 
neutron scattering analysis attempts to identify the elemental fractions using neutron elastic 
scatter. Provided the user knows the initial energy of a source neutron and can determine its final 
energy after an elastic scatter, the mass of the target nuclei can be calculated and chemical 
composition inferred. As opposed to the other systems, neutron transmission measurements 
focus on neutrons that are not attenuated. Instead, the source neutrons pass through the target and 
interact with a detector. Based on the interaction probabilities of neutrons at different energies 
with various nuclei, it is possible to deduce the target’s composition. Work on all three types of 
active neutron interrogation systems is ongoing, and attempts to combine the methods have had 
some success. A more in depth discussion of explosives detection methods, neutron sources, and 
active neutron interrogation can be found in Ch. 2.  
Despite the increased penetration depth of neutrons compared to x-rays, and the ability to 
determine chemical composition of low-Z materials, active neutron interrogation has failed to 
find extensive deployment when searching for conventional explosives. X-ray systems, trace 
chemical detection, and canine assets are all extensively used at airports, seaports, and border 
crossings, but neutron interrogation systems have not advanced much beyond occasional field 
tests. The systems have yet to prove themselves efficient and cost effective enough to replace the 
currently installed systems. Some of the main disadvantages are the large, complicated, 
expensive accelerators used as neutron sources, as well as the insufficiently low count rate 
abilities and energy resolution of neutron detectors. However, if these challenges can be 
overcome with easily implemented and deployable solutions, widespread active neutron 
interrogation and its promise of effective material discrimination will be closer to reality. 
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 Proposed Improvements 
This research focuses on several improvements to active neutron interrogation systems. 
The first improvement is a novel, compact shield design for both the neutron source and any 
detectors used in the system. Discussed in Ch. 3, the shield effectively collimates an isotropic 
fast neutron source, allowing for unattenuated neutrons to emerge from the shield opening at a 
specific solid angle, forming a beam of a desired size and shape. This limits the flux at other 
angles, reducing the dose to personnel and restricts the number of neutrons that could interact in 
the environment and contribute unwanted signal in a detector. In Ch. 4, the shield design is 
further refined and applied to a detector to constrict its field of view, reducing the undesirable 
particles detected and improving the system’s signal. Additionally, modular implementation of 
the design is discussed, which allows for altering the shield and permits portability and 
adaptability based on the desired application. 
The second part of the dissertation focuses on the development of a methodology to 
reliably and precisely reduce the energy of neutrons from a monoenergetic deuterium-deuterium 
(D-D) or deuterium-tritium (D-T) source, providing flexibility to the user. The initial idea, as 
investigated in Ch. 5, involves elastically scattering source neutrons of known energy off a target 
nucleus of known mass. The interrogation object is placed at a specific angle relative to the 
scatter target. Assuming a single elastic scatter, it is possible to determine the final energy of the 
neutron given its mass, initial energy, mass of the scatter nucleus, and angle of scatter.  
Ch. 6 further refines the idea by adopting time-of-flight (TOF) measurement techniques 
to discriminate undesirable neutrons, resulting in development of the novel variable energy 
neutron elastic scatter (VENES) system. The VENES system, which was tested in the laboratory, 
uses two organic scintillator detectors, one near the source and another separated by some 
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 distance and offset at a predetermined angle. Some neutrons emitted from the source will 
elastically scatter off a hydrogen nucleus in the first detector. In addition to serving as a scatter 
target, the pulse created when the neutrons scatter acts as a start signal. If the neutrons also 
interact in the second detector, generating another pulse, TOF can be used to confirm the 
neutron’s energy and neglect neutrons that may have multiply-scattered or interacted somewhere 
else in the environment before finding their way to the second detector. By altering the angle of 
the second detector relative to the first, and using TOF to discriminate multiple neutron scatters 
and other types of interactions, a fraction of the neutrons emitted from the monoenergetic fusion 
source can have their energy reliably varied by the user. The VENES system can be applied to 
active neutron interrogation, particularly when searching for conventional explosives. When 
probing a target, the energy can be adjusted based on the interrogation object’s scatter cross 
sections, density, thickness, and other properties that affect neutron attenuation. The neutron 
energy can be aligned based on resonance inelastic scatter peaks to search for characteristic 
gamma rays, encourage neutron elastic scatter, or influence neutron transmission measurements.  
To evaluate the effectiveness of the  VENES system, further laboratory measurements 
were performed in Ch. 7, placing several different materials, including an explosive surrogate, 
between the scattered D-D neutrons and the stop detector. The measured transmission count rates 
were used to benchmark Monte Carlo simulations and evaluate application of the VENES system 
to fast neutron resonance radiography. Successful identification of the approximate atom 
fractions for all simulated materials demonstrated the utility of the VENES system for active 
neutron interrogation. 
In Ch. 8, the promising results encouraged preliminary investigation in to alternative 
explosives detection applications. Simulations of both fast neutron analysis and fast neutron 
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 scattering analysis were performed using the VENES system as the neutron source. Additionally, 
implementation of previously developed source and detector shields were evaluated. The results 
helped direct future work and eventual possible deployment of the VENES system.  
Finally, Ch. 9 summarizes the benefits of the VENES system: such as ease of use, 
portability, and low comparative costs to similar neutron sources, and contrasts that against the 
relatively low count rate inherent in a system dependent on neutron elastic scatter. 
Evaluation Methods 
There are two primary types of analysis performed in this dissertation. Much of the 
original design and evaluation, for both the shield and  VENES system, were done using Monte 
Carlo N-Particle Transport Code (MCNP)1. This limited the time and resources required to build 
and test the designs and allowed for quick comparison between a large variety of choices. 
Preliminarily, the simulations were kept relatively simple, often neglecting environmental 
objects such as ground and air in order to avoid obscuring the underlying interactions of interest. 
Although there is always some uncertainty present in simulations, this minimalist approach 
helped limit it by reducing the complexity of the models. As a result, many of the early values 
obtained, particularly from the more basic simulations, provide relative results, not absolute. 
As research continued, the simulations began to incorporate more realistic models. These 
included source and detector housings, realistic source energy distributions, and approximated 
detector response functions. This provided more accurate simulations and allowed for more in 
depth analysis of the VENES system’s capabilities. Care was always taken to minimize statistical 
uncertainty and, when appropriate, randomized uncertainty was introduced to the simulated 
1 computer code Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport version 5 (Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 
87545, 2006). 
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 results to determine the susceptibility of VENES measurements to undisclosed systematic 
uncertainties. 
Whenever possible, laboratory measurements were performed. This served to confirm the 
simulated results and provide even more realistic values. Using a D-D generator and two liquid 
scintillators, the viability of elastic scatter to reliably change a source neutron’s energy was 
established. Further laboratory measurements investigated the application of the VENES system 
to searching for conventional explosives via neutron transmission.
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 CHAPTER 2: A REVIEW OF CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVES 
DETECTION USING ACTIVE NEUTRON INTERROGATION  
 
Abstract 
 Conventional explosives continue to be a serious threat. They are relatively easy to obtain 
or create and have the potential to cause massive harm to people and property. There are several 
tools employed by law enforcement to try to detect explosives before they are used, but they can 
be subverted if the correct precautions are taken. Active neutron interrogation, a rapidly evolving 
field, is an alternative to these other detection techniques. There are several different methods 
proposed that use active neutron interrogation to search for explosives: Fast Neutron Analysis, 
Thermal Neutron Analysis, Pulsed Fast/Thermal Neutron Analysis, Neutron Elastic Scatter, and 
Fast Neutron Radiography. These methods vary based on neutron energy and the radiation they 
detect. A thorough review of the basic principles behind active neutron interrogation and an 
investigation of each type of active neutron interrogation, complete with the advantages and 
disadvantages, was conducted and will be presented. 
Introduction 
 A quick, accurate method of finding hidden explosives is a high priority in national 
security. Relatively small amounts of explosive materials in airport luggage or landmines can 
cause injury or death to individuals and destruction of property. Various detection methods from 
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 different fields of science, including vapor detection and x-ray screening, have been employed in 
order to identify explosive materials (Hussein and Waller, 1998; Steinfeld and Wormhoudt, 
1998; Singh and Singh, 2003; Moore, 2004; Moore, 2007). However, it has been only during the 
last 25 years or so that neutron interrogation has become a viable method of identifying potential 
explosive materials (Gozani et al., 1989). This chapter will review the advantages and 
disadvantages of neutron interrogation as a means of explosives detection as well as provide a 
brief overview of the various types of neutron sources and related information. Then several 
techniques that use neutrons to identify explosives will be discussed in greater depth. These will 
include thermal neutron analysis, fast neutron analysis, pulsed fast/thermal neutron analysis, 
neutron elastic scatter or fast neutron scattering analysis, and fast neutron radiography.  
 The explosives interrogation methods that do not involve neutrons all have drawbacks 
that limit their effectiveness. Many methods, including the use of canines, ion mobility 
spectrometry, and chemiluminescence search for trace amounts of explosives in the air (Furton 
and Myers, 2001; Ewing et al., 2001; Jimènez and Navas, 2004). Unfortunately, if the explosives 
are properly handled and sealed, these techniques will be unable to identify the material. There 
are also detection methods that involve the use of x-ray transmission or photon scatter to 
investigate targets (Singh and Singh, 2003; Faust, 2002; Strom and Callerame, 2004; Tang and 
Hussein, 2004). However, these photons can be shielded using high atomic number materials, 
which would allow anything behind the shielding to remain undetected (da Silva and Crispim, 
2001). Furthermore, although densities and atomic numbers can be approximated using these 
methods, they cannot be specifically determined (Harding, 2004). This allows for confusion 
when examining objects. A harmless material with physical properties similar to that of an 
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 explosive will trigger a false alarm. More importantly, depending on the orientation of materials 
inside the object, it is still possible that explosive material could be misidentified as harmless. 
There have been many specific methods proposed that use a neutron source to search for 
explosives, but the active interrogation techniques these systems employ are generally the same. 
In passive interrogation, the system does not interact with the target and only uses information 
that can be obtained without invasive measures, such as when a canine unit sniffs the air around 
the outside of a target.  With an active interrogation system, the explosives detection system is 
actually interacting with the target, such as by directing neutrons towards it, in order to obtain 
information more quickly. Each of the systems discussed in this chapter requires neutrons to 
interact with the materials of interest in some specific target. Depending on the concentration and 
neutron interaction cross sections of the atoms present in the target, the neutrons have a greater 
or lesser chance of interacting and releasing radiation (Lehnert and Kearfott, 2010). Radiation 
associated with these neutron interactions includes characteristic x-rays, gamma rays, 
inelastically scattered neutrons, and elastically scattered neutrons (Buffler and Tickner, 2010). 
The active neutron interrogation systems have detectors set up to record one or more types of 
secondary radiation. The signal is then processed by the equipment and analyzed either by a 
computer or a person. This assists the operator in determining whether the target needs to be 
investigated further to see if the materials within it are either illegal or dangerous. 
 The major advantage of neutron based explosives detection systems is that it is hard to 
shield neutrons, which pass through iron and lead with very little attenuation. This is a benefit 
compared to many other systems, most notably those based on x-rays and gamma rays directed at 
the target, which can be shielded by middle- to high-atomic number, dense materials. If such 
materials are placed between the source and explosive, the explosive may not be detected. 
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 However, neutrons, which are better shielded by light nuclei, pass through high-atomic-number 
materials and reach the explosive. Another disadvantage of x-rays and gamma rays are that they 
can only broadly discriminate between organic and inorganic materials while neutrons are 
effective at differentiating between various types of organic material based on their chemical 
composition (Liu et al., 2008). 
The fact that neutrons are more difficult to shield with high-z materials may make them 
advantageous for detecting explosives, but it also causes them to be a hazard to work with. 
Neutrons can deliver a potentially harmful radiation dose to nearby personnel if the individuals 
are not properly protected. The difficulty of attenuating neutrons requires either significant 
shielding or large stand-off distances. Either option contributes to an expanded system footprint. 
This can make implementation for luggage inspection at airports and cargo inspection at 
shipping yards, both places where floor space is at a premium, complicated. Similarly, neutron 
sources used in land mine detection would necessitate shielding, which adds to the weight to the 
system and limits its portability. Furthermore, the additional shielding material adds to the 
system cost. When implementing on a large scale, these costs can be significant. 
Another disadvantage of neutron interrogation is the potential for materials activation. 
When high energy neutrons interact with certain nuclei, it is possible they will undergo a reaction 
and leave the target nucleus in an excited state. Eventually this nucleus will move to a stable 
nuclear state and release radiation. This may happen almost immediately after the neutron 
interacts with the nucleus, or it may be delayed, such as with activated silicon and phosphorous 
(Vourvopoulos and Womble, 2001). Due to the fact that the materials being interrogated are 
largely unknown, it is impossible to anticipate what interactions will occur and the amount of 
activation induced. Therefore, it is necessary to strike a balance between having a high enough 
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 neutron flux to obtain a clear signal, while keeping it low enough to minimize the risk due to 
activation. 
A final disadvantage is the novelty of the systems proposed. Research and development is 
continuing in the field of active neutron interrogation in a number of areas, but there has yet to 
be a system that has found widespread deployment. This means data and benchmarks are either 
being generated in a lab or at one or two trial locations. Conversely, metal detectors and x-ray 
screening, for example, have been used for decades in airports, courthouses, and other public 
areas around the world. They are mature, robust technologies with a proven track record. Any 
new approach must provide a distinct advantage or address a unique need to be considered for 
wide-scale adoption. Active neutron interrogation may be a viable alternative to other explosives 
detection techniques, but its pros and cons must be weighed carefully when compared to 
competing technologies. 
Basic Principles of Neutron-based Explosives Interrogation 
 Neutron sources 
 There are four basic types of compact neutron sources. The first is a radioactive material 
that spontaneously and continuously releases neutrons as it decays to a stable state. An example 
of this would be 252Cf, which has a neutron energy spectrum with a most probable energy of 0.8 
MeV and average energy of 2.1 MeV. Another neutron source type pairs two nuclides: one 
alpha-emitting, and another that absorbs the emitted alpha particle and then releases a neutron. 
These sources include plutonium beryllium (PuBe), americium beryllium (AmBe), and 
americium lithium (AmLi). Due to the variability of the alpha particle energy, the resultant 
neutron energy spectra are quite broad and dependent on the alpha source (Knoll, 2010). A third 
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 neutron source depends on a high energy photon to excite a nucleus resulting in the release of a 
neutron. The two nuclides that typically undergo this reaction are 9Be and 2H. The minimum 
photon energy for these reactions is 1.67 and 2.23 MeV, respectively. Typical sources of gamma 
rays include 226Ra, 124Sb, 72Ga, 140La, and 24Na. An advantage of neutron sources that use high 
energy photon excitation is that the resulting energy of the neutron is dependent on the energy of 
the incident gamma ray. If a monoenergetic photon source is used, a nearly monoenergetic 
neutron source will be obtained. However, the photoneutron interaction probability is relatively 
low. Therefore, a high activity gamma ray source must be used, which will create a large gamma 
ray background (Knoll, 2010).  
All of these types of neutron sources are easy to operate and require no equipment other 
than shielding. The associated major drawback is that they are constantly decaying and there is 
no way to turn them off. Therefore, when the neutron source is unshielded, it presents a constant 
hazard to nearby personnel, even when it is not being used. Furthermore, the radioactive material 
can expose unknowing individuals to a constant radiation dose if it is lost or stolen. The sources 
themselves present possible risks for terrorism when coupled with conventional explosives to 
create radiological dispersive devices. 
Neutron generators are a viable alternative that enable reactions that lead to the creation 
of neutrons. They allow for timed neutron pulses, can be turned off and thus are easier to 
transport, and have high neutron fluxes (Aleksandrov et al., 2005). One example of such a 
generator is the deuterium-tritium (D-T) neutron generator. When a D-T generator is turned on, 
deuterium (2H) ions are accelerated across a maximum voltage difference of around 90 kV into a 
tritium (3H) target. The deuterium and tritium undergo a fusion reaction to form an alpha particle 
(4He) and a neutron whose average initial energy is near 14.1 MeV (Knoll, 2010). A deuterium-
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 deuterium (D-D) neutron generator works in the same way, except in this case deuterium ions are 
accelerated towards a deuterium target.  When the two particles go through a fusion reaction, the 
product is 3H and a neutron with an average energy of about 2.5 MeV. In both cases, if the 
generator is off, the deuterium is not directed towards the tritium or deuterium and no neutrons 
are created. This makes it ideal for interrogation applications and reduces the risk of accidental 
exposure from the unshielded source. Several compact D-T and D-D generators have been 
designed specifically for active neutron interrogation applications (Chichester et al., 2007). For 
both radioisotopes that release neutrons and neutron generators, the energy of the neutron is 
dependent on the atom that is decaying or the reaction taking place. Both of these types of 
sources tend to have very specific neutron energies that cannot be easily adjusted. Large 
accelerators, which are costly and relatively complicated, can be used to impart the incoming 
deuterium ion with more energy than required to initiate fusion, resulting in some of the excess 
energy being transferred to the resultant neutron in the D-D or D-T reaction (Hall et al., 2006; 
Lanza, 2007). Alternatively, the neutrons can be passed through a moderating material so that 
they lose energy through multiple interactions with nuclei of low atomic mass. This will 
generally lower the average energy of the neutron to the thermal range around 0.025 eV, but 
cannot reliably reduce a significant number of neutrons to any other energy.  
All of the neutron sources have their own advantages and disadvantages, which are 
summarized in Table 1. It is up to the system designer to decide which best suits his or her needs 
while adequately limiting the potential dose to any operators or the nearby public.  
Neutron source collimation 
Regardless of the type of neutron source, the distribution of neutrons is either isotropic or 
nearly isotropic. This is not ideal for the application of neutron interrogation where the operator 
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 is interested in neutrons interacting in a target within a specified solid angle. If the source were 
unshielded and neutrons were released isotropically to interact with the surrounding 
environment, products of the interactions, either scattered neutrons or associated gamma rays, 
could end up being directed towards the detector and counted by the detection system. These 
additional interactions in the detector create noise and the signal from the materials being 
investigated may be lost or obscured. Furthermore, the additional neutrons provide a health 
hazard to anyone near the source. Shielding can be used to limit the isotropic neutron source, 
reduce the unwanted interactions, and protect nearby personnel and the public (Reda 2011, 
Whetstone and Kearfott 2011). Such shielding, applied to either radioactive sources or neutron 
generators, is never completely effective so there will still be some neutrons that escape the 
collimation and interact within the environment. In the case that additional shielding is too heavy 
or has too large of a footprint, another option is to use associated particle imaging (API). 
 Associated particle imaging 
 Without bulky collimation, it is very hard to determine if a detected gamma ray or 
neutron is the result of neutrons scattering in the environment or within the target. Additionally, 
even if it can be determined that the neutron interacted in the target, it is unknown whether the 
secondary radiation is a result of a single interaction or several, based on the detector signal 
alone. The incident neutron may undergo interactions within the target and change its energy 
before scattering out or creating a prompt gamma ray. This can lead to much uncertainty within 
the system. One way to correct this is to use associated particle imaging (API) (Beyerle et al., 
1990; Chichester et al., 2005). This system includes a either D-T or D-D fusion source. When the 
interaction occurs in the source and creates an energetic neutron, the associated charged 4He or 
3He nuclei, respectively, moves in the opposite direction due to conservation of momentum and 
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 is detected. The time and angle at which the charged particle is detected signals the time of 
creation and resultant incident angle of the neutron. If the neutron is not directed toward the 
target, any secondary radiation detected is ignored by the system (Sudac et al., 2007). If, on the 
other hand, the initial neutron is directed at the target, then the time until the secondary prompt 
gamma ray or scattered neutron interacts within the detector is used to determine if the neutron 
interacted only once. If so, it is counted by the system. Otherwise, it is neglected. The total time 
of flight (TOF) of the neutron can also be used to determine its energy. The additional 
information helps to reduce sources of uncertainty in the explosives detection system. Portable 
neutron imaging devices have been developed with yields of at least 1 x 108 neutrons per second 
and weighing 12 kg, which could prove useful for many explosives detection scenarios 
(Chichester et al., 2007). 
 Explosives detection methods 
In order to find explosives, active neutron interrogation methods rely on identifying the 
signature chemical makeup that most explosive materials possess. Many of the commonly used 
explosives have high nitrogen content (Gozani, 1994). This relatively large amount of nitrogen, 
compared to other elements common in explosives, such as hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen, is 
what neutron based detection systems look for (Buffler and Tickner, 2010). The abnormally high 
nitrogen content is used as a flag when searching for explosives.  Some of the explosives that can 
be detected are trinitrotoluene (TNT), cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (RDX), ammonium nitrate, 
composition 4 (C-4), pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), and Semtex 1A (Gozani and Strellis, 
2007; Sudac et al., 2008). Unfortunately, not all explosives are rich in nitrogen, such as 
triacetone triperoxide (TATP), which has been used by several terrorist groups, including shoe 
bomber Richard Reid in 2001 (Dubnikova et al., 2002). Furthermore, many other items of 
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 concern, such as guns and knives, would go undetected by all active neutron interrogation 
methods besides neutron transmission. Additionally, benign materials, such as rubber, silk, and 
nylon, may have high nitrogen content which could trigger false alarms (Cinausero et al., 2004).  
Although they are unable to detect all types of explosives, systems employing the various 
active neutron interrogation methods can be used in a wide array of applications. Their ability to 
detect both small and bulk explosives means they can be deployed to search automobiles and 
cargo containers. They can also be used for baggage and freight inspection at airports (Runkel et 
al., 2009). There is also ongoing research exploring usage of these systems to search for land 
mines and roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Narcotics and chemical agents, which 
are additional contrabands of interest to border security, also contain relatively high nitrogen 
levels or specific carbon to oxygen ratios and can be readily identified using neutron 
interrogation (Vourvopoulos and Womble, 2001; Gozani and Strellis, 2007). 
Neutron-based Explosives Interrogation Systems 
 There are several different types of active neutron interrogation methods, each with its 
unique advantages and disadvantages. The various methods are summarized in Table 2. The 
system designer must decide what elements he or she wants to search for and how high their 
associated neutron flux can be, then determine the best method to fit these requirements. The 
section will review such systems. 
 Thermal neutron analysis (TNA) 
 Thermal neutron analysis (TNA) takes advantage of the characteristic radiation released 
by activated nuclei (Gozani et al., 1989). In this method, thermal neutrons, with energy around 
0.025 eV, are used. While some of these passing through the object do so without interaction, 
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 others are absorbed through a characteristic (n, γ) reaction with nuclei within the target. The new 
nuclei created in the absorption process are placed in an excited state. In order for the nuclei to 
move to a stable state, they release a gamma ray with a characteristic energy dependent on the 
nuclei absorbing the neutrons. By using a spectroscopic gamma ray detector, the relative 
amounts of each of these elements can be determined by looking for these unique characteristic 
energy peaks in the gamma ray spectra. Generally, a high peak at nitrogen’s characteristic energy 
is used separately, or in conjunction, with other flags to signal the presence of suspicious 
material. 
 The theory of TNA for explosives detection has been around since the 1980s and several 
systems have been designed to use it to search for explosives (Davies et al., 1987, Gozani et al., 
1989, Brown and Gozani, 1997, McFee et al., 1998). TNA primarily searches for nitrogen and 
hydrogen, because when these nuclei absorb a thermal neutron, they emit a 10.8 and 2.2 MeV 
gamma ray, respectively (Buffler, 2004). Originally developed as a means to detect most solid 
explosives, TNA has also been applied to the detection of drugs, liquid explosives, and buried 
land mines due to its ability to also detect chlorine (Brown and Gozani, 1997; McFee et al., 
1998). More recently, the relative amounts of hydrogen, carbon, and nitrogen were determined 
for various samples when placed in a beam of thermal neutrons from a research reactor (Im et al., 
2006). A “small parcel explosive detection system” was created which employed TNA to scan 
packages. In tests, the system was able to determine 0.1 – 1.0 L of concealed liquid explosives 
and chemical weapons threats 90% of the time and provided false alarms 1% of the time with 
measurement times of 60 s. Also, the system was able to distinguish between live and inert 
explosive ordinances 100% of the time employing measurement times of 60 s (Shaw et al., 
2005).  
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 A pulsed TNA device is being developed which uses graphite to moderate the neutrons of 
a pulsed D-T generator until they reach thermal energies. Once the thermal neutron flux is 
sufficiently characterized, it should be possible to determine the chemical makeup of materials 
and detect explosives using multiple thermal neutron pulses. Additionally, the detectors will also 
have the ability to detect fast neutrons, which will allow the system to search for fissionable 
materials once the thermal neutrons induce fission (Favalli and Pendersen, 2007).  
TNA has proved an effective detection method. It is employed in a commercial system 
for determining the location of anti-tank mines (Clifford et al., 1999; Clifford et al., 2007) and 
more recently, land mines and other explosive remnants containing as little as 20 g of hydrogen 
(Brooks et al., 2012). Although the cost and time required to use TNA for demining is increased 
compared to more conventional methods, it can be justified for more complicated situations such 
as important infrastructure and industrial areas (Cinausero et al., 2004). It was shown that 
replacing a 252Cf source and moderator with a D- T source and moderator improved the TNA 
method for landmine detection both for deeper mines and when the system is not directly over 
the mine (Haslip et al., 2001). 
 Fast neutron analysis (FNA) 
 One improvement to the previous method is to increase the energy of the neutrons in a 
technique known as fast neutron analysis (FNA) (Gozani, 1994). Instead of relying on thermal 
neutron absorption like TNA, FNA exploits the inelastic scatter of fast neutrons off characteristic 
nuclei such as nitrogen, oxygen, and carbon. The ratio of these three elements in explosives is 
quite specific (Buffler, 2004). For an inelastic collision, when the fast neutron is incident on the 
nucleus, a new, lower energy neutron is emitted and is accompanied by a characteristic gamma 
ray. The cross sections for inelastic scatter vary by nuclei as well as neutron energy and are 
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 generally smaller than capture cross sections for thermal neutrons, meaning fewer interactions 
per unit flux (Buffler, 2004). A collimated beam of fast neutrons is typically directed at the 
target. By comparing the relative numbers of detected characteristic gamma rays, an operator or 
automated computer program can make a determination as to whether the target constitutes a 
threat. If the characteristic gamma rays are detected in ratios similar to conventional explosives, 
a red flag is raised and the package can be examined more thoroughly. As an example, FNA was 
used in a prototype system that was remotely controlled and employed a D-T generator and high-
purity germanium detectors to interrogate vehicles for IEDs (Koltick et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, researchers have investigated FNA for use in conjunction with coded 
aperture imaging to examine airport luggage and cargo containers. Coded aperture imaging 
works by placing shielding material over specific parts of the detector. Gamma rays interact with 
the detector after having passed through the unshielded part of the aperture. Given the pattern of 
the interactions on the detector and the configuration of the aperture, it is possible to determine 
the distribution of the source within a volume (Lanza and Zhang, 1999). Instead of a narrow 
beam of neutrons, this method uses a field of fast neutrons that interact throughout the item of 
interest simultaneously. The neutrons undergo an inelastic scattering interaction within the target 
and create characteristic gamma rays. Theoretically, by using coded aperture imaging, the system 
is able to determine the location of the interaction and therefore, the elemental makeup of 
specific regions within the target. The method is able to determine the mass of a sucrose sample 
to within 7% and determine its molar ratio of carbon to oxygen to within 4%, but needs further 
investigation for use in high background and three-dimensional applications (Accorsi and Lanza, 
2001). 
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 This method has an advantage over TNA because more of the elements present in 
explosives emit characteristic gamma rays during FNA. For TNA, the process usually just looks 
for high nitrogen content and hydrogen, but with FNA, the signal also includes information about 
the concentration of oxygen and carbon, which have unique concentrations relative to one 
another and nitrogen in explosives. Therefore, the additional information gained through FNA 
can be used to eliminate some of the false alarms associated with TNA (Singh and Singh, 2003).  
 One major drawback to this method is the large background noise associated with FNA 
(Gozani, 1994). The fast neutrons, once scattered, can interact within the gamma ray detectors 
and distort the gamma ray signal coming from the target. It is possible to shield these neutrons, 
but the detector efficiency must be sacrificed. One way to limit the fast neutron background is to 
use associated particle imaging. This method has allowed for preliminary detection of 
underwater TNT (Sudac et al., 2011). Another option is to use a pulsed beam of fast neutrons, as 
described in the next sub-section. 
 Pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA) and pulsed fast/thermal neutron analysis (PFTNA) 
 To reduce the background signal in FNA, the fast neutrons are released in short pulses in 
an approach termed pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA). Gamma rays traveling at the speed of 
light move about seven times faster than the neutrons used in PFNA, in which 8 and 14 MeV 
neutrons have velocities of 3.9 and 5.2 cm ns-1, respectively (Gozani, 1995). Releasing the 
neutrons in short pulses allows for any gamma rays that are created during an inelastic collision 
to reach the detector before the scattered neutrons that accompany them. The gammas rays from 
the target are counted first, and when the neutrons interact later within the detector and create 
additional gamma rays, the system discriminates and neglects them. Recently, hydrogen, carbon, 
and oxygen concentrations were determined in a variety of materials of interest using a 14 MeV 
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 PFNA source and a LaBr3:Ce detector (Naqvi et al., 2013). Additionally, Compton cameras have 
been investigated for use in PFNA to determine the elemental compositions at a localized point 
within the target (Farahmand et al., 2007). Compton cameras, originally used with gamma ray 
astronomy and medical imaging, detect the Compton scatter of a photon on one plane of a 
detector, and the photoelectric absorption of the same photon on another. Given the angle of 
scatter and final energy of the photon, the incident angle of the photon can be determined. With 
enough events, the source of the photons can be determined (Todd et al., 1974).  
After the fast neutrons interact in the target, some of them become thermalized through 
multiple interactions (Buffler, 2004). These thermal neutrons can then be absorbed in the 
nitrogen nuclei, just like in TNA, and release characteristic prompt gamma rays which are then 
recorded. Fast/thermal neutron analysis (FTNA) takes advantage of the already preset thermal 
neutrons to obtain more information about the object being interrogated. FTNA, combining the 
principles of PFNA and TNA, performs the equivalent of two separate interrogations at once, 
looking for both characteristic neutron absorption and neutron  inelastic scatter gamma rays. 
Furthermore, the neutron generator can be cycled in such a way to allow for neutron 
thermalization between pulses. This is known as pulsed fast/thermal neutron analysis (PFTNA). 
In this case, the target is hit with fast neutrons for about 10 µs and the gamma rays from the 
inelastic fast neutron collisions are detected, similar to PFNA. The generator is turned off for 90 
µs while the neutrons from the initial pulse thermalize within the target. Some of these 
thermalized neutrons are absorbed by nitrogen, hydrogen, and chlorine nuclei in the target and 
characteristic gamma rays are released. This cycle is repeated for a set number of times. Finally, 
the sample is allowed to sit for an extended time period while any characteristic gamma rays 
from previously activated nuclei with slightly longer half-lives, such as silicon or phosphorous, 
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 are released (Vourvopoulos and Womble, 2001). The combination of multiple detection 
techniques in PFTNA assists in determining the composition of the target. The relative amounts 
of carbon, oxygen, and nitrogen can be obtained with PFNA; the presence of nitrogen, hydrogen, 
and chlorine in the target can be determined with TNA; and by looking for delayed gamma rays, 
silicone and phosphorous can also be detected. This in turn helps the operator make a more 
accurate determination of the unknown material within a package and assess whether or not it is 
a threat. 
Many advances have been occurring in the fields of FTNA and PFTNA. Preliminary tests 
have shown the ability of an FTNA detection system to correctly determine gamma ray 
signatures of nitrogen rich targets as small as 3.8 L when compared to inert targets (Brewer et al., 
2012). A handheld PFTNA system was developed and tested using a 14.1 MeV D-T neutron 
generator that determined the elemental content of packages in field demonstrations (Womble et 
al., in 2001). It correctly verified the carbon to oxygen and nitrogen to oxygen ratios to within a 
few percent for C-4, TNT, and RDX explosives. Also, the use of PFTNA was investigated for 
the interrogation of larger objects, such as cargo containers (Vourvopoulos and Womble, 2001), 
while other researchers have attempted to design a CsI(Tl) detector that will be able to provide a 
multi-color picture of the object during PFTNA (Evans et al., 1999).  Using PFTNA, researchers 
have shown it is possible to find 2 kg of cocaine hidden behind 85 cm of cement (Dokhale et al., 
2001). More recently, a PFNA system was deployed in an airport in Houston, Texas. It uses a 
Van de Graaff accelerator to obtain neutron pulses on the order of several nanoseconds for TOF 
information and is able to obtain three dimensional images of airplane cargo containers (Strellis 
et al., 2009). Finally, artificial neural networks have been applied to help in identifying 
explosives from gamma ray spectra (Nunes et al., 2002). 
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  Fast neutron scattering analysis (FNSA) or neutron elastic scatter (NES) 
 Another detection technique is fast neutron scattering analysis (FNSA) or neutron elastic 
scatter (NES). Many explosives have a chemical signature that is high in nitrogen and also 
contains carbon, oxygen, and hydrogen. All of these elements have a relatively low atomic mass, 
which allows for a neutron to transfer a substantial amount of energy during an elastic collision. 
In elastic collisions, when the neutron interacts with a nucleus it immediately transfers energy as 
it bounces off. If the initial energy of the neutron is known, and if both the neutron’s scattering 
angle and scattered energy are determined by detectors, then the mass of the nucleus can be 
calculated (Buffler, 2004). The common elements in explosives have nuclei with different 
masses. Therefore, by using this method the relative amounts of each element can be determined 
based on the energy and angle of scatter of the detected neutrons.  
The benefit of this technique is that for most nuclides, the probability of elastic scatter is 
larger than either inelastic scatter or neutron capture. This allows for a stronger signal at lower 
flux, reducing the activation and required shielding. This method requires the ability to 
determine the energy of a scattered neutron, but the energy discrimination for neutron detectors 
is not nearly as good as gamma ray detectors. However, NES does show promise. 
Experimentally, it was shown that atom fractions of a small sample between 0.2 and 0.8 kg could 
be determined (Buffler et al., 2001). Also, computer simulations were run that helped 
characterize the scattering of fast neutrons in explosive materials (Lehnert and Kearfott, 2011b). 
If this detection method can be further improved, it would allow for explosives detection in 
airports or when searching for land mines (Brooks et al., 2004). 
  
24 
 
 Neutron transmission/Fast Neutron Radiography 
 Because neutrons attenuation varies based on neutron energy and the materials they are 
passing through, their transmission through a target reveals some unique information about the 
elemental makeup. Using a 252Cf source, it is possible to search for nitrogen and oxygen in the 
target. Both of these elements have neutron absorption resonances and the energy spectrum of 
the transmitted neutrons will show a decrease at these resonance energies compared to a sample 
that contained no nitrogen or hydrogen (Gokhale and Hussein, 1997). Also, looking at the ratio 
of fast neutron transmission to gamma ray transmission can help provide an idea as to the type of 
material in a target air cargo container (Eberhardt et al., 2005). This method allows for the 
determination of the density of materials as well as their class of composition: organic, glass or 
ceramic, or metal. 
 One of the advantages of neutron transmission is that it does not require a strong source 
because it is looking for neutrons that do not interact in the target. Since neutrons tend to have a 
relatively low interaction probability, most of them will pass through the target and contribute a 
signal to the system (Gokhale and Hussein, 1997; Sowerby and Tickner, 2007). However, 
neutron transmission cannot identify as many elements as some other active neutron 
interrogation methods and traditionally only determined high concentrations of certain elements, 
such as nitrogen. 
More recent advances in neutron transmission, known as fast neutron radiography, have 
shown promise. By combining neutron and gamma ray transmission, fast neutron/gamma ray 
radiography can determine the average composition of an unknown target material. This is either 
accomplished using separate compact D-D or D-T sources for the neutrons and a 60Co source for 
the gamma rays, or a high energy accelerator that pulses both particles (Sowerby and Tickner, 
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 2007).  Alternatively, a variable-energy, quasi-monoenergetic neutron source can be employed to 
interrogate the target through fast neutron resonance radiography. By having a variety of source 
neutron energies, it is possible to take advantage of multiple attenuation resonances to 
differentiate between hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen (Overley, 1985). This can be 
achieved either through a broadband pulsed spectrum neutron generator and TOF measurements 
or kinematic reactions in an accelerator where neutron energy is dependent on the incident 
deuterium energy and the neutron emission angle (Lanza, 2007).  One such broadband pulsed 
time-of-flight system that was developed initially had an explosives detection rate of 88% with a 
false alarm rate of 2%, which was improved to 93% and 3.4%, respectively (Overley et al., 1997; 
Overley et al., 2005). Additionally, the creation of a novel integrative detector that uses a plastic 
fiber scintillator screen has enhanced fast neutron energy discrimination via improved TOF 
measurements (Mor et al., 2009).  The kinematic method has also shown promise in simulations, 
but proven difficult in practice due to excessive secondary gamma ray contamination from the 
neutron source (Raas et al., 2005). Both fast neutron resonance radiography methods also require 
relatively complicated accelerators and implementation (Sowerby and Tickner, 2007). 
 Alternative and combined technologies 
 Many of the previously discussed methods of neutron interrogation have been adapted 
and applied to landmine detection. Several groups have looked at the ability of hydrogen rich 
explosives to thermalize fast neutrons and backscatter them (McFee et al., 2003; Datema et al., 
2003; Brooks et al., 2004). When scanning a location for a possible landmine with a neutron 
flux, the higher concentration of backscattered neutrons from hydrogen in the landmine indicates 
its presence. Several detectors have been designed specifically for this application and shown 
some success (Fioretto et al., 2004; Bom et al., 2004; Elsheikh et al., 2012). 
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 Recently, several explosives detection systems have been designed or built that 
incorporate both the more traditional x-ray inspection systems and active neutron interrogation 
systems (Valković et al., 2007; Carasco et al., 2008; Al-Bahi et al., 2013). A system has already 
been deployed for field testing in the port of Rijeka in Croatia which uses x-ray images to 
determine any suspicious objects within a large cargo container. If an object raises concern, then 
a D-T neutron source is used to interrogate that particular area. It uses “tagged” neutrons with an 
API to determine the time between creation of the initial neutron and the detection of FNA 
characteristic gamma rays (Carasco et al., 2008). In a different study, it was shown that by 
looking at the FNA peaks for oxygen and carbon as well as the neutron transmission peak, the 
explosive Semtex 1A was distinguished from other organic materials, provided the density of the 
target was known (Sudac et al., 2008). 
 Another system under development aims to combine any number of interrogation 
techniques to obtain information. This method could use TNA, FNA, and NES in conjunction 
with gamma ray transmission to obtain information about the target and then compare that 
information to a library of threat templates that have already been analyzed and stored in its 
memory (Dunn et al., 2007). A different system is trying to use a cylindrical inertial electrostatic 
device, which is capable of creating D-T and D-D neutrons and 80 keV x-rays as a line-like 
source. By combining line source TNA and PFNA with x-ray interrogation, the system hopes to 
decrease scan time and false alarm rates associated with neutron beams (Wu et al., 2007). A 
different experiment, first simulated with a Monte Carlo numerical code, found that observing 
the slowing down of fast neutrons by hydrogen; the scattering of fast neutrons by carbon, 
nitrogen, and oxygen; and the Compton scattering of gamma rays due to the object’s density, 
provide three useful indicators as to the composition of the object (Hussein et al., 2005). 
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 Development is continuing on a portable active neutron interrogation system that utilizes D-T 
and D-D generators for TNA and FNA, with comparisons of laboratory benchmark 
measurements to Monte Carlo simulations (Alfonso et al., 2013). Combining signals from fast 
and inelastic neutron scatter is also being investigated (Lehnert and Kearfott, 2011a, Lehnert et 
al., 2012).  
 Although systems designed to search for illicit nuclear material is beyond the scope of 
this work, the active neutron interrogation methods discussed here can also be applied to that 
mission. When irradiating a target to search for conventional explosives, the neutrons may also 
stimulate the release of characteristic radiation from special nuclear material. If the system is 
properly calibrated, these signatures can be detected as well (Valković et al., 2007; Mihalczo and 
Mullens, 2012; Alfonso et al., 2013). This dual use encourages increased deployment while 
minimizing the cost and expense of fielding multiple systems. 
 Feasibility of explosives detection using neutrons 
 In a published review the National Academy of Sciences suggested that the x-ray 
screening systems already in place at airports were currently sufficient for explosives detection 
and recommended that a working prototype pulsed neutron system for luggage interrogation not 
be constructed (National Research Council, 2002). The abilities of the system were no better than 
the x-ray method, while the cost and size made implementation impractical. However, the report 
does suggest further laboratory research so as to be prepared for any new explosives detection 
challenges that may arise. It has been suggested by Buffler (2004) that the use of a fast neutron 
interrogation system may be better suited for application as a second or third tier screening 
device. Only after a possible threat had been identified by x-ray screening would the package be 
interrogated. Therefore, each package would have more time to be examined, which would lead 
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 to better results. Also, the number of systems, and hence the price of implementing them, could 
be reduced as the number of packages screened would not be as large. 
Conclusion 
Advances in active neutron interrogation steadily continue.  Various aspects of the 
systems, such as neutron generators, electronics, signal acquisition, and analysis algorithms, are 
improving (Gozani and Strellis, 2007). Furthermore, the cost and size of neutron and gamma ray 
detectors will continue to decline. This allows for cheaper and expanded deployment of neutron 
interrogation-based explosives detection systems. 
For further improvement, several of the methods can be combined. If PFTNA can be 
combined with FNSA, both the inelastically and elastically scattered neutrons contribute a signal. 
This is a more efficient use of the neutron source, and as a result, fewer neutrons would be 
needed to determine if a target is a threat. These methods could be used in conjunction with non-
nuclear based devices to reduce the required neutron flux further. This would increase the 
throughput of the system while reducing the amount of activation and potential dose. 
Additionally, the lower neutron flux would require less shielding, reducing the weight and size of 
the system. 
Active neutron interrogation systems are an interesting alternative to other explosives 
detection methods. Their unique approach allows for detection of explosives that other systems 
may miss due to high density shielding or disguised contraband. However, they cannot detect all 
explosives or other illegal items, such as guns and knives. As the technology continues to 
improve, active neutron interrogation should be further explored as a possible replacement 
detection method or solution to new, unique problems. 
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 Tables 
Table 2.1: Summary of types of neutron sources, with advantages and disadvantages for use in 
active neutron interrogation systems for conventional explosives. 
Neutron 
source Examples Advantages Disadvantages 
Fission 252Cf Small Can't be turned "off"  
  Relatively 
inexpensive 
Not monoenergetic 
    
(α, n) Am/Be, Pu/Be Small Can't be turned "off" 
  Relatively 
inexpensive 
Not monoenergetic 
    
Photonuclear 9Be or 2H  Can be nearly 
monoenergetic 
Photon source can't be 
turned off 
 with 24Na, 28Al, or 
38Cl 
Small High gamma ray background 
 Relatively 
inexpensive 
 
    
Fusion 
generator 
D-D, D-T Can be nearly 
monoenergetic  
Expensive 
    Can be turned off Associated electronics make 
it larger than other sources 
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 Table 2.2: Summary of active neutron interrogation methods, including their advantages and 
disadvantages for conventional explosives detection. 
Active neutron 
interrogation method 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Thermal Neutron Analysis 
(TNA) 
Detects nitrogen and 
hydrogen 
Does not detect carbon or 
oxygen 
 Higher interaction probability 
than FNA 
 
   
Fast Neutron Analysis (FNA) Detects nitrogen, carbon, and 
oxygen 
High neutron background 
 Neutron moderation not 
required 
Relatively low fast neutron 
interaction cross section 
   
Pulsed Fast/Thermal 
Neutron Analysis 
Detects hydrogen, carbon, 
nitrogen, oxygen, chlorine, 
silicone, and phosphorous 
Lower interaction probability 
than NES 
 Low neutron background 
compared to TNA and FNA 
 
   
Neutron Elastic Scatter 
(NES) 
Higher interaction probability 
than neutron absorption 
Determination of final 
neutron energy is difficult 
 In theory, can detect all low 
atomic number elements 
Can only detect low atomic 
mass nuclides 
 Low neutron background  
   
Neutron transmission/Fast 
Neutron Radiography 
Lower flux necessary since 
transmission is likely 
Requires neutrons of various 
energies 
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 CHAPTER 3: USE OF MULTIPLE LAYERS OF REPEATING 
MATERIAL TO EFFECTIVELY COLLIMATE AN 
ISOTROPIC NEUTRON SOURCE 
 
Abstract 
This research was conducted to determine the optimal way to shield a compact, isotropic 
neutron source into a beam for active interrogation neutron systems. To define the restricted 
emission angle and to protect nearby personnel when standoff distances are limited, shielding 
materials were added around the source. Due to limited space in many locations where active 
neutron interrogation is employed, a compact yet effective design was desired. Using the Monte 
Carlo N-Particle Transport Code, several shielding geometries were modeled. Materials 
investigated were polyethylene, polyethylene enriched with 10B, water, bismuth, steel, nickel, 
Inconel 600, tungsten, lead, and depleted uranium. Various simulations were run testing the 
individual materials and combinations of them. It was found that at a standoff distance of 1.5 m 
from the source, the most effective shielding configuration is a combination of several layers of 
polyethylene and steel. Without any shielding, the dose is 3.71 x 10-15 Sv per source particle. 
With a shielding consisting of multiple layers of steel totaling 30 cm thick, interspersed with 
several layers of polyethylene totaling 20 cm thick, the dose drops to 3.68 x 10-17 Sv per emitted 
neutron at π radians opposite the shield opening.  The layered shielding approach is more 
effective at reducing dose equivalent and neutron fluence than shields made out of single 
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 continuous layers of the same material and thicknesses. Adding boron to the polyethylene and 
substituting tungsten for steel would make the shielding more effective, but add mass and cost. 
Introduction 
 Compact neutron sources are used for a variety of active neutron interrogation 
techniques, including special nuclear material detection (Hall et al., 2007), explosives detection 
at ports and border crossings (Lehnert and Kearfott, 2010), and landmine detection (Clifford et 
al., 1999; Cinausero et al., 2004). In general, the neutron sources used are  isotropic. However, 
many of the applications could benefit from a narrow neutron beam instead of an isotropic 
source. 
There are many options for an active interrogation neutron source, including, but not 
limited to: spontaneous fission sources such as 252Cf; sources that pair two isotopes, one alpha 
emitting and the other that absorbs the alpha particle and emits a neutron, including plutonium 
beryllium, americium beryllium, and americium lithium; photoneutron sources containing 9Be 
and 2H; and portable accelerators that create neutrons through deuterium-deuterium (D-D) and 
deuterium-tritium (D-T) fusion reactions (Knoll, 2010). In all of these cases, the neutrons are 
released with an isotropic or nearly isotropic angular distribution. This is not a desirable feature 
for most active neutron interrogation systems for a variety of reasons, including safety and signal 
interpretation. 
In the case of neutron elastic scatter, if the angle of approach of the neutrons is unknown, 
the information gathered by the active neutron interrogation system cannot be properly analyzed 
due to an unknown incidence angle (Buffler, 2004; Lehnert and Kearfott, 2011). Furthermore, 
the neutrons created in the source that are not initially directed at the target may interact with 
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 other objects within the vicinity of the source. The scattered neutrons or their secondary radiation 
could interact in the system’s detectors and create an undesired signal that makes determination 
of the materials within the target more difficult. Additionally, active neutron interrogation 
systems search for illicit materials within a larger object. If the source is not shielded, then the 
neutrons will hit a large cross section of the target all at once. If contraband is detected, it can be 
difficult to determine its exact location. Finally, the large neutron fluxes associated with these 
systems pose a radiation health risk for personnel or civilians near the source. 
The problems associated with active neutron interrogation discussed above can be 
mitigated by using appropriate materials to selectively shield the neutron source. An isotropic 
source can be shielded such that a majority of the neutrons emitted at a specified angle are 
unattenuated. Most of the neutrons emitted at other angles are scattered, usually multiple times, 
within the shielding material. They are either eventually absorbed within the shield or exit it at 
lower energies. It is desirable to collimate neutron sources into a beam in active neutron 
interrogation systems. Fewer neutrons scattering in the environment contribute to a cleaner 
signal in the detector and a reduced dose to nearby personnel. Furthermore, a well collimated 
beam allows the operator to know the incidence angle of the neutrons and systematically work 
the neutron beam over the target while investigating specific target volumes. 
The purpose of this research was to determine the optimal shielding to allow for 14.1 
MeV D-T source neutrons to emerge from the shielding at one angle unattenuated, while limiting 
the emissions of neutrons at all other angles. Although there are a number of possible sources 
that can be used in active neutron interrogation, the D-T source has seen widespread use (Pesente 
et al., 2004; Aleksandrov et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2007; Carasco et al., 2008). As opposed to 
fission sources, alpha-neutron sources, and photoneutron sources, a D-T generator can be turned 
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 off and will stop emitting neutrons, which is a desirable safety feature. Additionally, the energy 
of D-T neutrons is higher than the average energy of any of the other sources. Therefore, any 
shielding designs appropriate for D-T generators can be scaled for lower energy neutrons 
produced by other sources. 
It is not very difficult to shield neutrons if size and mass of the shielding is not an issue. 
If enough moderating material is placed between the source and the area of interest, the neutron 
fluence can be reduced to appropriate levels. However, in many instances where active neutron 
interrogation is used, such as airports, border crossings, and shipping ports, space is at a 
premium. In the case of landmine detection, the entire system, including shielding, must be 
portable. As a result, large, stationary neutron shields are not appropriate. Instead, an alternative 
shielding arrangement must be found that is more compact and effective. 
Shielding fast neutrons, compared to other forms of ionizing radiation, has presented a 
unique challenge from the near beginning of the nuclear age to the present time (Fermi and Zinn, 
1957; Studenski and Kearfott, 2007). Due to their lack of charge, neutrons tend to pass through 
materials with relative ease. This makes them ideal for searching for hidden contraband. 
However, this also means neutron shielding must be approached differently than other types of 
ionizing radiation. For neutrons with energy near 14 MeV, medium to high atomic number 
materials; such as iron, nickel, and lead, have higher attenuation cross sections compared to low 
atomic number materials; such as hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen (Shultis and Faw, 1996). For 
neutrons in the keV – MeV range, elastic scatter is the primary interaction with low atomic 
number elements, and a likely interaction with medium to high atomic number elements. 
Conservation of energy and momentum show that, on average, a neutron will lose more energy 
per elastic collision with lighter nuclei than it will with heavier nuclei. As neutrons lose energy, 
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 the capture cross sections of most nuclei increase, which makes neutron capture more likely. 
Therefore, an effective method of neutron attenuation is through multiple elastic collisions with 
light nuclei. Hence, lighter nuclides are commonly used for shielding neutrons. However, iron 
and other similar elements have large attenuation cross sections and should not be entirely 
discounted. Each type of material has its own advantages and disadvantages when it comes to 
shielding neutrons, but if they are combined, the best properties of both materials can be 
employed. 
Using layers of materials to shield neutrons was first proposed by Morrison (Morrison, 
1957). Repeating layers of hydrogenous material and higher atomic number material work to 
slow and absorb neutrons, then shield any secondary gamma rays created. Additional research 
was done to Morrison’s proposed design by Greene and Thomas in 1969 (Greene and Thomas, 
1969), which was then expanded upon by Maruyama and Bouts in 1972. Several different 
shielding configurations were set up and tested in a lab. The materials tested included steel, 
polyethylene, borated wood, and borated polyethylene. A neutron source was set up on the 
opposite side of the shielding from a neutron detector. After taking measurements, the ideal 
shielding design was found to include polyethylene and steel with 5 cm of polyethylene close to 
the source in order to reduce activation of the steel, then 25 cm of steel, then 5 cm of 
polyethylene, an additional 5 cm of steel, 5 more cm of polyethylene, and finally 5 cm of steel, 
for a shield thickness of 50 cm. Each of these measurements required setting up and 
deconstruction of heavy materials, which would be time-consuming and limit the number of 
configurations that could be tested. Now, with advanced simulation methods, it is possible to try 
a much larger variety of materials and shielding combinations in order to find an optimal 
configuration.  
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 Neutron shielding materials can then be used to make an isotropic source appear more 
like a neutron beam. Constructing a “beam” of neutrons is important in medical neutron therapy 
(Lundberg, 1973; Brahme, 1984; Mollon, 1987) and has also been considered for active neutron 
interrogation as well (Kearfott, 2008). The prevalence of isotropic neutron sources coupled with 
the difficulty in attenuating neutrons makes obtaining a monodirectional beam difficult. 
Additionally, since active neutron interrogation systems tend to be deployed in areas with limited 
space, the shielding size and mass is another important factor to consider. 
In this paper, several new shielding configurations for D-T generators are discussed and 
their neutron shielding effectiveness is examined. Also, data are presented that show that the 
layered shielding approach is effective at maintaining a beam of unattenuated neutrons at the 
shield opening while significantly reducing the neutron flux at all other angles.  
Materials and Methods 
 Due to the extended time required and high cost involved with testing so many shielding 
variations, real measurements in a laboratory could not be performed. Instead, the shielding 
design optimizations were performed as simulations in a Monte Carlo radiation transport 
computer program. The program used was the Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code 
(MCNP)1. A post processing computer code was written and executed in a commercially 
available mathematics parser2 to extract data from the MCNP output, which was then collected 
and graphed in a commercially available spreadsheet3 for analysis and comparison. 
1 computer code Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport version 5 (Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 
87545, 2006). 
2 computer program MATLAB (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA 01760-2098, 2006). 
3 computer program Microsoft Excel (Microsoft Corp., Redmond, WA 98052, 2007). 
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  Several materials were tested in the simulations: water; polyethylene; borated 
polyethylene; steel; nickel; Inconel 600, a nickel alloy; tungsten; lead; bismuth; and depleted 
uranum. Water, polyethylene, and borated polyethylene were chosen because of their ability to 
moderate and absorb neutrons. Materials with medium to heavy elements, such as steel and 
tungsten, were chosen because they were listed as effective, dense materials for shielding 
neutrons (Shultis and Faw, 1996; Hussein, 2003). The chemical composition and density of all 
materials tested can be found in Table 3.1. The use of some of the medium to higher atomic 
number materials could lead to neutron activation and was investigated (Hussein, 2003). In one 
arrangement, lead was used as an additional outside layer to attenuate any secondary gamma rays 
that may escape the shielding. 
 All of the shielding arrangements were a variation on the same design. The materials 
were arranged in a cylinder, 100 cm in length, with a typical radius of 66 cm. An isotropic 14.1 
MeV neutron point source was placed at the center of the cylinder. One end of the cylinder had a 
hole in it 50 cm deep, with a radius of 16 cm. The shielding consisted of layers 5 cm thick. Each 
layer could have its material varied independently. The solid angle of the unattenuated neutron 
beam is about 1.14 steradians, which is equivalent to a cone subtending and angle of just over 
35°. The solid angle was designed to meet the specifications of active neutron interrogation 
research being performed in the investigators’ facility (Lehnert and Kearfott, 2011). 
An example of the shielding can be seen in Figs. 3.1, 3.2, and Appendix A. It was 
surrounded on all sides by air. Several different arrangements of the materials were tested. Each 
specific arrangement is referred to as a geometry. A list of all the geometries simulated can be 
found in Table 3.2, while Fig. 3.3 gives a visual representation of geometries 1 - 14. Geometry 4 
contains the same materials and thickness that were determined as optimal by Maruyama and 
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 Bouts (1972). Geometries 11 – 14 were tested as alternatives to this design. They still consist of 
several alternating layers, however, the thickness of the large steel layer in the center was varied 
and additional alternating layers of steel and polyethylene were added to the outside in order to 
determine if Maruyama and Bouts’ design was the best solution. Geometries 15 – 23 have the 
same layered design as geometry 11, however, various other materials are substituted in for the 
steel or polyethylene in order to test their shielding effectiveness. 
 Two different metrics were used to evaluate the effectiveness of each shielding geometry. 
The first was to simulate the neutron and photon dose equivalent received at several points 
around the shielding. In order to do this, five spheres were constructed in MCNP, each with a 
radius of 25 cm. They were placed 1.5 m from the source at specific angles relative to the 
opening of the shielding. The sphere directly in front of the shielding is considered to be at 0 
radians. The next four were placed at π/4 radians, π/2 radians, 3π/4 radians, and π radians. This 
configuration can be seen in Fig. 3.4. The dose at each of the 5 points was estimated by 
multiplying the estimated neutron and photon fluence at a point at the center of each of the 
spheres by dose conversion factors found in ICRP Publication 51 (1987) and ICRU Report 47 
(1992). The fluence at a point was found using the F5 tally in MCNP. A large enough number of 
particle histories was run in order to keep statistical uncertainty below 5%. 
 The second method used for evaluating the various shielding geometries was to examine 
the estimated energy dependent neutron and photon fluence at the various angles. The F1 tally in 
MCNP 5 was used to determine the energy of each particle crossing the surface of a sphere in the 
simulation in order to estimate fluence. The same spheres as before were used, but in this case 
their interior was set to a vacuum and particles entering the sphere were counted. The energy 
spectra for the neutrons and photons passing through the spheres were generated, then 
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 normalized by the width of their energy bin, and graphed. The neutron and photon fluence 
through each of the spheres was estimated for geometries 0, 1, 3, 4, and 6 – 22. However, since 
the purpose of the shielding is to allow unattenuated neutrons to emerge from the opening while 
attenuating neutrons emitted at all other angles, and the photon dose turned out to be so low, only 
the normalized neutron fluence was plotted.  
In order to limit statistical uncertainty within the spectra, a large number of histories were 
run for each simulation. The number of histories was determined so that uncertainty within each 
energy bin was below 10%. However, in many cases, the uncertainty was below 5%. The 
number of histories required to limit uncertainty was a function of the number of neutrons that 
were simulating crossing the surface of the spheres. As such, the number of histories ran for a 
simulation varied depending on the effectiveness of the shielding.  
 The mass of each geometry was calculated using the density and volume of each of the 
layers. Only the materials listed were taken into account. No support structure or construction 
materials were included in the calculation. 
 There were concerns that the large neutron flux would activate some of the shielding 
materials to the point where their use would be impractical due to the imparted radioactivity and 
the complications that would create. Although full activation analysis is beyond the scope of this 
work, several simulations were run in MCNP to estimate the order of magnitude of the activation 
rate. To do this, an F4 tally, which provides the flux averaged over a cell, was calculated for each 
layer of steel in geometry 11. A multiplication function within MCNP was used to multiply this 
flux by the energy dependent (n,γ), (n,p), (n,2n), and (n,α) cross sections for each naturally 
occurring isotope of iron, manganese, and chromium. The number of new isotopes created by a 
particular reaction with a specific isotope can be determined by the differential equation, 
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dN N N
dt
σϕ λ= − ,      (3.1) 
 
where Nn is the number of new nuclei, Ni is the number of initial nuclei, σ is the reaction cross 
section for the initial nuclei, φ is the neutron flux, λn is the decay constant of the new nuclei, and 
t is time. The equation can be solved for the number of new nuclei as a function of time: 
 
( ) ( )1 ntin
n
NN t e λσϕ
λ
−= − .      (3.2) 
 
Therefore, the activity of the new nuclei, An, is: 
 
( ) ( ), 1 ntn n iA t N e λλ σϕ −= − .     (3.3) 
 
The maximum activity as λnt approaches infinity is then: 
 
max iA N σϕ= .      (3.4) 
 
The F4 tally with the multiplication function provides an estimate of σφ per source neutron 
within the cell. The reaction rates for each isotope were then multiplied by their relative 
abundance within steel and the total number of atoms for each layer. Finally, this was multiplied 
by the generator’s neutron production rate, which was estimated to be 2 x 108 neutrons per 
second. This provided the number of new radioactive isotopes at a given time. λn is already 
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 known, allowing for an estimate of the maximum activity for each isotope.  The maximum 
activities for each isotope in each steel layer were then summed to determine the total maximum 
activity. For these calculations, the steel was assumed to have 2% manganese and 20% 
chromium by weight, in order to account for steel alloys with relatively high amounts of each of 
these elements. 
The same process and assumptions were repeated for the tungsten and nickel in 
geometries 10 and 16, assuming no additives to those shielding materials. For geometry 10, it 
should be noted that the MCNP library used did not have cross section data available for 180W. 
Therefore, it was estimated that the interaction probability of 180W was equal to the largest 
interaction probability of the other isotopes in a given layer. Furthermore, after the interaction 
with the neutron, some of the new nuclei were isotopes that possessed a metastable state.  It was 
not clear how often a reaction would cause a nucleus to go to a metastable state instead of a 
ground state, so the conservative estimate was made to assume it occurred for every reaction. For 
example, 184W absorbed a neutron and became 185mW, which decayed to 185W, which then decays 
by beta emission to 185Re, a stable nucleus. It was assumed that for every 184W nucleus that 
absorbs a neutron, there were two decays. Additionally, if any new nucleus formed and decayed 
to another unstable nucleus, the decay of the progeny nucleus was also accounted for in the 
activity estimate. It was possible that a single reaction could contribute 3 or more decays due to 
metastable states and unstable progeny. 
 Finally, in order to investigate the effectiveness of the shielding and the neutron beam 
intensity, the simulated neutron flux emerging from the opening of the shielding was examined 
for geometry 11. Within MCNP, the neutron flux at varying radial distances from the centerline 
of the opening were estimated.  Planes were constructed parallel to the shielding surface that 
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 contained the opening. Rings 5 cm thick were then constructed on the plane, creating a bull’s-eye 
design with the centerline of the opening passing through the center of the bull’s-eye. Neutrons 
passing through each ring were counted and their energy was tallied. This was done at the 
shielding surface, 25 cm, 50 cm, 100 cm, and 150 cm from the opening surface. The shielding 
was simulated in a vacuum to focus entirely on the shielding materials’ performance.  
Results 
 The dose equivalent at each of the five points surrounding the shielding was estimated for 
both photons and neutrons for geometries 1 – 10 and can be found in Table 3.3. Due to photon 
attenuation within the shielding, the neutron dose is much higher than photon dose, and is the 
primary concern. Lead around the outside of the shielding is unnecessary, while adding over 
3,000 kg to the mass of the shielding, and will not be evaluated further as an exterior photon 
shield. Moreover, the shielding made entirely of water, geometry 2, was not as effective at 
reducing dose as the shielding made of polyethylene, geometry 1, and therefore was not further 
investigated. 
 The relative neutron fluence for each of these geometries at the opening of the shielding, 
0 radians, is shown in Fig. 3.5. There is a visible peak for all the spectra around 14 MeV. 
However, there are also a large number of neutrons with energy below 1 MeV due to multiple 
scattering events. The relative fluence at π/4 radians is also shown in Fig. 3.6. The sphere used to 
determine the fluence is outside the solid angle defined by the shielding opening, and therefore 
gives a good idea of how effective the shielding is. There is still a peak around 14 MeV for all 
the spectra, but the number of neutrons has decreased over two orders of magnitude for every 
geometry except for 0, which is air, and 3, which is less than 6 cm of steel. There are also more 
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 lower energy neutrons than were present at 0 radians. Finally, Fig. 3.7 gives the relative neutron 
fluence at 3π/4 radians. Out of all the spheres, the neutrons must travel the furthest through the 
shielding material to reach this sphere. The peak near 14 MeV is depressed between three and 
four orders of magnitude for all geometries except 0 and 3, when compared to the spectra at 0 
radians. There are also a large number of low energy neutrons, but fewer than compared to the 
spectra at 0 or π/4 radians.  
It is understood that the neutron flux, as simulated, is not a continuous spectra, but rather 
a series of binned counts. However, it was difficult to show multiple histograms on a single 
figure, so a scatter plot was used instead. Be aware that all these spectra represent histograms 
with the points representing the left edge of each bin. 
 According to the simulations, the layered shielding is effective. Even though the same 
thicknesses of each material were used, geometry 4 was more effective at reducing dose than 
either geometry 8 or 9, where there were no repeating layers. Therefore it is important to see if 
geometry 4, which was based on Maruyama and Bouts’ design (1972), is the best layering 
arrangement. Geometries 11 – 14 are all variations on the layering theme. The doses estimated 
outside the shielding for geometry 4 and geometries 11 – 14 can be found in Table 3.4. The dose 
for geometry 11 is the lowest of the five shielding configurations. Figs. 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 are the 
relative energy dependent neutron fluences for air, geometry 4, and geometries 10 – 14 at 0, π/4, 
and 3π/4 radians, respectively. As with the other spectra, there is a peak around 14 MeV at 0 
radians, but it is suppressed by several orders of magnitude at π/4 and 3π/4 radians. 
 Geometry 11 proved to reduce dose equivalent and neutron flux as effectively as 
geometry 4, but its design had more polyethylene and less steel, which reduced the weight. 
Geometries 15 – 22 were all variations on this design. Different materials were switched in for 
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 either the steel or polyethylene. The dose estimates outside the shielding are compiled in Table 
3.5, with geometry 11 also included for reference.  Geometries 16 – 18 had lower total dose 
equivalents at all 5 points around the shielding than geometry 11, while all other geometries had 
larger dose equivalents. At 0 and π/4 radians, geometry 16 was the lowest with about a 28% 
reduction in dose equivalent at π/4 radians. At π/2 – π radians, the lowest dose equivalent was for 
geometry 18, which was nearly a 50% reduction relative to geometry 11. 
 The results of the simulations can be found in Fig. 3.11a and b for 0 radians, 3.12a and b 
for π/4 radians, and 3.13a and b for 3π/4 radians. At 0 radians, the relative neutron fluences are 
about the same as geometry 11. Geometry 18 has a slightly increased neutron fluence below 6 
MeV and mildly decreased fluence above. At π/4 radians, the various relative fluences again are 
all very similar with all of them showing a decreased number of 14.1 MeV neutrons when 
compared to geometry 0. At higher energies, it appears geometry 15 is the highest of the fluences 
and geometry 18 is the lowest. In Fig. 3.13a and b, the fluences become slightly more 
differentiated. Geometries 15, 20, and 21 are clearly higher than the other geometries, while 
above several MeVs, geometries 18 and 19 appear to have the lowest relative fluence. It should 
also be noted that geometry 19, which included depleted uranium, had some neutrons that exceed 
14.1 MeV in all of its fluences. 
The mass of each geometry is given in Table 3.6, with geometry 10 having the maximum 
mass of 17,800 kg and geometry 3 the minimum mass of 352 kg. 
 The results of the activation estimates for steel, nickel, and tungsten were calculated 
using MCNP. The maximum activation of the steel was estimated to be 6.0 x 107 Bq or 1.6 mCi. 
The maximum activation for the nickel was estimated to be 1.2 x 108 Bq or 3.3 mCi. Finally, the 
maximum activation for the tungsten shielding was 2.0 x 109 Bq or 55 mCi. 
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  The simulated neutrons emerging from the opening of geometry 11 were tallied in 
MCNP. The average energy for the neutrons passing through each ring was estimated. The 
results for the plane at the shielding surface, 25 cm, 50 cm, 100 cm, and 150 cm can be seen in 
Fig. 3.14. In an attempt to quantify the neutron beam intensity, the neutron count, normalized by 
the area of each ring, was then multiplied by the average neutron energy for each ring. These 
values can be seen in Fig. 3.15. 
Discussion 
 The various neutron shielding designs are very effective in attenuating not only neutrons, 
but also photons. The dose equivalent for photons was significantly lower than for neutrons for 
every geometry tested. In shielding geometries that used dense, mid to high atomic number 
materials such as steel, lead, and tungsten, the photon dose was nearly two orders of magnitude 
less than the neutron dose equivalent. However, even geometries comprised entirely of 
hydrogenous materials had a photon dose equivalent one order of magnitude less than the 
neutron dose equivalent. This is fortunate. It means that when building neutron shielding 
structures such as these, an exterior lead layer to attenuate secondary photons will not be needed. 
The main concern for dose is from the neutrons. If those can be properly handled, then the 
photon dose should already be under control. 
It was also interesting to note that geometries 8 and 9 provided higher doses at angles 
other than 0 radians when compared to geometry 4. They all used the same amount of materials, 
15 cm of polyethylene and 35 cm of steel, however, when they are layered intermittently, they 
actually provide more of a shielding benefit than when they are separated. Due to the large 
relative mass of high atomic number materials contrasted to the low mass of a neutron, the 
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 energy lost by the neutron in an elastic scatter with a higher atomic number material is minimal. 
By employing multiple layers of the low atomic number and mid to high atomic number 
materials, the neutrons will pass through one or more layers of moderating material and have a 
chance of being slowed and absorbed. If they are not absorbed, they will also pass through 
several layers of higher atomic number scattering material. The neutrons that interact in these 
materials will be scattered through the shielding materials and have additional opportunities to be 
slowed and absorbed by the moderating material. By causing the neutrons to pass through the 
moderating material multiple times via scattering off mid- to high-atomic-number materials, the 
size of the shielding structure can be reduced.  
It should be noted that although the dose equivalent for geometry 9 is larger than 
geometry 4 everywhere except at 0 radians, the neutron dose equivalent a π/2 – π radians was 
actually lower. The larger gamma ray dose equivalent made the total dose equivalent larger for 
geometry 9 than geometry 4, which is most likely the result of neutron capture within the 
polyethylene and outer layers of steel that are not sufficiently shielded. Borated polyethylene 
may reduce the number of neutrons absorbed in the steel and reduce the gamma ray dose 
equivalent. 
An awareness of cost versus benefit is important when examining the data. The borated 
polyethylene in geometry 7 helped to reduce the dose by 8.0%, compared to geometry 4. This is 
due to the large neutron capture cross section of 10B. Owing to the increased cost of obtaining 
borated polyethylene, the relatively small benefit must be weighed against the higher price. The 
layers of tungsten and polyethylene were the most effective at reducing dose, so it would make 
an ideal choice. However, tungsten is much more expensive and could be very costly when 
buying the large amounts needed for this shielding application. 
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  Figs. 3.5 and 3.8 show that the neutrons emerging from the shielding opening are mostly 
in the energy range of 14 MeV. The amount of lower energy neutrons fall off between two to 
three orders of magnitude. There is a large peak near the thermal neutron energy range. This is 
because some neutrons not originally emitted at 0 radians interacted in the shielding material, 
were slowed down, but not absorbed. They were then able to exit the shielding and pass through 
the sphere. The addition of 10B to the polyethylene helped to reduce the number of low energy 
neutrons, but there were still some present. Depending on the application, energy discrimination 
or time-of-flight measurements may be able to help keep track of and neglect the low energy 
neutrons (Buffler, 2004). If only neutrons of a specific energy are examined, this will help 
eliminate some of the noise in the system. 
Neutrons that are initially directed at or are scattered towards the sphere at π/4 radians 
must first travel through the shielding material. Comparing Fig. 3.6 to Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.9 to 
Fig. 3.8 gives a good idea at how effective the shielding is. There is no longer a peak of neutrons 
at 14 MeV. The spectra show that most of the neutrons at this location have a lower energy. This 
corresponds to what was seen in Tables 3.3 – 3.5. As the point of interest moves further from the 
shield opening, the neutrons have to travel through more material and the dose equivalent and 
neutron fluence both decrease quickly. The neutron spectrum for the sphere at 3π/4 radians 
further confirms this. With even more shielding material to pass through, the neutron fluence is 
reduced even further. This would be the ideal place for personnel or detectors to be, because it is 
the most shielded location. 
The layered shielding design, originally proposed by Maruyama and Bouts and adapted 
for study here, was effective at shielding the neutrons at angles other than 0 radians. It reduced 
dose rate surrounding the shielding compared to geometry 1, a pure polyethylene shield, and 
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 geometries 8 and 9, which contained the same thicknesses of steel and polyethylene but were not 
layered. The relative neutron energy spectra of geometry 4 was very similar to the other steel and 
polyethylene layered shielding arrangements, geometries 11 – 14, even though the layers were 
arranged differently. Geometry 11 also was more effective at reducing dose than geometry 4 and 
it contained less steel, so it was lighter. Geometry 11 is a better configuration than geometry 4 
and was investigated further. 
Several other materials were tested using the pattern of layering seen in geometry 11. 
Geometries 19, 20, and 21, which replaced steel with depleted uranium, lead, and bismuth, 
respectively, were not as effective as geometry 11. Additionally, the spectrum for the depleted 
uranium had a small amount of neutrons above 14.1 MeV, which was a result of induced fissions 
and other neutron interactions. These higher energy neutrons are less than ideal, because even 
after multiple collisions, they could still have a relatively high energy and cause confusion within 
any data obtained. In geometry 22, water replaced the polyethylene in geometry 11. This 
substitution proved less effective. Polyethylene is a better moderating material and absorbs more 
slow neutrons when doped with 10B.  
Geometries 16 – 18 were more effective at reducing neutron fluence around the shield 
than geometry 11. Furthermore, the dose equivalent was reduced by nearly 50%. Geometry 16 
replaced the steel in geometry 11 with nickel. Geometry 17 was similar to geometry 16, but 
instead of pure nickel, the nickel alloy Inconel 600 was used, which was less effective. Geometry 
18 also used pure nickel, but the inner layers of polyethylene and nickel were switched. The 
neutron spectra at 0 and π/4 radians showed the neutron fluence for geometry 16 was similar to 
geometry 11, but at lower energies, geometry 18 had a higher relative fluence, while at energies 
above 6 MeV or so, the fluence for geometry 18 was decreased. At 3π/4 radians, both geometry 
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 16 and 18 had spectra that were smaller than geometry 11. This variation in neutron fluence can 
be seen in the dose equivalent estimates as well. The total dose equivalent for geometry 16 was 
lower at 0 and π/4 radians, while geometry 18 had a slightly lower dose equivalent at π/2, 3π/4, 
and π radians. Switching the layer of nickel and polyethylene in geometry 18 changes the 
average energy of the neutrons emerging near the shield opening, which increases the dose 
equivalent. Away from the shield opening, however, the neutrons must pass through a layer of 
moderating material within the large nickel layer, allowing for the scattered neutrons to be 
slowed further. The lowered neutron energy equates to a larger interaction probability, which 
increases shielding effectiveness.  
Another interesting observation from the simulations is that geometry 15, a 
homogenously mixed shielding which was comprised of polyethylene and steel atoms, is 
significantly less effective at shielding neutrons than the layered design. The spectra at π/4 and 
3π/4 radians is larger than geometry 11, which has the same atomic ratio and total density as 
geometry 15. Also, the dose equivalent at all locations simulated is significantly higher than 
geometry 11. At 3π/4 radians, there is over an order of magnitude difference between the two 
shielding configurations. This, combined with geometries 8 and 9’s simulations show the layered 
design is most effective.   
The mass of the shielding geometries differs greatly. The pure polyethylene, geometry 1, 
is the lightest, while the combination of tungsten and polyethylene, geometry 10, is the heaviest. 
Depending on the application, the mass of the shield may be of importance. If the active neutron 
interrogation system is meant to be mobile, then steel and tungsten, although effective shields, 
may not be ideal. If transportation of the shield is important, then water, which is relatively light, 
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 may be a better choice because it is available and can be accessed in most locations; therefore it 
does not need to be shipped. 
The activation of the shielding materials may be of some concern. The estimated 
maximum activity of geometry 11 was 6.0 x 107 Bq, while geometry 16 was estimated to be 1.2 
x 108 Bq. Geometry 10 had a higher maximum activity of 2.0 x 109 Bq, but a large fraction of 
that was due to isotopes with half-lives of 5.15 and 98.4 seconds. If left to set for 20 minutes or 
so after the source has been turned off, the activity of the tungsten shielding will drop by an 
order of magnitude. Furthermore, it should be realized that the activity within the shielding is 
distributed throughout the shielding material. There will be significant self-attenuation of 
photons within the steel, nickel, and tungsten, which will reduce potential dose. Also, geometric 
attenuation will minimize this even further. The eventual disposal of the shielding material could 
be a challenge because some of the newly formed nuclei have half-lives that are fairly long. 
Since only a few materials were simulated and only rough estimates were made using MCNP, 
this is a topic that will require further investigation in future work. 
The effectiveness of the shielding is a combination of limiting neutrons at undesirable 
angles and insuring a compact beam of high energy neutrons is directed where desired. Figure 
3.14 shows the average energy of neutrons leaving the shielding surface that contains the 
opening for geometry 11. At the surface of the shielding, the average energy peaks at 15 – 20 cm 
and there is a smaller peak at 65 – 70 cm from the centerline of the shield opening. This 
corresponds to the edge of the opening at 16 cm and the edge of the shielding at 66 cm. The 
increase is most likely due to the inner and outer layers of polyethylene absorbing thermal 
neutrons; therefore, the remaining neutrons have a higher average energy. The average energy at 
25, 50, 100, and 150 cm only have 1 peak each, which becomes less distinct, but has a larger 
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 magnitude, and shifts out the further the surface is from the shielding. This indicates a 
broadening of the neutron beam as it moves away from the shielding. Figure 3.15 takes the 
average energy of each ring and multiplies it by the normalized number of neutrons passing 
through each ring. These plots show the shielding efficiency and beam broadening. The beam 
intensity is much greater towards the centerline of the opening and drops off quickly. The beam 
does broaden as the isotropically released neutrons move further away from the shielding, but the 
beam still maintains most of its strength. Of course, the shielding design could be changed so 
that the opening was smaller or larger depending on the application and the desired beam width 
at a given distance. 
It is difficult to choose one ideal shielding configuration because the requirements may 
change with each application. However, geometry 11 is a good compromise. The layered 
materials are effective at attenuating the neutrons, while maintaining a neutron “beam.” The steel 
used is not nearly as expensive as tungsten, and furthermore, the mass of geometry 11 is less 
than the mass of the shielding based on a design by Maruyama and Bouts (1972), while 
maintaining a very similar neutron energy spectrum and a slightly lower dose equivalent around 
the source. Another option would be either geometry 16 or 18. The nickel is more effective than 
steel, and its mass and cost fall between that of steel and tungsten. Geometry 18 is slightly lighter 
than 16 and the dose equivalent is less at π/2 – π radians, but it is greater a 0 – π/4 radians. The 
choice of geometry would have to account for where the operator and other personnel would be 
located. Shielding could be further improved if borated polyethylene was substituted for the 
regular polyethylene, but that would add cost to the configuration. 
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 Conclusions 
The ability to shield isotropic neutron sources can be helpful in active neutron 
interrogation. The shielding around the source limits the number of neutrons interacting in the 
environment while still allowing for a narrow beam of unattenuated neutrons. This decreases the 
amount of unwanted secondary radiation interacting in the system’s detectors and distorting its 
signal. It also reduces potential dose to nearby personnel and limits activation concerns.  Because 
active neutron interrogation is often used in areas where space is limited, an effective, compact 
neutron shielding is necessary. 
Layering of various materials, like in geometries 4 and 11, which had a 5 cm thick inner 
layer of polyethylene, followed by a thicker layer of steel, and then several alternating 5 cm thick 
layers of polyethylene and steel, improves neutron shielding and reduces dose equivalent. The 
mid to high atomic number material serves multiple purposes. Firstly, it can be used to shield any 
gamma rays created when neutrons are absorbed. Additionally, the material can reflect neutrons 
back through the moderating material and slightly reduce the neutron energy every collision.  
There are many options for shielding neutrons. Each active neutron interrogation system 
is different and has different requirements. If space is limited, but the budget is higher, then 
perhaps layers of borated polyethylene and tungsten would be the preferred shielding method. 
However, if cost is the limiting factor, then maybe more common and less expensive materials 
like steel and polyethylene would be better choices. And if weight were an issue, then a pure 
polyethylene shield may be most effective. It is up to the designer to determine what is best for 
that particular scenario. 
This work is not meant to offer solutions to all neutron source shielding applications. 
There are limitless combinations of materials and shielding configurations that could be tested. It 
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 is up to the user to determine which shielding properties are most important to him or her. 
Hopefully, the shielding materials and evaluations methods discussed in this paper can act as a 
starting point when selecting high energy neutron shielding for portable or limited space 
applications. 
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 Figures 
 
Fig. 3.1: An example of how the shielding is assembled in MCNP, in this case it is geometry 4. 
Pictured is a cross section through the center of the shielding. Neutrons emerge unattenuated 
through the opening on the right side of the shielding, creating a beam, while the neutron fluence 
in all other directions is significantly more limited due to all of the shielding material. 
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Fig. 3.2: A cross section across the center of the geometry 4 shielding through its width, looking 
down the barrel.
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Fig. 3.3: A visual representation of geometries 1 – 14. Each 5 cm thick layer of material is represented by one block with the center of 
the configuration at the top and the outside at the bottom. 
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Fig. 3.4: The arrangement used in the MCNP simulations to estimate dose and relative neutron 
fluence at several points around the shielding. Geometry 1 is pictured. An F1 tally is used to 
determine the energy of neutrons that cross the surface of the spheres surrounding the shielding 
in order to estimate the energy dependent fluence of neutrons and photons at various points 
around the material.
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Fig. 3.5: A comparison of the normalized relative neutron fluence through the sphere located at 0 radians versus energy for geometries 
0 - 10. There is a large peak of neutrons around 14 MeV, the original energy of the source.  
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Fig. 3.6: A comparison of the normalized relative neutron fluence through the sphere located at π/4 radians versus energy for 
geometries 0 - 10. The peak of neutrons near 14 MeV has been reduced by about two orders of magnitude for many of the shielding 
arrangements tested.  
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Fig. 3.7: A comparison of the normalized relative neutron fluence through the sphere located at π/4 radians versus energy for 
geometries 0 - 10. The peak of neutrons near 14 MeV has been further reduced to about three – four orders of magnitude less for many 
of the shielding arrangements tested.  
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Fig. 3.8: A comparison of the normalized relative neutron fluence through the sphere located at 0 radians versus energy for geometries 
0, 4, and 11 – 14. Again, there is a large peak of neutrons around 14 MeV, the original energy of the source.  
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Fig. 3.9: A comparison of the normalized relative neutron fluence through the sphere located at π/4 radians versus energy for 
geometries 0, 4, and 11 – 14. The peak of neutrons near 14 MeV has been reduced by about two orders of magnitude for all of the 
shielding arrangements tested, when compared to geometry 0, air.  
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Fig. 3.10: A comparison of the normalized relative neutron fluence through the sphere located at 3π/4 radians versus energy for 
geometries 0, 4, and 11 – 14. Again, the peak of neutrons near 14 MeV has been reduced by about three – four orders of magnitude for 
all of the shielding arrangements tested. The spectra of geometries 11 – 14 are very similar to geometry 4, while the shielding 
materials are less massive.
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b) 
Fig. 3.11: A comparison of the normalized relative neutron fluence through the sphere located at 
0 radians versus energy for geometries a) 0, 11, and 15 – 18 and b) 0, 11, and 19 – 22. The peak 
near 14 MeV is present for all geometries.  
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a) 
 
b) 
Fig. 3.12: A comparison of the normalized relative neutron fluence through the sphere located at 
π/4 radians versus energy for geometries a) 0, 11, and 15 – 18 and b) 0, 11, and 19 – 22. The 
magnitude of the peak near 14 MeV has once again been reduced outside the solid angle of the 
shielding opening. 
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a) 
 
b) 
Fig. 3.13: A comparison of the normalized relative neutron fluence through the sphere located at 
3π/4 radians versus energy for geometries a) 0, 11, and 15 – 18 and b) 0, 11, and 19 – 22. The 
peak near 14 MeV, for all geometries, has been reduced by several orders of magnitude when 
compared to the unshielded source, geometry 0.
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Fig. 3.14: The average energy of neutrons at various distances from the centerline of the shield opening for geometry 11. The neutron 
energies were recorded at 0, 25, 50, 100, and 150 cm from the shielding surface that contained the opening. 
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Fig. 3.15: An estimation of how the relative neutron beam intensity varies based on distance from the shielding surface for geometry 
11. The beam intensity was determined by multiplying the average energy of neutrons crossing a plane at varying distances from the 
beam centerline by the relative number of neutrons crossing the plane at that radial distance.
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 Tables 
Table 3.1: A description of the materials simulated. 
Material Elemental makeup (relative 
abundance) Elemental makeup (weight %) 
Density 
(kg m-3) 
Air  C (0.001), N (0.755), O (0.231), 
Ar (0.013) 
1.2 
Polyethylene H (4), C (2)   940 
Borated 
polyethylene 
H (4), B (0.18), C (1.82)  940 
Water H (2), O (1)  1,000 
Steel/polyethylene 
mixture 
 H (1.36), C(8.34), Fe (90.30) 4,630 
Steel  C (0.2), Fe (99.8) 7,860 
Inconel 600  Ni (72.0), Cr (16.835), Fe (9.0), 
Mn (1.0), Cu (0.5), Si (0.5), C 
(0.15), S (0.00015) 
8,430 
Nickel Ni (1)  8,910 
Lead Pb (1)  11,340 
Bismuth Bi (1)  9,780 
Tungsten W(1)  19,250 
Depleted uranium 234U (0.000018), 235U (0.0024), 
238U (0.997582) 
  19,100 
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 Table 3.2: A listing of all the material configurations simulated. 
Geometry Description 
0 Air (no shielding) 
1 50 cm thick polyethylene shielding surrounding the source 
2 50 cm thick water shielding surrounding the source 
3 5.98 cm thick shielding of 1018 steel surrounding the source 
4 Alternating layers of steel and polyethylene starting from the inside with: 5 cm 
polyethylene, 25 cm steel, 5 cm polyethylene, 5 cm steel, 5 cm polyethylene, 5 cm steel  
5 Same as geometry 4, but with an added layer of 5 cm of lead on the outside 
6 Geometry 1 enriched with 3% 10B by weight 
7 Geometry 4 enriched with 3% 10B by weight 
8 15 cm thick of polyethylene on the inside of the shielding with 35 cm  thick of steel 
outside of that 
9 35 cm thick of steel on the inside of the shielding with 15 cm  thick of polyethylene 
outside of that 
10 
Alternating layers of tungsten and polyethylene starting from the inside with: 5 cm 
polyethylene, 25 cm tungsten, 5 cm polyethylene, 5 cm tungsten, 5 cm polyethylene, 5 
cm tungsten  
11 
Alternating layers of steel and polyethylene starting from the inside with: 5 cm 
polyethylene, 20 cm steel, 5 cm polyethylene, 5 cm steel, 5 cm polyethylene, 5 cm steel, 
5 cm polyethylene  
12 
Alternating layers of steel and polyethylene starting from the inside with: 5 cm 
polyethylene, 15 cm steel, 5 cm polyethylene, 5 cm steel, 5 cm polyethylene, 5 cm steel, 
5 cm polyethylene, 5 cm steel 
13 
Alternating layers of steel and polyethylene starting from the inside with: 5 cm 
polyethylene, 10 cm steel, 5 cm polyethylene, 5 cm steel, 5 cm polyethylene, 5 cm steel, 
5 cm polyethylene, 5 cm steel, 5 cm polyethylene 
14 Alternating layers of steel and polyethylene with every 5 cm for a total thickness of 50 cm 
15 A mixture of polyethylene and iron with the same proportions as are present in Geometry 11 
16 Same as geometry 11, but with nickel replacing the steel 
17 Same as geometry 11, but with the nickel alloy Inconel 600 replacing the steel 
18 Same as geometry 16, but with the inner 5 cm layers of nickel and polyethylene switched 
19 Same as geometry 11, but with depleted uranium replacing the steel 
20 Same as geometry 11, but with lead replacing the steel 
21 Same as geometry 11, but with bismuth replacing the steel 
22 Same as geometry 11, but with water replacing the polyethylene 
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 Table 3.3: A summary of the neutron and photon dose estimates at various points surrounding the shielding for various shielding 
geometries. The values are in units of 10-17 Sv per source neutron. 
    Geometry 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 radians 
Neutron Dose 3.71 5.33 5.27 2.94 5.92 5.92 5.27 5.84 5.53 9.69 5.62 
Photon Dose 0.000425 0.0242 0.0301 0.0379 0.0340 0.0340 0.0120 0.0214 0.0273 0.0357 0.0278 
Total Dose 3.71 5.35 5.30 2.98 5.96 5.96 5.28 5.86 5.56 9.73 5.65 
             
π/4 
radians 
Neutron Dose 3.71 0.336 0.411 1.09 0.338 0.338 0.316 0.324 0.403 1.13 0.203 
Photon Dose 0.000444 0.0121 0.0153 0.0147 0.00504 0.00489 0.00513 0.00252 0.00531 0.00883 0.00275 
Total Dose 3.72 0.349 0.426 1.11 0.343 0.343 0.321 0.327 0.409 1.14 0.206 
             
π/2 
radians 
Neutron Dose 3.72 0.111 0.164 0.941 0.0254 0.02048 0.103 0.0245 0.265 0.0233 0.00646 
Photon Dose 0.000429 0.00977 0.0125 0.0133 0.00140 0.000149 0.00382 0.000190 0.000192 0.0121 0.0000285 
Total Dose 3.72 0.121 0.176 0.954 0.0268 0.0206 0.107 0.0247 0.265 0.0353 0.00649 
             
3π/4 
radians 
Neutron Dose 3.71 0.0517 0.0841 1.24 0.0117 0.00925 0.0469 0.0109 0.201 0.00869 0.00250 
Photon Dose 0.000423 0.00725 0.00954 0.0189 0.000727 0.0000343 0.00280 0.0000857 0.000114 0.0113 0.0000102 
Total Dose 3.71 0.0589 0.0936 1.26 0.0124 0.00929 0.0497 0.0109 0.201 0.0200 0.00251 
             
π 
radians  
Neutron Dose 3.72 0.178 0.261 1.54 0.0355 0.0265 0.164 0.0338 0.388 0.0268 0.00710 
Photon Dose 0.000437 0.0119 0.0150 0.0223 0.00224 0.000260 0.00464 0.000279 0.000265 0.0128 0.0000232 
Total Dose 3.72 0.190 0.276 1.57 0.0377 0.0267 0.168 0.0341 0.388 0.0396 0.00712 
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 Table 3.4: A summary of the neutron and photon dose estimates at various points surrounding 
geometries 4 and 11 - 14. The values are in units of 10-17 Sv per source neutron. 
Geometry 
    4 11 12 13 14 
0 
radians 
Neutron Dose 5.92 5.84 5.74 5.64 5.52 
Photon Dose 0.0340 0.0338 0.0335 0.0334 0.0338 
Total Dose 5.96 5.87 5.78 5.67 5.56 
       
π/4 
radians 
Neutron Dose 0.338 0.302 0.272 0.249 0.244 
Photon Dose 0.00504 0.00510 0.00496 0.00515 0.00553 
Total Dose 0.343 0.307 0.277 0.254 0.250 
       
π/2 
radians 
Neutron Dose 0.0254 0.0235 0.0285 0.0303 0.0376 
Photon Dose 0.00140 0.00161 0.000829 0.00121 0.000824 
Total Dose 0.0268 0.0251 0.0294 0.0316 0.0384 
       
3π/4 
radians 
Neutron Dose 0.0117 0.00841 0.0130 0.0109 0.0175 
Photon Dose 0.000727 0.000919 0.000366 0.000658 0.000369 
Total Dose 0.0124 0.00933 0.0134 0.0116 0.0179 
       
π 
radians  
Neutron Dose 0.0355 0.0343 0.0390 0.0448 0.0531 
Photon Dose 0.00224 0.00252 0.00130 0.00188 0.00127 
Total Dose 0.0377 0.0368 0.0403 0.0467 0.0544 
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 Table 3.5: A summary of the neutron and photon dose estimates at various points surrounding the shielding for geometries 11 and 15 - 
22. The values are in units of 10-17 Sv per source neutron. 
Geometry 
    11 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
0 
radians 
Neutron Dose 5.84 7.60 5.57 5.62 6.26 6.93 6.42 6.58 5.88 
Photon Dose 0.0338 0.0383 0.0302 0.0325 0.0343 0.0358 0.0194 0.0181 0.0368 
Total Dose 5.87 7.64 5.60 5.65 6.29 6.97 6.44 6.60 5.92 
           
π/4 
radians 
Neutron Dose 0.302 0.733 0.216 0.231 0.259 0.477 0.497 0.601 0.331 
Photon Dose 0.00510 0.00613 0.00381 0.00428 0.00309 0.00432 0.00282 0.00301 0.00547 
Total Dose 0.307 0.739 0.220 0.235 0.262 0.482 0.500 0.604 0.336 
           
π/2 
radians 
Neutron Dose 0.0235 0.223 0.0139 0.0170 0.0133 0.0541 0.0713 0.118 0.0302 
Photon Dose 0.00161 0.00257 0.000596 0.000816 0.000438 0.000743 0.00103 0.00143 0.00189 
Total Dose 0.0251 0.226 0.0145 0.0178 0.0137 0.0548 0.072 0.119 0.0321 
           
3π/4 
radians 
Neutron Dose 0.00841 0.131 0.00499 0.00615 0.00465 0.0238 0.0307 0.0547 0.0108 
Photon Dose 0.000919 0.00159 0.000312 0.000441 0.000225 0.000631 0.000969 0.00139 0.00112 
Total Dose 0.00933 0.132 0.00530 0.00659 0.00487 0.0244 0.0316 0.0561 0.0119 
           
π 
radians 
Neutron Dose 0.0343 0.336 0.0197 0.0251 0.0187 0.0852 0.111 0.184 0.0438 
Photon Dose 0.00252 0.00375 0.000977 0.00134 0.000682 0.000988 0.00140 0.00182 0.00292 
Total Dose 0.0368 0.340 0.0206 0.0264 0.0193 0.0862 0.112 0.186 0.0467 
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 Table 3.6: An estimate of the mass of each of the shielding geometries. No support structure or 
construction materials were accounted for when calculating the mass, only the materials listed in 
Table 3.1. 
Geometry Mass (kg) 
0 0 
1 1,250 
2 1,330 
3 352 
4 7,520 
5 10,850 
6 1,250 
7 7,520 
8 9,360 
9 5,780 
10 17,800 
11 6,140 
12 6,750 
13 5,520 
14 6,270 
15 6,140 
16 6,880 
17 6,540 
18 6,760 
19 14,100 
20 8,600 
21 7,500 
22 6,180 
 
 
83 
 
 References 
Aleksandrov, V.D., Bogolubov, E.P., Bochkarev, O.V., Korytko, L.A., Nazarov, 
V.I., Polkanov, Y.G., Ryzhkov, V.I., Khasaev, T.O., 2005. Application of 
neutron generators for high explosives, toxic agents, and fissile material 
detection. Appl. Radiat. and Isotopes, 63 (5-6), 537-543. 
Brahme, A., 31 July 1984. Neutron collimator. U.S. Patent No. 4,463,266. 
Buffler, A., 2004. Contraband detection with fast neutrons. Radiat. Phys. Chem., 
71(3-4), 853-861. 
Carasco, C., Perot, B., Bernard, S., Mariani, A., Szabo, J-L, Sannie, G., Roll, Th., 
Valkovic, V., Sudac, D., Viesti, G., Lunardon, M., Bottosso, C., Fabris, D., 
Nebbia, G., Pesente, S., Moretto, S., Zenoni, A., Donzella, A., Moszynski, 
M., Gierlik, M., Batsch, T., Wolski, D., Klamra, W.,  Le Tourneur, P., 
Lhuissier, M., Colonna, A., Tintori, C., Peerani, P., Sequeira, V., Salvatoj, 
M., 2008. In-field test of EURITRACK tagged neutron inspection system. 
Nuc. Instrum. and Methods in Physics Research A, 588 (89), 397-405. 
Cinausero, M., Lunardon, M., Nebbia, G., Pesente, S., Viesti, G., Filippini, V., 
2004. Development of a thermal neutron sensor for humanitarian demining. 
Appl. Radiat. and Isotopes, 61 (1), 59-66. 
Clifford, E., Ing, H., McFee, J., Cousins, T., 1999. High rate counting electronics 
for a thermal neutron analysis land mine detector. Penetrating Radiation 
Systems and Applications, 3769, 155-166. 
Fermi, E., Zinn, W.H., 24 Sept. 1957. Neutronic reactor shield. U.S. Patent No. 
2,807,727. 
Greene, D., Thomas, R.L., 1969. The attenuation of 14 MeV neutrons in steel and 
polyethylene. Phys. Med. Biol., 14 (1), 45-54. 
Hall, J.M., Asztalos, S., Biltoft, P., Church, J., Descalle, M-A, Luu, T., Manatt, D., 
Mauger, G., Norman, E., Petersen, D., Pruet, J., Prussin, S., Slaughter, D., 
2007. The nuclear car wash: neutron interrogation of cargo containers to 
detect hidden SNM. Nuc. Instrum. and Methods in Physics Research B, 261 
(1-2), 337-340. 
Hussein, E.M.A., 2003. Handbook on Radiation Probing, Gauging, Imaging and 
Analysis, Volume II: Applications and Design, (Kulwer Academic Publishers, 
Norrwell, MA), pp. 689-692. 
International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP), 1987. Data for use in 
protection against external radiation. Oxford: ICRP Publication 51. 
84 
 
 International Commission on Radiation Units and Measurements (ICRU), 1992. 
Measurement of dose equivalents from external photon and electron 
radiations. Bethesda, MD: ICRU Report 47. 
Kearfott, K.J., 29 July 2008. Neutron irradiative methods and systems. U. S. Patent 
No. 7,405,409. 
Knoll, G.F., 2010. Radiation Detection and Measurement, 4th ed. (Wiley, Hoboken, 
NJ), pp. 19-22. 
Lehnert, A.L., Kearfott, K.J., 2010. The detection of explosive materials: review of 
considerations and methods. Nucl. Technol., 172 (3), 325-334. 
Lehnert, A.L., Kearfott, K.J., 2011. Simplified simulation of fastneutron scattering 
for an explosives detection application. Nucl. Sci. Eng.,168 (3), 278-286. 
Lundberg, D.A., 25 Dec. 1973. Neutron beam collimators. U. S. Patent No. 
3,781,564. 
Maruyama, T., Bouts, C.J., 1972. Attenuation of 15 MeV neutrons in multilayer 
shields composed of steel, polyethylene and borated materials. Phys. Med. 
Biol., 17 (3), 420-424. 
Mollon, L., 17 Feb. 1987. Neutron absorbing panel. U. S. Patent No. 4,644,171.  
Morrison, P., 18 June 1957. Radiation shield. U.S. Patent No. 2,796,529. 
Pesente, S., Nebbia, G., Lunardon, M., Viesti, G., Sudac, D., Nađ, K., Blagus, S., 
Valković, V., 2004. Detection of hidden explosives by using tagged neutron 
beams with sub-nanosecond time resolution. Nuc. Instrum. and Methods in 
Physics Research A, 531 (3), 657-667. 
Shultis, J.K., Faw, R.E., 1996. Radiation Shielding. (Prentice-Hall, Inc., Upper 
Saddle River, NJ), pp. 282-290. 
Studenski, M.T., Kearfott, K.J., 2007. Design and simulation of a neutron facility. 
Health Phys., 92 (2 Suppl), S37-44. 
Wu, L., Miley, G.H., Momota, H., Shrestha, P.J., 2007. An integrated broad area 
coverage fusion neutron/x-ray interrogation unit. Fusion Sci .and Technology, 
52 (4), 1096-1100. 
  
85 
 
 CHAPTER 4: LAYERED SHIELDING DESIGN FOR AN 
ACTIVE NEUTRON INTERROGATION SYSTEM 
 
Abstract 
The use of source and detector shields in active neutron interrogation can improve 
detector signal. In simulations, a shielded detector with a source rotated π/3 radians relative to 
the opening decreased neutron flux roughly three orders of magnitude. Several realistic source 
and detector shield configurations were simulated. A layered design reduced neutron and 
secondary photon flux in the detector by approximately one order of magnitude for a deuterium-
tritium source. The shield arrangement can be adapted for a portable, modular design. 
Introduction 
There have been several active neutron interrogation methods proposed to detect 
explosives and narcotics (Cinausero et al., 2004; Clifford et al., 1999; Lehnert and Kearfott, 
2010; Whetstone and Kearfott, 2014). The analyzed signal consists of one or more emitted 
radiation types, including characteristic x-rays, gamma rays, and inelastic and elastically 
scattered neutrons (Lehnert and Kearfott, 2011a). The various active neutron interrogation 
systems then have detectors set up to record one or more of these secondary radiations to obtain 
a signal. The signal is investigated and a determination of whether or not the materials within the 
target are either illegal or dangerous can be made.  
In such systems, a neutron source is required, many of which are approximately isotropic. 
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 Because the interpretation of the detector signal may be dependent on the neutron’s incident 
angle when it interacts in the target, this is not a desirable feature for most active neutron 
interrogation systems (Buffler, 2004; Lehnert and Kearfott, 2011a). Furthermore, neutrons that 
are not initially directed at the target may interact with other objects in the room, creating 
secondary radiation and adding noise to the system.  
By designing the shield for an isotropic source with a single opening, a limited neutron 
beam can be created. The neutrons emitted towards the opening have an unattenuated path 
towards the target, while many neutrons emitted at other angles are scattered and eventually 
absorbed within the shield (Whetstone and Kearfott, 2011). Similarly, the detectors used in an 
active interrogation system can be shielded so that radiation emerging from the area of interest 
will be preferentially detected over that from other angles. This is sometimes referred to as 
"collimation", although it could be argued that the term is better applied to photon shielding 
rather than neutron shielding. The increased complexity of neutron interactions in materials 
precludes the efficacy of producing a clean beam when compared to what is possible for photons. 
Using both source and detector shields creates a cleaner signal for both photons and neutrons, 
improving determination of the target’s composition for a variety of methods. 
The shield designs employed in this work were similar to those presented previously for 
shielding a deuterium-tritium (D-T) source (Whetstone and Kearfott, 2011) and based upon 
much earlier work (Greene and Thomas, 1969; Maruyama and Bouts, 1972). After evaluating 
several designs, two were chosen for further exploration. The neutron source shields were 0.5 m 
thick and consisted either of polyethylene or alternating layers of steel and polyethylene.  The 
polyethylene is a moderator to slow and absorb neutrons. Steel shields the neutrons and 
secondary gamma rays.  
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 For neutrons in the multiple MeV range, the iron atoms in steel have larger scatter cross 
sections than low atomic number materials (Shultis and Faw, 1996). However, due to the large 
relative mass of middle atomic number materials contrasted to the low neutron mass, the energy 
lost by the neutron in an elastic scatter with iron is minimal, thus requiring many interactions to 
slow the neutron. By having multiple layers of the low- and middle-atomic number materials, the 
neutrons will have many chances to scatter and pass through moderating material to lose energy 
or be absorbed. 
In addition to collimating the detector, it is also desirable to limit any radiation entering 
the detector that is not the result of a single scatter within the target, such as neutrons or gamma 
rays that scattered multiple times first in the target or in the surrounding environment. If the 
radiation ends up being directed towards a detector after it scatters, it may contribute an 
undesirable signal. To further compound matters, gamma rays can interact in neutron detectors 
and neutrons can interact in gamma ray detectors, which will also lead to poor signal quality.  
The layered technique used to shield the neutron source by Whetstone and Kearfott 
(2011) can be applied to detectors, only in a reverse order. Any neutrons that are not coming 
from the target area will have to pass through shielding, where they can be scattered, slowed, or 
absorbed by the polyethylene and steel, reducing the probability of entering the detector. The 
steel will also shield the detector from gamma rays. The result is a detector with a limited field of 
view focused on the area of interest. 
The purpose of this work was to extend the layered steel and polyethylene design to use 
with a detector in a D-T active neutron interrogation system. An examination was also conducted 
on how the combined source and detector shields affected the neutrons and photons entering the 
detector. Additional discussion on modular implementation of the design is included. 
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 Materials and Methods 
Monte Carlo N-Particle 5 (MCNP 5)1 was used to perform multiple simulations to 
determine neutron transmission. The shielded detector was suspended in air with an isotropic 
neutron source placed 1.0 m from the shield center and rotated 0, π/6, π/3, and π/2 radians about 
the opening. The neutron energies simulated were 14.1, 12.0, 10.0, 8.0, 6.0, 4.0, 2.5, and 1.0 
MeV. For each energy and source position, an F4 tally, representing the flux averaged over the 
cell, was estimated for neutrons in the detector volume. The number of histories performed 
ensured <5% statistical uncertainty. 
A shield previously developed for a D-T neutron source (Whetstone and Kearfott, 2011), 
was adapted for use with the detector by reversing the layering. The layer of shield closest to the 
detector was 0.05 m polyethylene, followed by 0.05 m steel, 0.05 m polyethylene, 0.05 m steel, 
0.05 m polyethylene, 0.20 m steel, and, finally, 0.05 m polyethylene on the outside. The detector 
was modeled after a 0.127 m radius, 0.127 m long EJ-309 liquid scintillator2, commonly used for 
fast neutron measurements (Kaplan et al., 2013, Dolan, et al., 2014). The 0.50 m thick, 0.127 
inner radius, 0.50 m long shield, shown in Fig. 4.1, is open at one end to allow unattenuated 
radiation to approach the detector. Material compositions are in Table 4.1.  
The combined source and detector shields were also simulated in a generic, more realistic 
environment that included walls, ceiling, floor, ground, and an interrogation object, shown in 
Fig. 4.2. The 0.634 m radius source shield is either the layered design from Whetstone and 
Kearfott (2011) or strictly polyethylene. The shield barrel has a radius of 0.134 m instead of 
0.160 m presented previously (Whetstone and Kearfott, 2011), providing a π/6 steradian solid 
1 computer code Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport version 5 (Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 
87545, 2006). 
2 EJ-309 liquid scintillator (Eljen Technology, Sweetwater, TX 79556). 
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 angle from the source to the inner shield edge. To approximate a neutron transmission 
measurement, the barrels of the two shields are parallel to the ground and facing each other with 
the source 1.873 m from the detector face. A 0.40 m radius, 0.30 m long water cylinder placed 
between the source and the detector represents an interrogation target. It is several mean free 
paths thick for D-T neutrons and wide enough that all unattenuated neutrons from the source 
shield opening will pass through. The source and center of the detector are 0.85 m above the 0.15 
m thick concrete floor resting on soil. The walls and ceiling of the 5.50 x 6.00 m, 2.35 m tall 
room are 0.15 m thick concrete. Several simulations were run with various shield configurations 
named arrangements 1-6, and one configuration with no shields, referred to as air. The specific 
layering schemes can be seen in Fig. 4.3. Only 14.1 MeV D-T neutrons were studied as the 
shield design could be adopted with modification for the less energetic deuterium-deuterium 
neutrons. An F4 tally determined the energy-dependent neutron flux averaged over the detector 
volume. Another F4 tally evaluated the effectiveness of the various shielding arrangements to 
minimize the secondary gamma ray background. The number of histories simulated for each 
arrangement was varied so the statistical uncertainty of each histogram bin was below 10%. 
Generally it was significantly lower.  
The neutron flux for the realistic arrangement was also investigated with the source and 
detector offset π/2 radians in the horizontal plane, meeting the requirements of neutron elastic 
scatter or pulsed fast neutron analysis measurements (Buffler, 2004; Lehnert and Kearfott, 
2011b, Gozani, 1994). In this case, source neutrons cannot pass through the target unattenuated 
and reach the detector. They must interact in the target or environment, or pass through both 
source and detector shielding before entering the detector. The neutron target was changed from 
a disc of water to a 0.25 m radius sphere of liquid nitrogen, with a density of 0.808 g cm-3, to 
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 yield a more obvious scattered neutron spectrum. Relative to Fig. 4.2, the source and its shield 
were rotated about the center of the target π/2 radians counterclockwise and moved back from 
the target an additional 0.15 m to allow space for both the source and detector shields. The 
source was 1.15 m from the target center. The detector/shield locations and dimensions remained 
unchanged. An example MCNP input file can be found in Appendix A. Each arrangement was 
again simulated, with the source and detector shield from arrangement 1 now referred to as 
arrangement 7, arrangement 2 as 8, etc. A modified arrangement 5, with the shield openings 
aligned, was chosen to compare to the rotated simulations. Arrangement 5 was considered a 
compromise, using polyethylene in the source shield to minimize mass and reduce the generation 
of secondary gamma rays, while the detector shield still employed layered polyethylene and steel 
to shield both neutrons and gamma rays. The only modification to arrangement 5 was to move 
the source and shield back 0.15 m and change the scatter target to match arrangements 7-12.  
Results 
 The averaged detector neutron flux from the simulated sources at various energies and 
angles can be found in Fig. 4.4.  The largest flux was at 0 radians relative to the shield opening 
and the smallest was at π/3 radians. The flux difference between the two was estimated to be 
roughly three orders of magnitude for all neutron energies, both with the steel and polyethylene 
layered shield and the shield that contained only polyethylene. 
The results for the aligned system simulated in a room can be seen in Fig. 4.5 and 4.6. It 
should be noted that spectral data are generally displayed in the form of histograms. However, in 
order to display multiple data sets in a single figure, it was decided to use scatter plots instead, 
where the upper right corner of each bin is represented by a data point. Furthermore, the energy 
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 between data points was varied in the lower region of the spectrum to more accurately reflect the 
variation in the flux. Therefore, it was necessary to normalize the simulated bin counts by the 
width of the bin. The units on the y-axis of the spectra are particles cm-2 MeV-1 per source 
particle.   
The spectra from D-T neutrons entering the detector were very similar, regardless of the 
detector and source shield. Only the simulation with no shield, labeled air, showed a flux 
spectrum approximately one order of magnitude greater for all energies. The peak to background 
ratio for the shielded arrangements were all similar and ranged between 21 and 36 when taken 
from 4 to 12 MeV. The air arrangement, with no shield material, had ratios between 7 and 19.  
The secondary photon spectra showed a greater variability with shield arrangement. 
Again, the largest overall flux was the simulation without shielding, while the lowest flux was 
seen for arrangements 3 and 5 at higher energies, and arrangement 2 for lower energies. The flux 
difference between shielded configurations was just over an order of magnitude between 6 and 7 
MeV and got progressively smaller at lower energies. The photon spectra were shown for 
energies up to 7 MeV to account for the most prominent gamma rays associated with inelastic 
neutron scatter off carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen, all of which are present in the air, with oxygen 
also in the interrogation target and carbon in the shielding material. The gamma rays of concern 
are carbon: 4.43 MeV, nitrogen: 2.31, and oxygen: 6.13 MeV, all seen in the simulations. An 
estimate of the peak to background ratio at all three energies was performed to better understand 
the characteristic gamma ray behavior of the various arrangements, with results in Table 4.2. 
As seen in Fig. 4.7, when rotated π/2 radians, a large decrease in the 14.1 MeV neutrons 
was observed in arrangements 7 – 12. The simulated detector neutron flux of arrangements 7 – 
12 was normalized by the flux of the modified arrangement 5 and displayed in Fig. 4.8. For 
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 arrangements 7, 9, 11, and 12, which all included source shields, the ratios at 14.1 MeV are 
below 0.001. The ratios for arrangements 8 and 10, which had no source shields, were below 
0.06. Large peaks at 12.6 MeV, with magnitudes between 1.2 and 0.7 are visible in all spectra. 
 The gamma ray spectra for the various rotated arrangements, seen in Fig. 4.9, had a 
magnitude and shape similar to the aligned spectra. An estimate of the peak to background ratio 
was again performed, with results in Table 4.3.  
Discussion 
Simulations 
As seen in Fig. 4.4, both shielding arrangements, as a function of position, produce 
spectra having the same order of magnitude and basic shape. Even though the source was further 
from the shield opening, the thickness of shielding material was actually less than at π/3 radians, 
due to the cylindrical form. In general, this correlated to the relative counts at each position in 
both shields. The layered and polyethylene shield designs were similarly effective at reducing 
neutron flux at all angles. The order of magnitude drop in neutron flux from 0 to π/6 radians, and 
even larger drop from π/6 to π/3 radians, demonstrate efficient detector collimator design.  
In the simulations, there was a wider spread in neutron flux at π/2 radians for both the 
layered and strictly polyethylene designs. As expected, closer inspection revealed that the lower 
energy neutron sources tended to have a lower total flux than the higher energy sources. High 
energy neutrons are less likely to be scattered or absorbed in the shield, so there is a greater 
number of them that reach the detector. Interestingly, this trend was reversed when the neutron 
source was at π/3 radians. Although the data points are more tightly packed, the highest energy 
sources had lower fluxes while low energy sources had higher fluxes.  This was most likely the 
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 result of the average neutron path length through the shield being longer at π/3 radians than at 
π/2. This extra material allowed for an accumulation of multiply scattered lower energy neutrons 
while the higher energy neutrons passed through with fewer interactions and a smaller buildup 
factor. At π/2 radians, the same phenomenon was not observed because there was not enough 
shield material for the lower energy neutrons to undergo significant buildup. Similar effects can 
be seen in Veselkin et al. (1969) and Shin et al. (1997). This theory is further supported by 
comparing the 1 MeV neutron flux at π/3 and π/2 radians for the polyethylene and layered shield 
designs. In both instances, the total neutron flux is actually larger at π/3 radians, even though the 
amount of attenuating material is greater. The same does not hold true for the higher energy 
neutron fluxes. 
The simulated neutron energy spectra from neutron transmission, seen in Fig. 4.5, reveal 
no significant differences among designs. Large disparities between spectra were not anticipated 
because the source shield opening was directly aligned with the detector shield opening. The 
spectra is dominated by neutrons that were emitted from the source and traveled through the 
shield opening, possibly after one or more scattering events, towards the detector. For all 
arrangements, there is a peak at 14.1, then the spectra drops by over an order of magnitude and 
rises up to 108 times as the energy approaches thermal. Even in arrangements 2 and 4, having no 
source shield, the spectra are similar. The air arrangement, however, was consistently at least an 
order of magnitude greater than the shielded simulations and had a smaller peak to background 
ratio, validating the effectiveness of the detector shields at minimizing multiply scattered 
neutrons. 
When the source was rotated about the target π/2 radians in the horizontal plane, there 
were some interesting results. As seen in Fig. 4.7, when combined with collimation, the new 
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 alignment significantly suppresses the 14.1 MeV peak in arrangements 7-12. Both arrangement 5 
and air maintain a large D-T peak due to a lack of shield material between the source and 
detector. In Fig. 4.8, when the energy dependent neutron fluxes of arrangements 7-12 were 
normalized by the flux of modified arrangement 5, a peak at 12.6 MeV resulting from single 
elastic scatter in the nitrogen target was clearly visible.  The peaks have a magnitude ranging 
from 1.2 to 0.75. Arrangements 7, 9, 11, and 12, which included source shields, had peak ratios 
near 0.75 with similar spectra shapes. At higher energies, the ratios fell below 0.001, a three 
order of magnitude drop in source neutrons entering the detector.  
Despite signal noise, the simulation demonstrates a clear method of neutron energy 
adjustment. All that is required is an elastic scatter target of known atomic mass, a neutron 
source with a constant energy, and proper shielding to limit the detector field of view. This 
would allow for active interrogation with neutrons of controllable and variable energies.  
The photon spectra for both the aligned and rotated arrangements varied significantly. 
The smallest spectra with aligned shields (arrangements 2, 3, and 5) have no steel in the source 
shield, eliminating many of the photons generated. Arrangement 4 also has no steel. However, 
more secondary photons from neutron interactions in the room are evident due to decreased 
attenuation in the polyethylene detector shield.  
Furthermore, as seen in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, the characteristic carbon gamma ray peak-to-
background ratio is greatest for arrangements 2, 5, and 9, where the large carbon content of the 
polyethylene shields creates a sizeable 4.43 MeV gamma ray peak. For the water interrogation 
target, arrangement 3 had the largest peak to background ratio for characteristic oxygen gamma 
rays at 6.13 MeV. When the detector and shield were rotated π/2 radians, the carbon and oxygen 
peak-to-background ratios were generally smaller because the gamma rays had to pass through 
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 more shielding material. Arrangement 7, which had the steel and polyethylene layered shield for 
both the source and detector, provided the greatest peak-to-background ratio for the 2.31 MeV 
characteristic nitrogen gamma rays. With the large amounts of steel present, the arrangement 
effectively limited the detector field of view. 
Proposed shielding design 
The addition of a source and detector shield to an active neutron interrogation system 
helps minimize undesired neutrons and photons entering the detector. When the source and 
detector shield openings are facing each other, the relative arrangement of steel and polyethylene 
around the source does not have a significant effect on neutron flux in the detector. Although 
steel in the source shield has been shown to reduce the neutron flux and total dose around an 
isotropic neutron source (Whetstone and Kearfott, 2011), by removing it, the total detected 
secondary gamma ray flux can be significantly reduced. However, a larger characteristic carbon 
gamma ray peak will be present, which could be a problem for some measurements. Similarly, 
the use of steel in the detector shield does not appear to meaningfully change the detector’s 
neutron spectra.  
When the detector is rotated π/2 radians, layers of steel around both the source and 
detector minimize environmental neutron interactions and secondary gamma rays entering the 
detector. This allows for cleaner signals from the target of interest. When used properly, steel can 
improve the performance of an active neutron interrogation system by effectively collimating the 
source and detector. 
Appropriate collimation reduces the system footprint. The use of multiple separate layers 
provides an easy method to break down and reconstruct the system, facilitating portability. This 
can be accomplished by using a rectilinear shield design, seen in Fig. 4.10. Each layer can 
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 consist of a preferred material in two “L” shaped pieces that fit together in an open-ended box. 
One end can be closed using a shielding cap with the other left open to allow for neutrons to 
emerge unattenuated. Additional layers fit flush against previous layers until the desired shield 
thickness is achieved. As seen in Fig. 4.11, the modular shield design can employ overlapping, 
interlocking pieces, adding structural stability and eliminating the emergence of unattenuated 
neutrons at joints or between layers. The modular construction also allows for simple adjustment 
and adaptability by changing, removing, or adding layers depending on the application.  
In all interrogation systems, the most important consideration is a signal with minimal 
noise. The shield design proposed in this paper offers a novel method for both material 
arrangement and implementation to help produce a cleaner detector signal. 
Conclusions 
The use of source and detector shielding can greatly increase the effectiveness of active 
neutron interrogation systems. The source shield limits unattenuated neutrons entering the 
surrounding area and, combined with the detector shield, reduces the number and energy of 
secondary photons and scattered neutrons entering the detector by an order of magnitude. The 
limited field of view provides a cleaner signal without sacrificing detector efficiency for the area 
of interest. The simulations show the similarities and differences between shield designs that 
employ either polyethylene or alternating layers of steel and polyethylene.  
Depending on the application, the source and detector shields can be used separately or 
combined, with or without steel, to enhance an active neutron interrogation system. The 
proposed modular shield component designs allow for easy construction, transportation, 
disassembly, and modification. The shield designs presented are viable options for active neutron 
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 interrogation and deserve consideration for new detection systems.  
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 Figures 
 
a) 
 
b) 
Fig. 4.1: A cutaway a) side view and b) down the barrel of the detector shield. This represents 
the layered steel and polyethylene design.  
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a) 
 
b) 
Fig. 4.2: A a) top-down and b) side view of the simulated room with the detector, source shield, 
and water target arrangement. 
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Fig. 4.3: A graphical representation of the various shield arrangements simulated in the realistic environment. Each layer is 0.05 m 
thick. 
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a) 
 
b) 
Fig. 4.4: The neutron flux for a variable energy neutron source at different locations around the 
a) layered polyethylene and steel and b) pure polyethylene detector shields. 
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Fig. 4.5: The detector neutron energy spectra for various aligned source and detector shield arrangements. 
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Fig. 4.6: The detector gamma ray energy spectra for various aligned source and detector shield arrangements. 
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Fig. 4.7: The detector neutron energy spectra for the rotated source and detector shield arrangements.  
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Fig. 4.8: Arrangements 7– 12, normalized by the spectra from a modified arrangement 5. There is a noticeable increase at 12.6 MeV, 
which is correlated to the elastic scatter of 14.1 MeV neutrons off the nitrogen target at π/2 radians.  
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Fig. 4.9: The detector gamma ray energy spectra for the rotated source and detector shield arrangements.  
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Fig. 4.10: An example of how the modular shielding could be constructed so that there were no continuous seams between layers. The 
“L” shaped pieces form a rectilinear box which can then be capped at one end to create either a source or detector shield. 
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Fig. 4.11: An example design for the various shield pieces so that they fit together more securely and limit the size and length of 
cracks at seams. 
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 Tables 
Table 4.1: A description of materials simulated. 
Material Elemental makeup (relative 
abundance) Elemental makeup (weight %) 
Density 
(kg m-3) 
Air  
(McConn et al., 
2011) 
 C (0.001), N (0.755), O (0.231), 
Ar (0.013) 1.2 
Polyethylene H (4), C (2)   940 
Water H (2), O (1)  1,000 
Steel  C (0.2), Fe (99.8) 7,860 
EJ-309 H(5), C(4)  960 
Nitrogen N(1)  810 
Soil  
(Eckerman and 
Ryman, 1993) 
H (0.2938), C (0.0187), O 
(0.5045), Al (0.0259), Si 
(0.1354), K (0.0143), Fe 
(0.0027) 
 1,750 
Concrete 
(McConn et al., 
2011) 
 
H (0.56), O (49.81), Na (1.71), 
Mg (0.26), Al (4.57), Si (31.51), S 
(0.13), K (1.92), Ca (8.29), Fe 
(1.24) 
2,080 
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 Table 4.2: Peak-to-background ratio for characteristic gamma rays in simulated D-T shielding 
arrangements with the source and detector shield openings aligned. 
Photon 
energy 
(MeV) 
Peak-to-background ratio for each arrangement 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Air 
2.31 9.2 + 0.2 17.3 + 0.4 14.2 + 0.2 12.0 + 0.1 12.8 + 0.3 10.7 + 0.3 7.0 + 0.1 
4.43 9.4 + 0.3 9.5 + 0.4 39.9 + 1.7 7.1 + 0.2 29.9 + 1.5 11.1 + 0.5 3.6 + 0.1 
6.13 3.3 + 0.1 7.9 + 0.5 22.3 + 1.6 10.1 + 0.4 9.2 + 0.6 3.7 + 0.2 9.5 + 0.2 
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 Table 4.3: Peak-to-background ratio for characteristic gamma rays in simulated D-T shielding arrangements with the shielded detector 
rotated π/2 radians relative to the source. 
Photon 
energy 
(MeV) 
Peak-to-background ratio for each arrangement 
7 8 9 10 11 12 Air Modified 5 
2.31 24.6 + 0.6 13.4 + 0.2 13.6 + 0.3 13.3 + 0.2 19.1 + 0.5 18.8 + 0.4 6.1 + 0.1 13.9 + 0.2 
4.43 4.9 + 0.2 5.1 + 0.1 23.5 + 1.5 13.7 + 0.4 6.9 + 0.3 6.5 + 0.3 12.4 + 0.4 21.6 + 0.6 
6.13 1.8 + 0.1 2.0 + 0.1 3.2 + 0.4 6.6 + 0.3 1.8 + 0.2 1.7 + 0.1 8.5 + 0.4 1.8 + 0.1 
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 CHAPTER 5: A METHOD FOR USING NEUTRON ELASTIC 
SCATTER TO CREATE A VARIABLE ENERGY NEUTRON 
BEAM FROM A MONENERGETIC NEUTRON SOURCE 
Abstract 
There are a variety of sources that can be used for active neutron interrogation. Currently, 
however, only complicated, expensive accelerators can provide monoenergetic neutrons across a 
range of energies. This work describes preliminary investigation into the design of a compact, 
portable source that can reliably vary neutron energy. If feasible, such a system could be of 
significant benefit to active neutron interrogation for contraband detection. The proposed method 
uses elastic neutron scatter at a specific angle to reliably reduce the neutron energy of a 
deuterium-deuterium (D-D) or deuterium-tritium (D-T) fusion neutron source. The research 
focuses on D-T Monte Carlo simulations, both in idealized and more realistic scenarios, and a 
small experiment using a D-D source, a boron triflouride (BF3) neutron detector, and a water 
scatter target. Systematic uncertainty of the method is also analyzed. The idealized scenarios 
showed promise and encouraged future work, but the more realistic simulations highlighted the 
need for discrimination of multiply scattered neutrons, either through a pulsed generator or 
associated particle imaging.  
Introduction 
Active neutron interrogation can employ various methods of neutron generation and be 
applied to several different methods of contraband detection. The search for explosives and 
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 narcotics can be performed using pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA) and neutron elastic scatter 
(Buffler, 2004; Lehnert and Kearfott 2010; Lehnert and Kearfott, 2012; Strellis et al., 2009; 
Whetstone and Kearfott, 2014). Neutron transmission and fast neutron radiography, which utilize 
neutrons that do not interact in a target, can be employed to investigate the elemental 
composition of a target (Overley et al., 2006; Sowerby and Tickner, 2007). Neutron energy plays 
a strong role in the performance of explosives detection methods of various types (Hsu and 
Kearfott, 1999). 
One drawback to active neutron interrogation is that the user is limited in choices for a 
neutron source. Large accelerators, although more versatile, are expensive, complicated, and 
occupy a large area. This is not ideally suited to many applications, including anything mobile or 
at locations such as airports or border crossings where space is limited and costs need to be 
controlled. Smaller, portable neutron sources are also available, but they too have issues. High 
energy photon sources, when paired with 9Be or 2H, can generate neutrons through a (γ,n) 
reaction (Knoll, 2010). The photon energy dictates the energy of the released neutron, potentially 
allowing for a near-monoenergetic source. However, photonuclear sources require a high gamma 
ray flux that may impede measurements and, unless a large accelerator is used to create photons, 
the practical maximum energy of the neutrons is limited to about 1 MeV. Small fission and 
radioisotope sources such as 252Cf and plutonium-beryllium, respectively, release neutrons over a 
range of energies (Knoll, 2010). Unfortunately, all of these compact source types cannot be 
turned off and present a hazard if lost or stolen.In contrast, fusion sources, such as deuterium-
deuterium (D-D) and deuterium-tritium (D-T) generators, are compact, can be powered on and 
off, and have relatively high energy nearly-monoenergetic spectra around 2.5 and 14.1 MeV, 
respectively. This makes them the sources of choice for many active neutron interrogation 
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 applications (Aleksandrov et al., 2005). Unfortunately, in both cases, the resulting neutron 
energy is fixed, limiting the user to only two choices, even if a different energy is more ideal. A 
portable, tunable neutron source that could be turned off and minimized photon background 
could find use in many active neutron interrogation applications. 
There are many benefits to a tunable neutron source. First, it would allow the user to set 
the neutron energy in such a way as to take advantage of natural resonance peaks in materials of 
interest. Traditional explosives and narcotics have unique nitrogen, oxygen, and carbon ratios. 
All three of these elements have distinct, strong, neutron interaction peaks in the 1 – 15 MeV 
range (Raas et al., 2005). A neutron source that could change its energy reliably and easily would 
allow for more thorough measurements at lower fluence. Another benefit would be that lower 
neutron energies would require less shielding and provide less dose to any personnel in the area. 
Theory 
The proposed compact, tunable active neutron interrogation system uses either a 
monoenergetic D-D or D-T neutron source and takes advantage of neutron elastic scatter to 
reliably reduce the energy of the neutrons. The system, which includes previously designed 
radiation shielding for the source and detector (Whetstone and Kearfott, 2011; Ch. 4), utilizes a 
scattering target directly in front of the source and a detector separated by some distance and 
offset at a predetermined angle. Some of the neutrons emitted by the source will have a single 
elastic interaction with a nucleus in the scatter target and be directed towards the detector. In this 
case, it is possible to calculate the neutron’s remaining energy. Knoll (2010) provides an 
equation to determine the energy of the recoil nucleus in the laboratory system, ER, given the 
initial energy of the source neutron in the laboratory system, En, the angle of scatter in the center 
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 of mass coordinate system, Θ, the mass of the scatter nucleus, ms, and the mass of the neutron, 
mn:  
. 
𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 = 2𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛(𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2 (1 − cosΘ)𝐸𝐸n.     (5.1) 
 
Assuming a completely elastic scatter, the energy of the scattered neutron in the laboratory 
system, En’, is 
 
𝐸𝐸n
′ = 𝐸𝐸n �1 − 2𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛(𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2 (1 − cosΘ)�.    (5.2) 
 
Solving for Θ yields 
 
Θ = cos−1 �1 − (𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2
2𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
�1 − 𝐸𝐸n′
𝐸𝐸n
�� .    (5.3) 
 
Using trigonometry to convert the neutron scattering angle from the center of mass coordinate 
system, Θ, to the laboratory reference system, ψ, gives  
 tan𝜓𝜓 = sinΘ
cosΘ+
𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠
.      (5.4) 
 
Substituting Eq. 5.3 for Θ, applying trigonometric identities, and solving for ψ yields an equation 
that provides the appropriate scatter angle in the laboratory system as a function of En’, En, mn, 
and ms, all of which should be known by the user: 
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𝜓𝜓 = tan−1
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.     (5.5) 
 
It should be noted that in this case, the arctangent must be taken between 0 and π radians instead 
of the traditional –π/2 and π/2 radians. This allows for proper accounting of neutron backscatter. 
Table 5.1 employs Eq. 5.5 to provide various examples of the necessary scatter angle required to 
reduce a D-T neutron to one of several final energies in the laboratory system.   
 Similarly, given the initial neutron energy and by using conservation of kinetic energy 
and momentum in the laboratory reference system, the final energy of a neutron undergoing a 
single elastic scatter off a known nucleus at a specific angle can be determined: 
 
𝐸𝐸n
′ = 𝐸𝐸n(𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2 �𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛2𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(2𝜓𝜓) + 2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝜓𝜓�𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠2 − 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛2𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2𝜓𝜓 + 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠2�.   (5.6) 
 
For reference, Table 5.2 provides the final energy of a D-T neutron after a single elastic scatter 
off different nuclei at various angles in the laboratory system. As can be seen from the table, the 
fraction of energy lost by the neutron drops quickly as the mass of the nucleus increases, even 
with head-on collisions that result in a π radians backscatter. This limits the nuclei that can be 
employed in this method, particularly if the desire is to lower the D-T neutron energy below 6 
MeV.  
By taking advantage of the relationship in Eq. 5.5, altering the angle of the detector 
relative to the scattering target, and utilizing a scatter target of known composition, a fraction of 
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 the neutrons emitted from the monoenergetic fission source can have their energy reliably varied 
by the user. This effectively creates a source of neutrons whose energies can be altered to fit 
specific applications. The method provides additional flexibility during active neutron 
interrogation based on the scatter target’s density, thickness, scatter cross sections, and other 
properties that affect neutron attenuation. All this can be accomplished without the need for 
large, expensive accelerator systems. 
Materials and Methods 
 The preliminary investigation of the proposed active neutron interrogation system was 
simplified in order to establish proof of principle and determine if further research was 
warranted. Although this method could be applied to neutrons from a D-D or D-T source, 
simulations focused solely on D-T neutrons since they had a higher energy and provided a wider 
dynamic range for the scattered neutrons. The initial work was performed using Monte Carlo N-
Particle (MCNP)1 simulations. So as to focus on the underlying physics, the geometry of the first 
simulations was set up in an idealized manner with a point D-T source emitting neutrons of 
energy 14.1 MeV in a cone whose apex is π/6 radians and directed towards the scatter target. A 
neutron energy cutoff of 0.2 MeV was applied and the number of simulated histories insured a 
statistical uncertainty of less than 5% per histogram bin.  
A cylindrical scattering target was placed in the center of a vacuum. The composition, 
radius, and depth of the cylinder were varied to test different scattering target materials. Table 
5.3 contains the materials tested and their respective scatter target properties. The materials were 
specifically chosen to contain low atomic number nuclei in order to maximize the energy transfer 
1 computer code Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport version 5 (Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 
87545, 2006). 
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 on a single elastic scatter, therefore providing a wider dynamic energy range for the scatter 
neutron source. The scattering material was also chosen so as to minimize the number of nuclei 
with different atomic masses that it contained. For example, pure graphite, which only contains 
carbon, would be preferable to ethyl alcohol (C2H5OH). However, water and methane (CH4), 
which contain both hydrogen and either oxygen or carbon, were explored for the possibility of 
scattering neutrons at two distinct energies. The thickness of each scatter target simulated was 
roughly equivalent to two D-T neutron mean free paths.  
Within the simulations, a sphere was created 3.048 m from the center of the scattering 
target. Twelve smaller spheres were arranged equally-spaced in a circle, with their centers on the 
surface of the larger sphere. The smaller spheres had radii of 0.780 m and were placed in such a 
way that the surfaces defined by the intersection of the small spheres on the larger sphere were 
located in positions corresponding to 0, π/6, π/3, π/2, 2 π/3, 5π/6, and π radians (0°, 30°, 60°, 90°, 
120°, 180°) around the center of the sphere. The location associated with π radians correlates to a 
back scatter of a source neutron in the scattering target, and the location at 0 radians corresponds 
to a source neutron passing straight through the scattering target without any change in direction. 
The purpose of these surfaces is to count the number of neutrons that cross them using an F1, or 
surface current, tally. An example of the simulation geometry can be seen in Fig. 5.1 and found 
in Appendix A. 
A more realistic and thorough set of MCNP simulations were also conducted that 
contained a source and detector arrangement based on layered, cylindrical design from 
Whetstone and Kearfott (2013). It consisted of 0.50 m of polyethylene shielding surrounding an 
isotropic 14.1 MeV source and alternating layers of steel and polyethylene surrounding the 
detector. There is also a cylindrical target for the neutrons to elastically scatter off. It was 
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 composed of either helium or nitrogen, and consisting of the same dimensions as in the previous 
simulations. The arrangement was simulated in a room filled with air consisting of a concrete 
floor, roof, and walls. A list of all materials used in the simulation can be found in Table 5.4. The 
center of both shield arrangements was placed 2.89 m away from the center of the scattering 
target. The simulated detector was a 0.1270 m thick cylinder, with a radius of 0.0635 m, and 
consisted of the organic liquid scintillator EJ-309, which is commonly used for fast neutron 
detection (Kaplan et al., 2013; Dolan, et al., 2014)2. The detector and shield are arranged in such 
a way as to allow for a 5π/6 radian backscatter off the target while still permitting enough space 
to allow for both source and detector shielding materials. Enough histories were simulated that 
the statistical uncertainty of each histogram bin within the peaks was below 10%. The simulated 
geometry can be seen in Fig. 5.2 and found in Appendix A. The focus of this simulation was to 
obtain a better estimate of the neutron energy spectra in a non-idealized scenario. 
Finally, a separate investigation was done in the laboratory using an MP 320 portable 
D-D neutron generator3, two plastic containers each holding 3.8 L of distilled water acting as a 
scattering target, and a boron triflouride (BF3) proportional neutron counter. The purpose of the 
experiment was to determine if the neutron scattering effect could be witnessed in real world 
conditions. Although the equipment used did not provide neutron energy spectra, by looking at 
gross counts, it was possible to detect a change in the neutron flux near the detector. By 
separating the generator and detector with a large amount of shielding, this change in counts was 
more easily detected.  
All three components were set on the concrete floor of the laboratory. As seen in Fig. 5.3, 
the generator and detector were located next to a concrete wall, which acts as a radiation shield 
2 EJ-309 liquid scintillator (Eljen Technology, Sweetwater, TX 79556). 
3 MP 320 D-D neutron generator (Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc., Waltham, MA 02451). 
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 for personnel in the area during generator operation. The wall turned outward at a right angle, 
providing an opportunity to place the generator and detector on either side, with a straight line 
distance between them passing through approximately 0.93 m of concrete. After a background 
measurement, the generator was turned on, and a gross count in the BF3 detector was obtained. 
The two water containers were then placed at the vertex of the right angle, 0.38 m from the 
generator and 0.91 m from the BF3 proportional counter. Another gross count was obtained with 
the scattering target present. The laboratory setup with the water containers can be seen in Fig. 
5.4. 
Results 
 The results for the initial simulations can be seen in Fig. 5.5 – 5.10. For each scattering 
target, the neutron energy spectra at various angles are all combined on a single figure to allow 
ready visualization of the energy differences between peaks. For the 4He spectra, the 0 and π/6 
radians spectra are included. However, at 0 radians, the peak represents neutrons that were 
unattenuated, and the π/6 peak is the result of a small angle and small energy transfer elastic 
scatter. Therefore, these two peaks are magnitudes larger than the other spectra and do not 
change significantly for the various scatter targets. The 0 and π/6 radian spectra are omitted from 
Fig. 5.6 – 5.10 to simplify the figures and improve readability. Table 5.5 summarizes the results. 
It lists the peaks and provides an estimate of their full width at half maximum (FWHM) for each 
spectrum, including 0 and π/6 radians. It is important to note the scatter plots represent 
histograms with the data points correlating to the high end of each 0.20 MeV bin. As a result, 
some peak locations will be shifted slightly to the right. For instance, 14.1 MeV neutrons will 
create a peak at 14.2 MeV.  
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 For each spectrum, a peak can be seen that correlates to the neutron elastic scatter off a 
nucleus. The 9Be, 12C, CH4, and H2O targets each produced multiple peaks at some scatter 
angles. This is the result of inelastic neutron scatter that excites the 9Be nucleus to the 2.43 MeV 
energy level, the 12C nucleus to the 4.43 MeV energy level, and the 16O nucleus to the 6.13 and 
7.12 MeV energy levels (National Nuclear Data Center, 2014). The remainder of the energy is 
distributed between the neutron and nucleus as if it were an elastic scatter. 
 The results of the realistic simulations can be seen in Fig. 5.11. The helium spectrum 
contained several peaks, including one at 5.6 MeV. Similarly, the nitrogen spectra contained 
multiple peaks, with one at 10.8 MeV. When compared to what was predicted by Eq. 5.6 and 
observed in the idealized simulations, the nitrogen peak was found where it was expected and the 
helium peak was shifted up 0.2 MeV. However, in both spectra, there were other peaks that were 
not the result of elastic scatter off the target. These were located at 12.4 and 11.2 MeV.  
 For the laboratory experiment, a BF3 tube was used to detect moderated neutrons. The 
energy deposited in the fill gas, which is independent of the initial neutron energy, was 
determined and the resultant energy spectra were analyzed. The gross neutron counts within the 
region of interest were determined while the D-D generator was producing neutrons, both with 
and without the presence of the water jugs, along with a background count rate. The resultant 
count rates can be found in Table 5.6. The ratio of the count rate when the water was present 
versus not present is 1.24 + 0.02. 
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 Discussion 
Uncertainty analysis 
 Before beginning discussion of the results, it is important to have a thorough 
understanding of the systematic uncertainty associated with using neutron elastic scatter to 
reliably change the energy of neutrons. For many of the elastic scatter peaks in Table 5.5, the 
estimated FWHM was greater than 1 MeV. The peaks can most likely be narrowed through 
careful optimization of the scatter target dimensions in order to reduce self-attenuation and 
multiple scatter events. However, there are other systematic issues that also contribute to the 
FWHM. The final neutron energy, En’, calculated by Eq. 5.6, is a function of the neutron scatter 
angle, ψ, which is determined by the initial direction of the neutron and the  relative locations of 
the scatter target and detector. Because the scatter target and detector are not discrete points, but 
rather consist of a non-negligible volume, the actual scatter angle can vary depending on the 
location of the interactions within both the scatter target and detector. This ultimately results in 
single elastic scatter neutrons with a range of energies being detected and contributes to the 
broadening of the peaks. 
A more thorough analysis, similar to the work done on Compton cameras (Ordonez and 
Chang, 1999), is beyond the scope of this work. However, if it is assumed that the source 
neutrons originate from a single point and both the scatter target and detector are cylinders, then 
it is possible to calculate the range in energies of single elastic scatter neutrons that interact in the 
detector.  As seen in Fig. 5.12, a relative coordinate system that describes the points at the edges 
of the scatter and detector volumes can be determined. In this arrangement, the center of the 
scatter cylinder, point 6, is located at the origin with both its axis and the neutron point source on 
the Z axis. The axis of the detector is aligned with the center of the scatter target, forming the 
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 desired scatter angle ψ. The distance between the source and the center of the scatter target is D1 
and the distance between the center of the scatter target and the center of the detector is D2. The 
length and radius of the scatter target and detector are L1, r1, L2, and r2, respectively. Provided 
these dimensions, which should be fairly simple to determine, and through application of basic 
trigonometry, the relative coordinates of possible interaction points on the edge of the scatter 
target and detector can be calculated. The coordinates of points 1 – 19 in Fig. 5.12 can be seen in 
Table 5.7. 
A good first order approximation of the systematic uncertainty associated with the 
neutron elastic scatter method can be derived using the coordinates found in Table 5.7. The 
interaction points along the edges of the scatter target and detector will provide the largest 
deviation in scatter angle when compared to ψ. For instance, a neutron that undergoes a single 
elastic scatter at point 2 and then interacts in the detector at point 11 will have a different scatter 
angle than a neutron that scatters at point 2 and interacts in the detector at point 13. The actual 
scatter angle, ψA, of a neutron originating from a point source, scattering somewhere in the 
scatter target, and being detected somewhere in the detector, can be calculated using the law of 
cosines: 
 
𝜓𝜓𝐴𝐴 = 𝜋𝜋 − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐−1 �𝑑𝑑12+𝑑𝑑22−𝑑𝑑022𝑑𝑑1𝑑𝑑2 �.     (5.7) 
 
As seen in Fig. 5.13, the variables d0, d1, and d2 constitute the three sides of the triangle 
containing the angle π – ψA, where d1 is the distance between the point source, located at 
coordinates (x0, y0, z0), and the interaction in the scatter target, located at (x1, y1, z1), calculated: 
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 𝑑𝑑1 = �(𝑥𝑥1 − 𝑥𝑥0)2 + (𝑦𝑦1 − 𝑦𝑦0)2 + (𝑧𝑧1 − 𝑧𝑧0)2.    (5.8) 
 
Similarly, d2 is the distance from the scatter location to the point of interaction in the detector, 
and d0 is the distance from the point source to the neutron interaction in the detector. 
 By computing ψA for interactions at the edges of the scatter target and detector, the 
theoretical upper and lower bounds of potential single elastic scatter angles can be calculated. 
These values can then be substituted into Eq. 5.6 to determine the span of En’. Using this 
method, an estimate of the range of scatter angles and neutron energies in the idealized 
simulations was made. For simplicity’s sake, only the simulation containing a water scatter target 
was analyzed. Furthermore, the simulated ideal hemisphere detectors were treated as cylinders 
with their centers 3.048 m from the center of the scatter target, radii of 0.780 m, and lengths 
approximated as 0.390 m. No other simulation dimensions needed to be altered for the 
calculation. The range of neutron scatter angles and energies can be found in Table 5.8. Although 
the realistic simulations were only executed for a single scatter angle of 5π/6 radians, by using 
the source, water scatter target, and detector dimensions, a similar estimate of the variation in 
scatter angle and neutron energy was compiled in Table 5.9.  
 Comparison of Tables 5.8 and 5.9, as well as analysis of the neutron elastic scatter 
method, demonstrates several ways to minimize systematic uncertainty. Reducing L1, r1, L2, and 
r2 creates smaller scatter target and detector volumes for the neutrons to interact in. Similarly, 
increasing D1 and D2 minimizes the solid angle defined by the scatter target and detector, 
respectively. Although these approaches reduce the range of potential scatter angles, they also 
decrease the fraction of neutrons that undergo a single elastic scatter in the target and interact in 
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 the detector. This inherent tradeoff between efficiency and uncertainty must be considered when 
implementing the system.  
Simulations 
In the idealized elastic scatter simulations, as seen in Fig. 5.5 – 5.10 and Table 5.5, there 
are easily identifiable peaks that correlate to the expected energy of neutrons that underwent a 
single elastic scatter event off a nucleus in the scatter target. Even after accounting for the 
neutron energy resolution in the simulations, the peak locations were not always present where 
they were predicted to be by Eq. 5.6. However, the calculated peak location almost always fell 
within the FWHM of the simulated peaks. The wide range of possible scatter angles seen in 
Table 5.7 explains the large FWHM values of the elastic scatter peaks and the shift of those 
peaks away from their expected values. In Table 5.5, the three scatter angles with the largest 
FWHM and greatest difference between the expected and observed neutron energies was 
consistently π/3, π/2, and 2π/3 radians. Due to the geometry, those three arrangements also have 
the largest range in potential scatter angles in the idealized simulations, leading to less discrete 
peaks. Changing dimensions of the scatter target and detectors could help reduce these issues. 
Another factor to consider is the composition of the scatter target. As seen in Eq. 5.6 and 
Table 5.2, a smaller scatter target mass gives a wider range of potential neutron energies because 
more energy can be transferred in a single elastic collision. On the other hand, a larger scatter 
target mass allows for more precise adjustments. A relatively small change in scatter angle 
provides a smaller change in neutron energy when compared to a less massive scatter target.  
For CH4 and H2O, no peaks were observed at energies that would correlate to scatter of a 
1H nucleus. There were not enough single elastic scatters off hydrogen to create a peak that was 
observable above the multiple scatter background. This is unfortunate, because hydrogen gives 
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 the widest range of possible neutron scatter energies. Unexpectedly, there were several instances 
when peaks at multiple energies were seen in the scattered neutron spectra. These occurred for 
9Be, 12C, CH4, and H2O. They were all the result of neutron inelastic scatter off 9Be, 12C, and 
16O. The peaks were not observed at all scatter angles, and in most cases, were significantly 
smaller than the elastic scatter peak. The inelastic scatter and the associated characteristic gamma 
rays could present a problem, increasing gamma ray background and possibly obscuring the 
signal when attempting to identify materials based on their characteristic photons. However, the 
inelastic scatter peaks may also provide an opportunity to further reduce the energy of the 
neutron beyond what is possible with a single elastic scatter, albeit at a potentially lower 
intensity. 
In general, it would appear that the backscatter peaks at 5π/6 and π radians were narrower 
compared to other scatter angles. This is a combination of the smaller range of potential scatter 
angles compared to π/3, π/2, and 2π/3 radians and the neutrons having to pass through less 
scattering target material, which provided fewer opportunities to undergo a second, glancing 
collision that would transfer a small fraction of energy away from the neutron.  
 In the realistic MCNP simulations, the systematic uncertainty was considerably reduced 
when compared to earlier arrangements. However, the resulting neutron spectra were 
significantly more complicated. Even with idealized detectors that identified every incident 
neutron and had a relatively high degree of energy resolution, the spectra suffered when other 
materials were introduced. The peaks that did not coincide with either helium or nitrogen were 
the result of a 5π/6 radian single elastic scatter off 16O and 28Si. These were two of the most 
prominent nuclides in the concrete, which comprised the floor, ceiling, and walls of the 
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 simulated room. During real world deployment, it is expected that similar peaks from nuclides in 
the surrounding environement would also be present.  
Furthermore, the underlying spectral noise is the result of the large, multiply-scattered 
neutron background. Not all neutrons that emerge from the source shield opening will undergo 
an isolated single elastic scatter and enter the detector. Some will interact once or more in the 
room before reaching the detector. Additionally, other emitted neutrons will pass through the 
source shield, possibly undergo one or more interactions, and find their way to the detector. The 
consequence is a large neutron background partially obscuring the elastic scatter neutron peaks. 
When combined with additional peaks from surrounding media, this background complicates the 
resultant spectra and any application using this method. 
Although not perfect, the simulations support the hypothesis that, at least theoretically, it 
is possible to reliably reduce the energy of a fraction of neutrons from a monoenergetic source. 
Provided the user knows the mass of the nuclei in the scatter target and the initial energy of the 
neutrons, the angle of scatter required for a desired final neutron energy can be determined using 
Eq. 5.5.  
Laboratory experiment 
Due to the unlikely nature of a fast neutron interacting in the detector during the 
laboratory experiment, the BF3 tube was surrounded by polyethylene to slow the neutrons before 
they entered the gas detector. This resulted in a complete lack of knowledge of the incoming 
neutron energy. Although it is promising to observe that the presence of water increased the 
neutron count rate, without any way to determine the incident neutron energy, it is impossible to 
know how many of those neutrons underwent a single elastic scatter in the water and how many 
had multiple interactions. Because the detector was set up at π/2 radians, any single elastic 
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 scatter neutrons must be from scatter off oxygen. Due to the masses of the two particles, 1H 
cannot elastically scatter neutrons at that angle. 
To confirm the proposed method of varying neutron energies using different scattering 
target materials and angles, determination of the scattered neutron energies is required. This, 
unfortunately, cannot be accomplished using gross counts. In future experiments, a different 
detector is needed that can provide sufficient neutron energy resolution ranging from a fraction 
of an MeV to tens of MeV in order to identify single elastic scatter neutrons from a 
monoenergetic source. 
Applications and future work 
If the method can be refined and the background neutrons that interact in the environment 
can be eliminated, the single elastic scatter peaks could be used as a source of 
quasi-monoenergetic neutrons. This is not the only way to create neutrons at specific energies, 
but by using a compact D-D or D-T source, the system is considerably smaller and cheaper than 
the particle accelerators typically used. There are several applications that the single elastic 
scatter system could potentially be used with.  
Multiple PFNA, neutron elastic scatter, or neutron transmission measurements could be 
conducted quickly by changing the scatter target or angle to align the new neutron energy with 
peaks and valleys in the neutron attenuation cross sections for various isotopes of interest. 
Observation of the change in the number of neutrons passing through the interrogation target at 
several carefully chosen energies could provide useful information about its composition. 
Although the application is outside the scope of this work, neutron imaging could also benefit 
from the flexibility of a variable energy neutron source. Depending on the density and thickness 
of the interrogation target, the user may want to lower the neutron energy to improve image 
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 quality. Neutron activation measurements could also be improved by aligning the scattered 
neutron energy with cross section resonances of interest, increasing the likelihood of interaction 
and requiring less flux. 
Application of the elastic scatter method to neutron transmission and imaging is only 
feasible if the neutron detection is improved significantly. As seen in the realistic simulations, 
even with shielding, the detector is still exposed to a large number of neutrons at all energies. If 
the detector could determine incident neutron energy, as opposed to gross counts, many of the 
neutrons could be neglected due to having the wrong energy. Instead focus could be paid only to 
the behavior of the elastic scatter peak in the neutron energy spectrum. Unfortunately, the 
neutron background in the simulations obscures much of these peaks. Even with ideal energy 
resolution, the neutrons that interact in the environment must be further discriminated. One way 
to accomplish this is to use neutron time of flight. If the neutron generator can be pulsed at a 
significantly high frequency, or if the generator has associated particle imaging, then the neutron 
time of flight can be determined when the neutron interacts in the detector (Chichester et al., 
2007). If the time of flight does not match the expected flight time for a neutron that undergoes a 
single elastic scatter in the target, then the neutron is neglected. This also provides a method for 
confirming the neutron energy. Future work will focus on integrating neutron energy and time-
of-flight information in to the process. 
Conclusions 
The neutron elastic scatter method provides added flexibility to monoenergetic D-D and 
D-T sources and is an alternative to the larger, costlier, and more complicated particle 
accelerators that are traditionally required to obtain neutrons of specific energies. Although the 
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 method still needs refinement, implementing neutron energy and time-of-flight discrimination 
should significantly improve the neutron elastic scatter signal. With improvements, the cost, size, 
portability, and ease of use of the novel, variable energy neutron system may make it a viable 
accelerator substitute. 
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 Figures 
 
Fig. 5.1: A simulated source and scatter target in a vacuum surrounded by idealized detectors 
placed at regular intervals to determine the neutron scatter spectra at various solid angles 
(radians).  
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a) 
 
b) 
Fig. 5.2: A a) top-down and b) side view of the realistic simulations performed using MCNP. All 
lengths are in meters. 
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Fig. 5.3: A top-down view of the layout of the neutron scatter experiment performed in the Neutron Science Laboratory at the 
University of Michigan. The generator created neutrons at 2.5 MeV. 
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Fig. 5.4: A photograph of the laboratory experiment performed with the D-D neutron generator to the left, scatter target to the right, 
and BF3 detector in the back. 
137 
 
  
Fig. 5.5: The simulated neutron energy spectra at various angles for a 4He scatter target.  
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Fig. 5.6: The simulated neutron energy spectra at various angles for a 9Be scatter target.  
139 
 
  
Fig. 5.7: The simulated neutron energy spectra at various angles for a 12C scatter target. 
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Fig. 5.8: The simulated neutron energy spectra at various angles for a CH4 scatter target.  
141 
 
  
Fig. 5.9: The simulated neutron energy spectra at various angles for a 14N scatter target.  
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Fig. 5.10: The simulated neutron energy spectra at various angles for an H2O scatter target.  
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Fig. 5.11: The simulated neutron energy spectra for the realistic scatter arrangement at 5π/6 radians with helium and nitrogen scatter 
targets. 
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Fig. 5.12: A diagram of the various dimensions and point locations on the source, scatter target, and detector. These relative locations 
can be used to estimate the range in scatter angles for a given arrangement. 
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Fig. 5.13: A diagram demonstrating the application of the law of cosines to determine neutron scatter angle.
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 Tables 
Table 5.1: Examples, for various nuclei, of the calculated single elastic scatter angle required, ψ, 
to achieve a given final neutron energy. The incident neutron has an energy of 14.1 MeV and the 
angles are provided in the laboratory system of reference. 
Necessary D-T scatter angle (degrees) for a given neutron energy (MeV) 
Final 
neutron 
energy 
(MeV) 
Nucleus 1H 4He 9Be 12C 14N 16O 
Mass 
(amu) 1.0078 4.0026 9.0121 12.0000 14.0031 15.9949 
12.0 
 
22.7 46.9 73.6 87.5 96.7 106 
10.0 
 
32.6 70.7 122 
   8.00 
 
41.1 95.7 
    6.00 
 
49.3 131 
    4.00 
 
57.8 
     2.00  67.8      
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 Table 5.2: The calculated final energies of a 14.1 MeV neutron undergoing single elastic scatter 
off various nuclei, in the laboratory system, through a range of angles, ψ. 
D-T scatter neutron energy in laboratory system (MeV) 
Scatter angle 
(radians) 
Scatter angle 
(degrees) Nucleus 1H 4He 9Be 12C 14N 16O 
0 0 
 
14.10 14.10 14.10 14.10 14.10 14.10 
π/12 15 
 
13.15 13.86 13.99 14.02 14.03 14.04 
π/6 30 
 
10.57 13.18 13.68 13.79 13.83 13.86 
π/4 45 
 
7.04 12.15 13.20 13.42 13.52 13.59 
π/3 60 
 
3.52 10.92 12.60 12.96 13.12 13.24 
5π/12 75 
 
0.93 9.64 11.94 12.45 12.67 12.84 
π/2 90 
  
8.42 11.26 11.91 12.21 12.43 
7π/12 105 
  
7.36 10.62 11.40 11.76 12.03 
2π/3 120 
  
6.50 10.06 10.95 11.36 11.67 
3π/4 135 
  
5.84 9.60 10.57 11.02 11.37 
5π/6 150 
  
5.39 9.27 10.30 10.77 11.14 
11π/12 165 
  
5.12 9.06 10.12 10.62 11.00 
π 180     5.03 8.99 10.07 10.57 10.95 
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 Table 5.3: The properties of the scatter targets used in the idealized MCNP simulations. 
Scatter 
target 
Density 
(kg m-3) 
Thickness 
(m) 
Radius 
(m) 
4He 143 0.88 0.30 
9Be 1850 0.11 0.20 
12C 2250 0.14 0.20 
CH4 416 0.32 0.30 
14N 808 0.37 0.20 
H2O 1000 0.20 0.20 
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 Table 5.4: Description of materials simulated for the realistic MCNP scenario. 
Material Elemental makeup (relative 
abundance) 
Elemental makeup 
(weight %) 
Density 
(kg m-3) 
Air  
(McConn et al., 
2011) 
 C (0.001), N (0.755), O 
(0.231), Ar (0.013) 1.2 
Polyethylene H (4), C (2)   940 
Water H (2), O (1)  1,000 
Steel  C (0.2), Fe (99.8) 7,860 
EJ-309 H(5), C(4)  960 
Helium He(1)  143 
Nitrogen N(1)  810 
Soil  
(Eckerman and 
Ryman, 1993) 
H (0.2938), C (0.0187), O 
(0.5045), Al (0.0259), Si 
(0.1354), K (0.0143), Fe 
(0.0027) 
 1,750 
Concrete 
(McConn et al., 
2011) 
 
H (0.56), O (49.81), Na 
(1.71), Mg (0.26), Al 
(4.57), Si (31.51), S 
(0.13), K (1.92), Ca 
(8.29), Fe (1.24) 
2,080 
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 Table 5.5: Estimated peak information for the various scatter targets in the idealized simulations. The energy resolution in the 
simulation was 0.2 MeV. 
Scatter 
angle 
(radians) 
  4He 
 
9Be 
 
Peak 1 
 
Peak 1 
 
Peak 2 
 
Maximum 
value 
(neutrons 
per source 
particle) 
Maximum 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Expected 
Energy 
(MeV) 
FWHM 
(MeV) 
 
Maximum 
value 
(neutrons 
per source 
particle) 
Maximum 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Expected 
Energy 
(MeV) 
FWHM 
(MeV)   
Maximum 
value 
(neutrons 
per source 
particle) 
Maximum 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Expected 
Energy 
(MeV) 
FWHM 
(MeV) 
0   1.02 x 10-1 14.2 14.10 0.4 
 
1.06 x 10-1 14.2 14.10 0.4 
     π/6 
 
2.88 x 10-3 13.4 13.18 1.5 
 
6.17 x 10-3 14.0 13.68 1.0 
 
3.79 x 10-4 11.2 11.23 1.2 
π/3 
 
1.31 x 10-3 11.8 10.92 2.4 
 
6.64 x 10-4 13.4 12.60 1.2 
 
1.81 x 10-4 10.6 10.34 1.3 
π/2 
 
4.47 x 10-4 9.8 8.42 2.6 
 
7.06 x 10-5 12.6 11.26 1.2 
     2π/3 
 
2.58 x 10-4 6.4 6.50 1.5 
 
1.74 x 10-4 10.2 10.06 1.3 
 
1.36 x 10-4 8.2 8.26 1.2 
5π/6 
 
8.77 x 10-4 5.4 5.39 1.0 
 
1.99 x 10-4 9.4 9.27 0.9 
 
2.03 x 10-4 7.4 7.61 0.9 
π   3.04 x 10-3 5.2 5.03 0.4   5.38 x 10-4 9.2 8.99 0.4   3.31 x 10-4 7.2 7.38 0.5 
 
Scatter 
angle 
(radians) 
  12C 
 
Peak 1 
 
Peak 2 
 
Maximum 
value 
(neutrons 
per source 
particle) 
Maximum 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Expected 
Energy 
(MeV) 
FWHM 
(MeV)   
Maximum 
value 
(neutrons 
per source 
particle) 
Maximum 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Expected 
Energy 
(MeV) 
FWHM 
(MeV) 
0   1.07 x 10-1 14.2 14.10 0.4 
     π/6 
 
6.25 x 10-3 14 13.79 0.8 
 
6.34 x 10-4 9.4 9.44 0.8 
π/3 
 
5.47 x 10-4 13.6 12.96 0.9 
 
2.72 x 10-4 9.0 8.88 0.9 
π/2 
 
1.43 x 10-4 12 11.91 1.8 
     2π/3 
 
3.64 x 10-4 11.2 10.95 1.1 
 
4.63 x 10-4 7.0 7.50 0.9 
5π/6 
 
8.00 x 10-4 10.4 10.30 0.8 
 
1.23 x 10-3 6.6 7.05 0.5 
π   1.72 x 10-3 10.2 10.07 0.4   1.48 x 10-3 6.4 6.90 0.5 
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 Table 5.5 Continued: Estimated peak information for the various scatter targets in the idealized simulations. The energy resolution in 
the simulation was 0.2 MeV. 
Scatter 
angle 
(radians) 
  CH4   14N 
 
Peak 1 
 
Peak 2 
 
Peak 1 
 
Maximum 
value 
(neutrons 
per source 
particle) 
Maximum 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Expected 
Energy 
(MeV) 
FWHM 
(MeV)   
Maximum 
value 
(neutrons 
per source 
particle) 
Maximum 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Expected 
Energy 
(MeV) 
FWHM 
(MeV) 
 
Maximum 
value 
(neutrons 
per source 
particle) 
Maximum 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Expected 
Energy 
(MeV) 
FWHM 
(MeV) 
0   9.89 x 10-2 14.2 14.10 0.4 
      
1.16 x 10-1 14.2 14.10 0.4 
π/6 
 
2.94 x 10-3 14.2 13.79 0.6 
      
7.84 x 10-3 14.0 13.83 0.5 
π/3 
 
9.92 x 10-5 13.6 12.96 0.8 
      
7.87 x 10-4 13.6 13.12 1.1 
π/2 
 
4.27 x 10-5 12.0 11.91 1.3 
      
6.47 x 10-4 12.4 12.21 1.3 
2π/3 
 
8.71 x 10-5 11.2 10.95 1.1 
 
7.09 x 10-5 7.0 7.50 0.6 
 
4.41 x 10-4 11.6 11.36 0.9 
5π/6 
 
1.77 x 10-4 10.4 10.30 0.4 
 
2.22 x 10-4 6.6 7.05 0.5 
 
6.75 x 10-4 10.8 10.77 0.5 
π   3.85 x 10-4 10.2 10.07 0.4   2.91 x 10-4 6.4 6.90 0.5   1.39 x 10-3 10.6 10.57 0.6 
 
Scatter 
angle 
(radians) 
  H2O 
 
Peak 1 
 
Peak 2 
 
Peak 3 
 
Maximum 
value 
(neutrons 
per source 
particle) 
Maximum 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Expected 
Energy 
(MeV) 
FWHM 
(MeV)   
Maximum 
value 
(neutrons 
per source 
particle) 
Maximum 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Expected 
Energy 
(MeV) 
FWHM 
(MeV)   
Maximum 
value 
(neutrons 
per source 
particle) 
Maximum 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Expected 
Energy 
(MeV) 
FWHM 
(MeV) 
0   1.10 x 10-1 14.2 14.10 0.4 
          π/6 
 
4.31 x 10-3 14.2 13.86 0.6 
          π/3 
 
1.94 x 10-4 13.8 13.24 1.2 
          π/2 
 
2.00 x 10-4 12.6 12.43 0.9 
          2π/3 
 
1.23 x 10-4 12.0 11.67 0.8 
 
8.02 x 10-5 6.2 6.59 0.8 
 
7.22 x 10-5 5.4 5.78 1.0 
5π/6 
 
3.63 x 10-4 11.2 11.14 0.4 
 
1.45 x 10-4 5.8 6.30 0.5 
 
9.97 x 10-5 5.0 5.51 0.5 
π   7.28 x 10-4 11.0 10.95 0.5   2.14 x 10-4 5.8 6.19 0.6   8.97 x 10-5 4.8 5.42 0.6 
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 Table 5.6: The counts in the region of interest for the laboratory neutron scatter experiment. 
Arrangement Gross counts Live time (s) Counts per second 
Background        50  +  7 2247.78   0.022 + 0.003 
Generator 
with no water 
scatter target 
18,470 + 140 729.36 25.32 + 0.19 
Generator 
with water 
scatter target 
2,3070 + 150 737.22 31.29 + 0.21 
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 Table 5.7: A list of the relative coordinates for the various points found in Fig. 5.12. 
Point X Y Z 
1 0 0 -D1 
2 -r1 0 -L1/2 
3 0 r1 -L1/2 
4 r1 0 -L1/2 
5 0 -r1 -L1/2 
6 0 0 0 
7 -r1 0 L1/2 
8 0 r1 L1/2 
9 r1 0 L1/2 
10 0 -r1 L1/2 
11 (D2-L2/2)sinψ-r2sin(π/2-ψ) 0 (D2-L2/2)cosψ+r2cos(π/2-ψ) 
12 (D2-L2/2)sinψ r2 (D2-L2/2)cosψ 
13 (D2-L2/2)sinψ+r2sin(π/2-ψ) 0 (D2-L2/2)cosψ-r2cos(π/2-ψ) 
14 (D2-L2/2)sinψ -r2 (D2-L2/2)cosψ 
15 D2sinψ 0 D2cosψ 
16 (D2+L2/2)sinψ-r2sin(π/2-ψ) 0 (D2+L2/2)cosψ+r2cos(π/2-ψ) 
17 (D2+L2/2)sinψ r2 (D2+L2/2)cosψ 
18 (D2+L2/2)sinψ+r2sin(π/2-ψ) 0 (D2+L2/2)cosψ-r2cos(π/2-ψ) 
19 (D2+L2/2)sinψ -r2 (D2+L2/2)cosψ 
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 Table 5.8: An estimate of the variation in scatter angle and scatter energy of neutrons in the 
idealized simulations.  ψ Expected 
(radians) 
 ψ A,Max 
(degrees) 
 ψ A,Min 
(degrees) 
Δ  ψA 
(radians) 
Δ  ψA 
(degrees) 
E'n,Expected 
(MeV) 
E'n,Max 
(MeV) 
E'n,Min 
(MeV) 
ΔE'n 
(MeV) 
0 0.78 0.00 0.78 44.9 14.1 14.1 13.6 0.5 
π/6 1.28 0.09 1.19 68.2 13.9 14.1 12.9 1.2 
π/3 1.76 0.24 1.52 87.1 13.2 14.1 12.1 2.0 
π/2 2.25 0.79 1.47 84.0 12.4 13.6 11.5 2.1 
2π/3 2.75 1.35 1.41 80.6 11.7 12.8 11.1 1.7 
5π/6 3.13 1.91 1.22 69.7 11.1 11.9 11.0 0.9 
π 3.14 2.47 0.67 38.5 11.0 11.3 11.0 0.3 
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 Table 5.9: An estimate of the variation in scatter angle and scatter energy of neutrons given the 
detector dimensions and the distance between the source and scatter target in the realistic 
simulations.  ψ Expected 
(radians) 
 ψ A,Max 
(radians) 
 ψ A,Min 
(radians) 
Δ  ψA 
(radians) 
Δ  ψA 
(degrees) 
E'n,Expected 
(MeV) 
E'n,Max 
(MeV) 
E'n,Min 
(MeV) 
ΔE'n 
(MeV) 
0 0.17 0.00 0.17 9.5 14.1 14.1 14.1 0.0 
π/6 0.69 0.35 0.34 19.7 13.9 14 13.7 0.3 
π/3 1.20 0.88 0.32 18.3 13.2 13.5 13 0.5 
π/2 1.69 1.44 0.25 14.4 12.4 12.6 12.2 0.4 
2π/3 2.18 2.00 0.17 10.0 11.7 11.8 11.6 0.2 
5π/6 2.67 2.57 0.10 5.5 11.1 11.2 11.1 0.1 
π 3.14 3.12 0.03 1.5 11.0 11.0 11.0 0.0 
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 CHAPTER 6: EXPERIMENTAL VERIFICATION OF A 
METHOD TO CREATE A VARIABLE ENERGY NEUTRON 
BEAM FROM A MONOENERGETIC, ISOTROPIC SOURCE 
USING NEUTRON ELASTIC SCATTER AND TIME OF 
FLIGHT 
 
Abstract 
 An experiment was performed to determine the neutron energy of near-monoergetic 
deuterium-deuterium (D-D) neutrons that elastically scatter off a hydrogenous target. The 
experiment used two liquid scintillators to perform time-of-flight (TOF) measurements to 
determine neutron energy, with the start detector also serving as the scatter target. The stop 
detector was placed 1.0 m away and at scatter angles of π/6, π/4, and π/3 radians, and 1.5 m at a 
scatter angle of π/4 radians. When discrete 1 ns increments were implemented, the TOF peaks 
had estimated errors between -21.2 and 3.6% relative to their expected locations. Full widths at 
half maximum (FWHM) ranged between 9.6 and 20.9 ns, or approximately 0.56 to 0.66 MeV. 
Monte Carlo simulations were also conducted that approximated the experimental setup and had 
both D-D and deuterium-tritium neutrons. The simulated results had errors between -17.2 and 
0.0% relative to their expected TOF peaks when 1 ns increments were applied. The largest D-D 
and D-T FWHMs were 26.7 and 13.7 ns, or approximately 0.85 and 4.98 MeV, respectively. 
These values, however, can be reduced through manipulation of the dimensions of the system 
components. The results encourage further study of the neutron elastic scatter TOF system with 
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 particular interest in application to active neutron interrogation to search for conventional 
explosives. 
Introduction 
 The work performed in Ch. 5 discussed a method for changing the energy of neutrons 
from a deuterium-deuterium (D-D) or deuterium-tritium (D-T) source. The ability to reliably 
change the energy of a near-monenergetic source has applications to many different fields, 
including active neutron interrogation to search for conventional explosives. The neutron energy 
could be aligned with resonant reaction peaks or valleys to change the chance of attenuation and 
elastic scatter or similarly increase the likelihood of producing secondary gamma rays, thereby 
increasing the detection probability (Overley et al., 2006; Sowerby and Tickner, 2007; Lehnert 
and Kearfott 2010; Lehnert and Kearfott, 2012; Strellis et al., 2009; Whetstone and Kearfott, 
2014; Lehnert and Kearfott, 2014).  
By using a target of known composition, it is possible to predict the final energy of 
monoenergetic neutrons that undergo a single elastic scatter at a variety of angles. As seen in the 
previous chapter, the final neutron energy, En’, can be calculated based on the original energy, 
En, the lab frame scatter angle, ψ, the mass of the scatter target nucleus, ms, and the mass of the 
neutron, mn: 
 
𝐸𝐸n
′ = 𝐸𝐸n(𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2 �𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛2𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(2𝜓𝜓) + 2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝜓𝜓�𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠2 − 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛2𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2𝜓𝜓 + 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠2�.   (6.1) 
 
Conversely, the laboratory frame scatter angle necessary for a desired final neutron energy can 
be determined using: 
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with the arctangent taken such that ψ ranges between 0 and π radians, with 0 corresponding to an 
unscattered neutron and π describing a backscatter event (Whetstone and Kearfott, 2015).  
 In preliminary simulations from Ch. 5, both idealized and more realistic, the neutron 
elastic scatter method showed promise, resulting in a significant fraction of neutrons that 
underwent a single elastic scatter and obtained a final energy that was predicted by Eq. 6.1. The 
proposed method was not without its drawbacks, however. Many of the neutrons created by the 
source did not undergo a single elastic scatter in the target. Instead, they interacted somewhere 
else in the environment, creating a relatively large neutron background in the simulated 
detectors, which obscured the desired signal from the single elastic scatter events. Furthermore, 
laboratory confirmation of the simulation results was difficult because obtaining scattered 
neutron energy information proved problematic. The method of fast neutron detection previously 
employed required slowing of the neutrons in hydrogenous material, thus sacrificing energy 
information. Although more neutrons were seen by a shielded detector when a scatter target was 
present, it was not possible to determine how many of those neutrons were from single-neutron 
elastic scatter.  
Fast neutron spectroscopy is essential to observe whether elastic scatter is an effective 
method of reliably changing neutron energy. With the large background, confirming neutron 
energy is a good way to discriminate neutrons that did not undergo a single elastic scatter in the 
target. Unfortunately, determining final neutron energy directly can be problematic because fast 
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 neutrons generally only deposit a fraction of their energy in an elastic scattering detector before 
scattering out. Alternatively, other popular neutron detectors, such as boron trifluoride (BF3), 
depend on the neutron to first be slowed down by passing through moderating material before 
being absorbed and generating a signal. In both instances, it is very difficult to determine the 
incident neutron energy. 
 A standard alternative to energy spectroscopy is neutron time of flight (TOF). The 
velocity, v, of the scattered neutron can be determined by dividing the distance traveled, d, by the 
neutron TOF. Assuming a non-relativistic velocity, its energy, E’n, can be calculated using the 
kinetic energy equation: 
 
𝐸𝐸′𝑛𝑛 = 12𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣2,     (6.3) 
 
𝐸𝐸′𝑛𝑛 = 12𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 � 𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇�2.     (6.4) 
 
Depending on the timing resolution, this method can provide functional energy information. 
However, it requires two signals to measure TOF. The start signal can be from either the 
generator signaling the neutron creation, or from a detector that the neutron interacted in. The 
stop signal occurs in a detector some distance from the location of the start signal, and indicates 
the neutron’s arrival. The time and distance between pulses can then be used with Eq. 6.4 to 
confirm the neutron’s energy.  
Conversely, if the energy of an elastically scattered neutron is calculated via Eq. 6.1, the 
velocity can be predicted, 
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 𝑣𝑣 = �2𝐸𝐸′𝑛𝑛 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛⁄      (6.5) 
 
and, provided d is known, the TOF can be estimated,  
 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑑𝑑
�2𝐸𝐸′𝑛𝑛 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛⁄
.     (6.6) 
 
Applying neutron TOF allows for discrimination of neutrons that entered the stop detector 
without first undergoing a single elastic scatter in the target. If the neutrons do not have a start 
signal or the correct TOF, and hence the correct energy, they can be quickly neglected. 
Proposed improvements to laboratory setup 
 The method for changing the energy of neutrons from a monoenergetic source, originally 
discussed in Ch. 5, can be enhanced through the application of TOF. The additional information 
allows the user to determine the scattered neutron energy while also neglecting many of the other 
neutrons that were obscuring the signal in the earlier simulations. This will create cleaner, more 
distinct peaks. Furthermore, the proposed improvements can be applied to any monoenergetic 
source while maintaining the simplistic original design. This is accomplished via adoption of 
TOF measurement techniques. In the modified system, the neutron elastic scatter target also 
functions as the TOF detector that generates the start signal.  
The resultant source and detector arrangement, known as the variable energy neutron 
elastic scatter (VENES) system, requires two organic scintillators to be used as fast neutron 
detectors. The detectors consist of hydrogenous material and generate a light pulse when a 
neutron imparts energy to a hydrogen atom. As long as it is above the set threshold, the amount 
of energy deposited and size of the pulse do not matter. They simply act as triggers to signal the 
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 beginning and end of the TOF. The first, or start detector, is placed near the neutron generator. 
The second, or stop detector, is placed at a predetermined distance and angle away from the start 
detector. When the generator is turned on, it will act as a near isotropic source of neutrons. Some 
neutrons will travel towards and interact in the start detector, creating a signal. A fraction of 
those neutrons will undergo a single elastic scatter and be directed towards the second detector. 
Some of those neutrons will interact, creating a stop signal. Using Eq. 6.1, the expected scattered 
neutron energy can be determined and the time for the neutron to travel a set distance can be 
calculated based on Eq. 6.6. 
In addition to providing the start signal, the use of an organic liquid scintillator as the 
scatter target provides an excellent opportunity to interrogate with neutrons having a wide 
variety of possible energies. Since a neutron and 1H nucleus have nearly identical masses, the 
percentage of neutron energy lost through a single elastic scatter can range between 0 and 100% 
for scatter angles between 0 and roughly π/2 radians, respectively. This is an advantage over 
heavier potential scatter nuclei, whose larger masses create an increasingly narrow range of 
scattered neutron energy options across all scatter angles, limiting applicability. 
By using two detectors in coincidence, TOF measurements automatically reduce the 
neutron background associated with operating an isotropic source. Only neutrons that interact in 
the start and stop detectors and within a set amount of time are analyzed. A start signal without a 
stop and a stop signal without a start are automatically discarded. This eliminates source 
neutrons that bypass the start detector and either interact immediately in the stop detector or 
interact in the environment before entering the stop detector. Similarly, neutrons that scatter off 
the start detector at a different angle, never reaching the stop detector, are ignored. Compared to 
the simulations from Ch. 5, the inherent selection bias of TOF measurements will ultimately 
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 result in cleaner spectra with the neutron noise significantly reduced and a more prominent single 
elastic scatter peak. 
By using the start detector as the scatter target, TOF measurements and neutron energy 
information will be available. This will not only permit experimental investigation of the use of 
elastic scatter as a method to reliably vary the energy of neutrons from a monoenergetic source, 
but also significantly reduce the background of the neutron energy spectra in the VENES system.  
Materials and Methods 
 The experimental work was performed with a portable MP 320 D-D neutron generator1. 
The organic scintillators were both cylindrical canisters containing EJ-309 liquid2, which has a 
hydrogen-to-carbon ratio of 1.25. The start detector, which was also the scatter target, was a 
length of 25.4 mm and had a radius of 12.7 mm and was connected to an H10580 photo-
multiplier tube (PMT) assembly3. The stop detector was 127 mm long and had a radius of 63.5 
mm and was connected to a XP4512B PMT4. The start and stop detectors were connected to 
negative high voltages of roughly -1330 V and -1360 V, respectively. They were each calibrated 
before measurements with 137Cs attached directly to their faces. A 12-bit, 250-MHz, eight-
channel digitizer5 collected and processed the pulses. 
The arrival time of each neutron is determined by its pulse’s creation in the detector and 
subsequent appearance in the digitizer. The digitizer has a timing resolution of 4 ns, but it is 
possible to reduce this value through a consistent and fairly accurate method of calculating pulse 
1 MP 320 D-D neutron generator (Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc., Waltham, MA 02451). 
2 EJ-309 liquid scintillator (Eljen Technology, Sweetwater, TX 79556). 
3 H10580 PMT assembly (Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., Hamamatsu City, Japan) 
4 XP4512B PMT (Photonis Technologies S.A.S., Merignac, France) 
5 V1720 digitizer (CAEN, Viareggio, Italy) 
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 arrival times. Through a post-processing algorithm, the pulse’s maximum voltage is determined 
based on the digitizer samples acquired in the waveform. In order to minimize interpolation 
errors, the pulse arrival is defined as the point in time in which its rising edge is at half of the 
pulse’s maximum. This can be estimated by identifying the rising edge data points immediately 
below and above the half-maximum value and assuming a straight line between them. Through 
linear interpolation, the pulse time of arrival can be approximated and is no longer limited to a 4 
ns resolution. The neutron TOF is then simply calculated by subtracting the neutron pulse arrival 
time in the start detector, tstart, from the arrival time in the stop detector, tstop: 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠.     (6.7) 
 
The start detector was placed next to the D-D generator, with its face parallel to the side 
of the generator, centered along the source plane, touching the housing. Throughout the 
experiment, the stop detector was moved relative to the start detector. Measured from the center 
of the front face of each detector, it was positioned 1.00 m away at π/6, π/4, and π/3 radians 
scatter angles. It was also placed at 1.50 m and a π/4 radians scatter angle. When measuring from 
the center of each detector volume, the distance and scatter angle between the detectors increases 
by varied amounts, but always less than 0.06 m and 0.011 radians (0.7 degrees). These adjusted 
values were accounted for when calculating the expected TOF. A diagram of the laboratory 
arrangement can be seen in Fig. 6.1 and 6.2. In order to minimize the effect of the concrete floor 
on the neutrons, the generator and both detectors were elevated off the ground roughly 1.20 m 
using a metal frame to hold the generator and a combination of cinderblocks and metal ring 
stands with clamps to secure the detectors. Extra structural stability was added through generous 
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 application of duct tape. The closest wall was roughly 1.4 m from the center of the neutron 
generator. Images of the laboratory setup can be seen in Fig. 6.3 – 6.5. 
 Although the TOF coincidence measurements helped to significantly reduce background, 
the EJ-309 liquid scintillators also responded to gamma rays, creating coincident pulses in the 
start and stop detectors. During generator operation, the gamma ray background was significant 
and needed to be reduced. This was accomplished using a previously developed pulse shape 
discrimination (PSD) post-processing tool that compared the tail integral of a pulse to its total 
integral (Flaska and Pozzi, 2007; Pozzi et al., 2009; Kaplan et al., 2014; Detection for Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Group, 2014a). Generally, in liquid scintillators, the tail integral to total integral 
ratio is larger for neutrons compared to gamma rays. Through careful selection of parameters 
within the post processing tool, it is possible to eliminate nearly all gamma ray noise in the 
signal. In order to capture as many pulses as possible, the threshold settings for both detectors 
were set at 70 keVee. 
 After PSD, a MATLAB6 script was used to calculate the TOF between the start and stop 
detector and generate a histogram with fixed width Δt. In order to more easily compare the 
somewhat noisy curves, a line of best fit was generated. Using Eq. 6.4, and assuming d was 
constant and equal to the distance between the center of the start detector and the center of the 
stop detector, the TOF histograms were transformed to neutron energy. Given the fixed width of 
Δt and En’~1/TOF1/2, the neutron energy histogram bin widths become wider the larger E’n is. As 
such, it was necessary to normalize the histogram values by their variable bin widths to obtain an 
accurate curve. Next, the MATLAB Curve Fitting Tool found the best Gaussian curve to fit the 
6 computer program MATLAB (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA 01760-2098, 2006). 
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 neutron energy peak, based on r2 value. Finally, the equation of the curve was transformed from 
neutron energy back to TOF by removing the normalization and using Eq. 6.6. 
 In an effort to confirm the neutron elastic scatter in the start detector and benchmark the 
results, Monte Carlo simulations of the experiment were conducted using the modified Monte 
Carlo N-Particle (MCNP)7 Transport Code, MCNPX-PoliMi8. The modified code allows the 
user to obtain precise TOF information from the simulated neutrons, providing more accurate 
and realistic results compared to the original code (Pozzi et al, 2003). The spectra did not require 
PSD because gamma rays were not simulated. The output files were then post-processed using 
MCNPX-PoliMi’s MPPost9 to more accurately model the detector response (Miller et al, 2012; 
Enqvist et al, 2013). The simulation allowed for precise TOF measurements which did not 
require interpolation and provided much smoother spectra. However, in order to mirror the 
experimental post-processing algorithm, once the TOF histogram was obtained from MPPost, a 
process similar to what was employed on the laboratory data was used to determine the best 
curves to fit the neutron energy, and consequently, TOF peaks. 
 The simulated geometry included a generator model, which was provided by the MP 320 
manufacturer, as well as models of the start and stop detectors, their PMTs, and the associated 
housing materials (Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc., 2014; Detection for Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Group, 2014b). The isotropic point source was placed in the generator near the face of the 
deuterium target and produced neutrons of 2.5 MeV. The center of the generator and both 
detectors was 1.23 m above a concrete floor. Just as in the experiment, the start detector was 
7 computer code Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport version 5 (Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 
87545, 2006). 
8 computer code MCNPX-PoliMi v2.0 (Polytechnic of Milan, Milano, Italy and the University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor, MI, USA). 
9 computer code MPPost v2.1.0 (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA) 
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 aligned with the source plane, 53 mm from the point source, with the stop detector placed at the 
same relative distances and scatter angles. The universe extended 3.00 m, with its remaining 
volume filled with air. The concrete walls and all other objects in the laboratory were neglected.   
 Further simulations were conducted where the 2.5 MeV source was replaced with a 14.1 
MeV source to investigate application of this method to a D-T generator. All other aspects of the 
simulation and analysis remained unchanged. 
Results 
The spectra from the detector at 1.0 m and a π/4 radian scatter angle are shown before 
and after PSD in Fig. 6.6. The removal of the peak at roughly 3 ns, which is due to a single 
gamma ray interacting in the start then stop detectors, and the suppression of the background, 
illustrate the effectiveness of the PSD post processing technique. The oscillating noise 
introduced into the spectra from the TOF interpolation technique is also visible. 
The experimental TOF spectra with their associated lines of best fit can be seen in Fig. 
6.7. To better visualize the TOF peaks, each histogram was normalized by the maximum value in 
the best fit line appearing in Fig. 6.8. Similarly, the simulated D-D TOF spectra are presented in 
Fig. 6.9 and 6.10 and the simulated D-T TOF spectra are found in Fig. 6.11 and 6.12. The source 
strength of the experimental D-D generator was not precisely known, but it was assumed to be 2 
x 106 neutrons per second. All spectra were presented with 1 ns resolution and error bars indicate 
the statistical uncertainty. 
The neutron energy spectra and the associated Gaussian curves for the three sets of data 
appear in Fig. 6.13 – 6.15. Due to the relationship between TOF and E’n, the widths of the 
energy bins vary and get larger as E’n increases. In the tens of keV range, due to the shrinking 
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 bin width and contribution from neutrons that underwent multiple scatters between the start and 
stop detector, noise and uncertainty dominate the lower energies of the neutron energy spectra. 
Therefore, that energy range is not shown here. Again, the error bars represent the statistical 
uncertainty of the histogram values. A quantile-quantile plot was also generated comparing the 
scattered neutron energy curve to the Gaussian fit. An example from the simulated π/4 radians D-
D scatter at 1.0 m, between approximately 2.4 and 0.7 MeV, can be seen in Fig. 6.16. The shape 
is typical of all of the Q-Q plots, with most of the points lying near the line y = x. This confirms 
the similarity between the scattered neutron energy spectra and the Gaussian fit. The only 
deviation was from points near the edge of the curve where the Gaussian distribution broke down 
due to contributions from interactions other than a single elastic scatter off hydrogen in the start 
detector. 
Due to the noise in the curves, the peak maximum, peak mode, and the full width at half 
maximum (FWHM) values for the various spectra were determined based on the Gaussian 
curves fit to the neutron energy spectra and the resultant best fit lines for the TOF spectra. The 
values from all the spectra can be found in Table 6.1. The approximated experimental FWHM 
values were between 9.6 to 20.9 ns and 0.56 to 0.66 MeV. The simulated D-D spectra had 
FWHMs ranging from 11.2 to 25.2 ns and 0.58 to 0.85 MeV. Finally, the simulated D-T spectra 
had FWHMs between 5.1 to 12.8 ns and 2.71 to 4.98 MeV. 
Comparing the experimental and simulated D-D data was difficult due to the variation 
between peak maxima at the same stop detector location. Therefore, for a visual comparison 
between the experimental and simulated data, the D-D TOF spectra were normalized by the peak 
height in Fig. 6.17. The percent differences between the experimental and simulated D-D data 
for the TOF peak maximum, peak mode, and FWHM are presented in Table 6.2. 
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 Discussion  
Experimental data 
As seen in Fig 6.6, PSD completely eliminates the gamma ray peak, confirming its 
effectiveness. Furthermore, the background is reduced by approximately a factor of three. For 
comparison, when the stop detector was positioned at 1.0 m and π/4 radians, the maximum peak 
value was reduced by only 11% after PSD. The remaining background seen in the experimental 
results is due to coincident neutron measurements between the start and stop detectors. The 
background is not visible in the simulations because there was only one neutron simulated at a 
time, eliminating the chance for incidental coincident measurements between two neutrons. All 
points in the spectra after the peak are a result of a single neutron first interacting in the start 
detector and eventually, possibly after multiple interactions in the environment, interacting in the 
stop detector. Although not shown in the figures, the simulations contained some negative TOF 
values that were the result of a neutron interacting first in the stop detector and then the start 
detector. As expected, these interactions were much less likely and indiscernible above the 
background present in the experimental results. 
The oscillations present in the experimental TOF data are an artifact of the time linear 
interpolation process. The rise time of the peaks in both the start and stop detectors appear to be 
on the order of roughly 4-6 ns, meaning that for a majority of pulses, the digitizer values will 
jump from at or near baseline to at or near the peak value in a single 4 ns step. In these instances, 
the rising edge half-maximum time, which is linearly interpolated, will fall roughly halfway 
between the two points spaced 4 ns apart, creating an approximately 2 ns offset. Therefore, when 
calculating neutron TOF, the offset, which is present for both the start and stop detector arrival 
times, is canceled out via subtraction. This leads to a majority of the calculated TOF values 
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 falling near a multiple of 4 ns, hence the oscillation seen in the figures. If the pulse rise time was 
slower or the digitizer resolution was higher, this would not be a concern as the points along the 
rising edge would be more evenly distributed. However, since the rise time is so steep, the 
oscillation is an unavoidable byproduct of interpolation. The process of converting the TOF bins 
to neutron energy and fitting a Gaussian peak corrects for this oscillation and allows for easier 
analysis of both peaks. 
The TOF experiments performed as expected. As evident in Table 6.1, the TOF peaks 
were located near the anticipated time. The π/6 radian scatter had the largest peak maximum, 
followed by π/4 radians at 1.0 m, then π/3 radians. This correlates to the relative attenuation 
expected by neutrons of decreasing energy. The π/4 radians scatter at 1.5 m had the lowest 
maximum due to the increased travel distance and smaller solid angle presented by the stop 
detector. Similarly, the smaller solid angle for neutron scatter leads to a narrower energy FWHM 
for the π/4 radian scatter at 1.5 m when compared to the same angle at 1.0 m. The same does not 
hold true, however, when looking at the TOF peaks’ FWHM. There, the additional travel 
distance broadens the FWHM at 1.5 m, even though the neutron energy range is actually 
narrower.  
As discussed in Ch. 5, the detected scattered neutrons will have a range of energies and 
corresponding TOFs due to the non-negligible volume of the start and stop detectors. This, 
combined with the light creation and collection within the detector, PMT, and associated 
electronics, contributes to the broadening of the peaks. However, at π/3 radians the TOF spectra 
has a feature that is not the result of peak broadening. The initial rise in the peak beginning 
around 55 ns, seen in Fig. 6.7 and 6.8, is significantly faster than what a neutron that undergoes a 
single scatter off 1H near π/3 radians is capable. Instead, multiple interactions with the H and C 
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 nuclei found in the EJ-309 liquid scintillator material induce a pulse in the start detector while 
still leaving the neutron with enough energy to arrive at the stop detector sooner than expected 
and alter the leading edge on the TOF spectra. Due to the scattering angle, the threshold on the 
start detector is too large to detect the neutron scatter off a 12C nucleus at either π/6 or π/4 radians 
and could most likely be adjusted to eliminate the π/3 neutrons as well.  
D-D simulation data 
Due to a lack of gamma rays, multiple coincident neutrons, and imprecise TOF 
interpolations present in the PoliMi spectra, the simulations provide a somewhat idealized 
representation of the experimental TOF results. However, it is first important to confirm the 
simulations are properly representing the experiment. Comparing the simulated D-D spectra to 
the experiment, as seen in Fig 6.16 and Tables 6.1 and 6.2, demonstrates a strong, but not 
perfect, correlation between the two data sets. Most glaring is the difference in the maximum 
values of the experimental peaks compared to their simulated counterparts. This is primarily the 
result of the D-D generator having an imperfect isotropic distribution resulting in nearly twice as 
many forward directed neutrons than those emitted at π/2 radians (Csikai, 1987). The generator 
was assumed to create 2.0 x 106 neutrons per second isotopically, which was the value used 
when normalizing the experimental spectra. However, the actual flux was most likely more 
complicated, resulting in the smaller peaks when compared to the simulations.  
Interestingly, the ratios of the simulated D-D peak heights are similar to the experimental 
peak heights. The ratio between the π/6 and π/4 radians scatter at 1.0 m is 0.58 for the 
experimental peaks and 0.55 for the simulated peaks. Comparing π/4 and π/3 radians scatter at 
1.0 m reveals a ratio of 0.29 and 0.40 for the experimental and simulated peaks, respectively. 
Finally, the ratio between π/3 radians scatter at 1.0 m and π/4 radians scatter at 1.5 m is 0.51 
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 experimental and 0.82 simulated. These are relatively close, especially considering the amount of 
noise in the experimental spectra and the uncertainty of the precise peak height. 
When comparing the simulated TOF peak to experimental peak, the largest percent 
difference between the spectra modes is 5.2% at π/6 radians. The disagreement in values was not 
entirely unexpected. Although every care was taken to confirm that the stop detector was set up 
properly in relation to the start detector, as seen in Eqs. 6.1 and 6.6, even a small deviation in the 
distance, d, and scatter angles, ψ, between the two detectors can shift the TOF peak by several 
ns. For example, an uncertainty of + 0.03 m and + 0.087 radians (5 degrees) results in a TOF 
uncertainty of + 1.5, 1.7, 1.8, and 1.8 ns, for scatters at π/6 radians, π/4 radians, and π/3 radians 
at 1.0 m, and π/4 radians at 1.5 m, respectively. Another source of discrepancy is the initial 
energy of the neutron, En. Although it was assumed to be 2.5 MeV in the simulation and when 
calculating the expected TOF of neutrons, the actual value is unknown and may be slightly 
different due to the operating voltage of the neutron generator.  
When comparing the FWHM of the two data sets, although still within the expected 
range, the simulated data set is consistently larger by 16 – 30%. The volumes of the simulated 
detectors were the same as their experimental counterparts. However, since they are liquid, it is 
possible that they were not completely filled and the actual active volume may have been 
smaller. Alternatively, light collection near the edge of the detectors in the laboratory may have 
been inefficient, reducing the effective detector size. Also, the post-processing of the simulated 
data that was meant to mimic the experimental detector response may have broadened the peaks 
more than expected. Even with the broadened peaks, the π/3 radians scatter spectra also shows a 
contribution from elastic scatter off 12C in the start detector, similar to the experimental spectra. 
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 Regardless of the minor irregularities between the simulated and experimental data, with 
the shape and location of the peaks very similar to one another, the simulated results provide an 
effective representation of the behavior of neutrons in the experiment. 
D-T simulation data 
 Although there were no experimental results to compare to, because of the lack of an 
appropriate experimental system, the simulated D-T spectra were still very interesting. Due to 
the higher energy of the neutrons, as seen in Table 6.1, the FWHM of the TOF peaks was 
considerably narrower than either other data set. However, given that E’n ~ 1/TOF1/2, the energy 
range of the neutrons interacting in the detector is significantly larger than the D-D neutrons. 
Furthermore, one of the four energy spectra had peak modes in the same TOF bin as anticipated 
based on Eq. 6.6., while the spectra from π/4 and π/3 at 1.0 m and π/4 at 1.5 m were within 1, 6, 
and 2 ns, respectively. This closer fit is not surprising due to the larger range of neutron energies 
contained in each bin and the shorter TOFs. 
 Similar to the D-D experiment and simulations, the D-T π/3 spectra showed contributions 
from neutrons interacting with 12C. In this case, however, the energy difference was enough to 
form two separate TOF peaks at approximately 22 and 27 ns. The 22 ns peak correlates to an 
elastic scatter, while the 27 ns peak correlates to the inelastic scatter that excites the 12C nucleus 
to the 4.44 MeV energy state (National Nuclear Data Center, 2014). These peaks are relatively 
small compared to the peak from elastic scatter off the hydrogen nucleus, but contribute to the 
detector signal. They must either be taken into account in future experiments, or eliminated 
through higher detector threshold settings. 
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 General observations 
 The forward shift of nearly all the TOF peaks in all of the data sets, as seen in Table 6.1, 
is a result of preferential attenuation of the lower energy neutrons present in the spectra. As 
neutron energies decrease, the probability of the neutron interacting again before reaching the 
stop detector increases. As a result, a larger proportion of higher energy neutrons are counted, 
changing the shape of the TOF peak. This effect is strongest in the lower energy neutron spectra, 
specifically for the experimental and simulated D-D π/3 radians results. For scattered neutrons 
with higher energies, whether due to a smaller scatter angle or D-T source neutrons, the 
proportion of neutrons attenuated is smaller, leading to less of a peak shift. 
 A potential drawback to the VENES system is the relatively low probability for a neutron 
created in the generator to interact in both the start and stop detector. As an example, in the 
simulated D-D spectra for a π/4 radians scatter at 1.0 m, less than four source neutrons out of 
every million contribute to the signal between 50 and 100 ns, which is nearly the entire width of 
the peak and correlates to an energy range of 1.75 MeV. Depending on the source strength, 
measurement times could be on the order of hours or longer. This is not ideal for many 
applications. Larger detectors can increase the system’s efficiency, but as seen in Ch. 5, will also 
broaden the TOF peaks and increase the systematic uncertainty. Strong sources or long count 
times are the only practical solution to correct for this lack of efficiency.  
Although the scattered neutrons are not monenergetic, their TOF, and hence energy 
range, is centered near what was predicted by Eqs. 6.1 and 6.6, confirming it is possible to 
reliably change the energy of neutrons from a near-monoenergetic source. However, in the 
current arrangement, the peak neutron energy range, particularly from the D-T source, is likely 
too wide for many applications. Many of the neutron interaction cross section resonances are a 
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 fraction of an MeV wide and an effective neutron interrogation system should produce neutrons 
whose energy range is on a similar scale. Fortunately, the energy range of the VENES system 
can be adjusted. As previously discussed, the energy resolution is dependent on a combination of 
the distances between the neutron source, start detector, and stop detector as well as the detector 
volumes. The FWHM, as determined via simulation, is approximately 14 to 40% of the potential 
neutron energy range estimated using the method discussed in Ch. 5 (Whetstone and Kearfott, 
2015).  
As an example, using the D-T source and same scatter angles, but increasing the distance 
between the neutron source location and start detector to 1.0 m, the distance between the start 
and stop detectors to 2.0 m, and reducing the size of the stop detector to that of the start detector, 
results in expected neutron energy peaks with approximate FWHM values between 0.26 and 0.48 
MeV. This is a 90% reduction in the energy range at each scatter angle compared to the 
previously simulated arrangement when the larger stop detector was 1.0 m from the start 
detector. The system dimensions can be adjusted further if a more narrow energy range is 
desired. Unfortunately, the increase in distance between components and decrease in stop 
detector volume also results in approximately a six order of magnitude reduction in the expected 
count rate due to increased geometric attenuation and decreased detector volume.  
Another factor in the VENES system’s precision is the width of the energy steps possible. 
Ultimately, this is dependent on the timing resolution of the system and the neutron TOF. As 
seen in Table 6.1, even though the width of the TOF peak decreases as the scatter energy of the 
neutrons increases, the energy range of the neutrons per ns time step increases. Adapting Eq. 6.4, 
the system’s scattered neutron energy step, ΔEn’, can be determined via:  
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where Δt is the timing step. Assuming a constant timing step and distance between the start and 
stop detector, like in the experiment, the scattered neutron energy step will decrease as the TOF 
gets larger and the timing step becomes a smaller fraction of the neutron TOF. In other words, 
the energy step of the system improves as the neutron energy decreases. In the absence of 
improved timing resolution, the energy step can be reduced by increasing the distance between 
the start and stop detector, which increases the expected TOF for a given neutron energy. This 
again results in the timing step becoming a smaller proportion of the TOF and improves the 
energy step of the system across all neutron energies. Again, assuming a distance of 2.0 m 
between the start and stop detector and a timing step of 1.0 ns, the possible energy step for 
neutrons scattered at energies near 2.0, 7.5, and 12.0 MeV are approximately 0.04, 0.29, and 0.59 
MeV, respectively. 
 Another potential limit to the precision of the VENES system is the resolution of the stop 
detector’s angle relative to the start detector. For example, adjusting the stop detector’s location 
in order to change the expected scattered neutron energy from 7.5 MeV to 7.6 MeV requires an 
adjustment of less than 0.0072 radians, or approximately 0.4 degrees. This type of alteration is 
possible, but requires precise movements with little room for error.  
In practice, application of the VENES system will require some flexibility in regards to 
the energy of the scattered neutrons. The neutron energy peak will likely not be narrow enough, 
or precise enough, to fit completely in some of the neutron interaction cross section resonances. 
However, even if the neutron energy peak is wider than the resonance, many of the neutrons will 
still fall within it, altering the likelihood of interactions. Also, other neutron cross section 
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 resonances are approximately the same size or larger than the potential neutron energy peaks, 
allowing for precise alignment. Combined, this makes the VENES system a good option for 
active neutron interrogation. 
The simulated results provided a strong approximation of the laboratory setup. Although 
the peak maximums and FWHM were not precisely replicated, the simulated spectra behavior 
and peak shapes were consistent with what was seen in the laboratory results. Use of MCNP 
PoliMi simulations should be continued to further understand the neutron scattering process 
within the TOF system and help study its use in active neutron interrogation. 
 Based on experimental results, the new method of elastic scatter, confirmed via TOF 
measurements, appears to be an effective method of reliably reducing the energy of neutrons to a 
predetermined value. This was corroborated via simulations of both D-D and D-T neutrons. The 
VENES system is also portable and much less complicated than the large particle accelerators 
that are generally used to create neutrons of varying energies. Further study, both via laboratory 
measurements when possible, and simulations when necessary, is needed to see how this method 
can be applied to different types of active neutron interrogation, including pulsed fast neutron 
analysis, neutron elastic scatter, and neutron transmission measurements. 
Conclusions 
Both the experimental and simulated investigation of neutron elastic scatter of near-
monoenergetic neutrons at specific angles were encouraging. The application of TOF 
measurements allows for both confirmation of the neutron energy and discrimination of source 
neutrons that did not interact in the scatter target. The VENES system provides a relatively easy 
means to create neutrons centered around an energy of the user’s choosing, which could have 
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 tremendous impact upon active interrogation methods in general. Potential challenges include the 
relatively low detection rate and, due to the volumes of the start and stop detectors, potentially 
broad energy range of elastically scattered neutrons. However, these can be partially corrected 
for with careful selection of the neutron generation rate, detector sizes, and relative component 
locations. 
Future work will focus on the adoption of the VENES system to active neutron 
interrogation in search for conventional explosives. The potential to change the energy of source 
neutrons opens up many new avenues of study. Additional experimental and simulation work is 
needed to characterize the method and understand the effects of inserting an interrogation target. 
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 Figures 
 
Fig. 6.1: A schematic view of the TOF system used to determine the energy of neutrons 
elastically scattered off the start detector. 
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Fig. 6.2: A schematic view of the laboratory setup of the TOF experiment. 
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Fig. 6.3: An image from the experimental setup looking down the barrel of the stop detector 
towards the start detector and D-D neutron generator.  
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Fig. 6.4: An image from the experimental setup taken perpendicular to the D-D generator 
cylinder, with the start detector in the foreground and the stop detector in the background. All 
components have been elevated roughly 1.2 m off the ground.  
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Fig. 6.5: An image of the neutron generator with the start detector in front of it. 
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Fig. 6.6: A comparison of the experimental π/4 radians scatter spectra at 1.0 m, both with and without PSD. 
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Fig. 6.7: The experimental D-D TOF spectra, including lines of best fit. 
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Fig. 6.8: The normalized experimental D-D TOF spectra. 
188 
 
  
Fig. 6.9: The simulated D-D TOF spectra, including lines of best fit. 
189 
 
  
Fig. 6.10: The normalized simulated D-D TOF spectra. 
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Fig. 6.11: The simulated D-T TOF spectra, including lines of best fit. 
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Fig. 6.12: The normalized simulated D-T TOF spectra. 
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Fig. 6.13: The calculated experimental D-D scattered neutron energy spectra, normalized by the bin width. 
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Fig. 6.14: The calculated simulated D-D scattered neutron energy spectra, normalized by the bin width. 
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Fig. 6.15: The calculated simulated D-T scattered neutron energy spectra, normalized by the bin width. 
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Fig. 6.16: An example quantile-quantile plot comparing scattered neutron energy data to the Gaussian fit. All generated plots had a 
similar, linear appearance. 
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Fig. 6.17: A comparison of the normalized experimental and simulated D-D TOF spectra. 
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 Tables 
Table 6.1: The TOF and energy peak information based on the Gaussian curve fit to the energy spectra and transformed to the TOF 
spectra. 
    
TOF - line of best fit 
 
Energy - Gaussian fit 
Data set 
ψ 
(radians) d (m)   
Peak 
maximum 
(per 
source 
particle) 
Observed 
peak 
mode 
(ns) 
Predicted 
peak 
mode 
(ns) 
% 
difference 
Estimated 
FWHM 
(ns)   
Peak 
maximum 
(source 
particle-1 
MeV-1) 
Peak 
center 
(MeV) 
FWHM 
(MeV) r2 
Experimental 
D-D 
π/6 1.0 m 
 
2.12 x 10-7 58 56 3.6 9.6 
 
3.57 x 10-7 1.66 0.58 0.972 
π/4 1.0 m 
 
1.23 x 10-7 64 69 -7.3 14.2 
 
2.77 x 10-6 1.36 0.66 0.978 
π/3 1.0 m 
 
3.51 x 10-8 78 99 -21 20.9 
 
1.52 x 10-6 0.87 0.56 0.944 
π/4 1.5 m 
 
1.80 x 10-8 92 101 -8.9 19.4 
 
5.62 x 10-7 1.43 0.65 0.947 
              
Simulated  
D-D 
π/6 1.0 m 
 
3.52 x 10-7 55 56 -1.8 11.2 
 
5.19 x 10-6 1.81 0.77 0.993 
π/4 1.0 m 
 
1.94 x 10-7 63 69 -8.7 18.3 
 
4.37 x 10-6 1.33 0.85 0.992 
π/3 1.0 m 
 
7.72 x 10-8 80 99 -19 25.1 
 
3.56 x 10-6 0.82 0.58 0.978 
π/4 1.5 m 
 
6.32 x 10-8 94 101 -6.9 25.2 
 
2.14 x 10-6 1.33 0.78 0.982 
              
Simulated  
D-T 
π/6 1.0 m 
 
2.04 x 10-7 24 24 0.0 5.1 
 
2.30 x 10-7 9.87 4.40 0.987 
π/4 1.0 m 
 
1.14 x 10-7 28 29 -3. 5 9.4 
 
2.23 x 10-7 6.49 4.98 0.976 
π/3 1.0 m 
 
6.15 x 10-8 36 42 -14 10.9 
 
2.54 x 10-7 4.06 2.71 0.948 
π/4 1.5 m   3.80 x 10-8 41 43 -4.7 12.8   1.10 x 10-7 6.65 4.63 0.959 
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 Table 6.2: The percent differences between the experimental and simulated D-D data, based on 
the lines of best fit. 
ψ 
(radians) d (m) 
Peak 
maximum  
Peak 
mode 
Estimated 
FWHM 
π/6 1.0 m -66.6 5.2 -16.4 
π/4 1.0 m -58.0 1.6 -28.5 
π/3 1.0 m -120 -2.6 -20.1 
π/4 1.5 m -251 -2.2 -30.3 
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 CHAPTER 7: APPLICATION OF A VARIABLE ENERGY 
NEUTRON BEAM TO SEARCH FOR CONVENTIONAL 
EXPLOSIVES USING FAST NEUTRON RESONANCE 
RADIOGRAPHY 
 
Abstract 
 Application of the variable energy neutron elastic scatter (VENES) system to fast neutron 
resonance radiography (FNRR) was investigated for detection of conventional explosives. 
Preliminary work focused on laboratory measurements of transmission rates using neutrons 
whose energy had been reduced to roughly 1.25 MeV by the VENES system in conjunction with 
a deuterium-deuterium (D-D) generator. Transmission ratios varied between 0.0327 + 0.0004 
and 0.559 + 0.003. Monte Carlo simulations were used to benchmark future work, with 
transmission measurement uncertainties ranging between 73 and -36%. The FNRR method was 
simulated using a D-D and deuterium-tritium generator to obtain neutrons with energies ranging 
from 1.0 to 11.8 MeV. Using the least squares method, the elemental composition of nearly all 
materials tested was correctly identified, with the only exceptions being the misclassification of 
the presence of less than 0.006 atomic fractions of nitrogen in paper, toluene, and vegetable oil. 
In general, the largest difference in calculated atomic fraction was 0.013. The results encourage 
further exploration of FNRR and investigation of methods to improve the VENES system 
efficiency. 
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 Introduction 
Conventional explosives can cause significant damage to people and property. Given the 
persistent threat of terrorism and relative ease at which explosives can be obtained and used, it is 
important to continually investigate new and improved explosives detection methods. One field 
of study is based on active neutron interrogation, which directs neutrons at an unknown target in 
order to help determine if explosives are present. There are many different approaches to active 
neutron interrogation that vary in execution, however, they all attempt to identify unique relative 
elemental concentrations of one or more of the following: hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, and 
oxygen (Buffler, 2004; Buffler and Tickner, 2010; Whetstone and Kearfott, 2014). Of particular 
note is relatively high nitrogen content (Gozani, 1994; National Research Council, 2004). 
 Traditionally, the neutron sources used in active interrogation are either based on 
constantly decaying radioactive materials, such as a 252Cf or a combination plutonium and 
beryllium source, or on particle accelerators that initiate fusion reactions, such as deuterium-
deuterium (D-D) or deuterium-tritium (D-T) generators (Knoll, 2010). The neutrons from 
radioactive decay have a broad energy spectrum, ranging across several MeV, while D-D and 
D-T generators create nearly monoenergetic neutrons centered on 2.5 and 14.1 MeV, 
respectively. However, none of these sources may be ideal when trying to determine if an 
unknown target contains explosive materials.  
As seen in Fig. 7.1, the likelihood of neutron-nuclear interactions varies significantly and 
is uniquely dependent on the incident neutron energy (National Nuclear Data Center, 2015). 
Many of the largest cross-section resonances occur between 1 and 10 MeV. Therefore, the ideal 
source is one that has the ability to create nearly monoenergetic neutrons across a range of 
different energies, allowing the user to tune the neutron energy to what is appropriate for the 
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 application. This can already be accomplished through large particle accelerators, but the 
systems are significantly more complicated than other neutron sources and carry much higher 
costs. 
 Fortunately, an alternative to accelerators has been developed. As discussed in Ch. 5 and 
6, elastically scattering nearly monoenergetic D-D or D-T neutrons off a scatter target containing 
nuclei of known mass, and detecting them at a specific and adjustable angle, results in a source 
of neutrons with consistent and variable energy (Whetstone and Kearfott, 2015). This can be 
confirmed via neutron time-of-flight (TOF) measurements. The variable energy neutron elastic 
scatter (VENES) system described in Ch. 6 uses an organic scintillator as both the scatter target 
and a start detector to calculate TOF. Some of the source neutrons will elastically scatter off the 
hydrogen in the scintillator and create a start pulse. Some of these neutrons will then interact in 
the stop detector, creating the stop pulse. Assuming a single elastic scatter and an unattenuated 
flight path, the scattered neutron energy, En’, should correspond to: 
 
𝐸𝐸n
′ = 𝐸𝐸n(𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠+𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2 �𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛2𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(2𝜓𝜓) + 2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝜓𝜓�𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠2 − 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛2𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2𝜓𝜓 + 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠2�,   (7.1) 
 
where En is the initial neutron energy, ms is the mass of the scatter nucleus, mn is the mass of the 
neutron, and ψ is the scatter angle in the laboratory system (Whetstone and Kearfott, 2015). The 
scattered neutron energy can be confirmed via the neutron TOF. Compared to accelerators, this 
method is relatively cheap, compact, and simple. 
 This new method for tuning neutrons can potentially be applied to a variety of explosives 
detection active neutron interrogation techniques, including Fast Neutron Resonance 
Radiography (FNRR). In FNRR, fast neutrons with energies in the MeV range are directed at an 
204 
 
 interrogation target and the change in transmission across that energy range provides information 
as to the composition of the target (Chen et al., 2001; Chen and Lanza; 2002). Fig. 7.1 shows that 
carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen all have localized regions of high and low attenuation at different 
energies, while hydrogen’s attenuation cross section steadily declines as neutron energy 
increases. By carefully observing the changes in neutron transmission for neutrons of specific 
energies, it is possible to determine the elemental densities present in the interrogation target.  
One current method of producing neutrons of variable energy for transmission 
measurements requires accelerating 4.2 MeV deuterons into a beryllium metal target, which 
creates neutrons with a broad spectrum of energies and whose spectroscopic information is 
determined via neutron TOF (Overley et al., 2006). Another option necessitates accelerating 
deuterium ions up to several MeV in a radio-frequency quadrupole (RFQ) accelerator before 
impact with a deuterium target (Lanza, 2007). This results in neutrons whose final energies, due 
to conservation of momentum, are functions of the angle of the neutrons’ initial flight paths 
relative to the incident deuterium ion beam. A previously proposed system had possible neutron 
energies between 1.67 and 5.13 MeV (Raas et al., 2005). By using a D-T neutron generator with 
the recently developed VENES system, the larger accelerators could be replaced, allowing for 
more portability and a theoretical range of neutrons between 0 and 14.1 MeV. The preferred 
neutron energies can be determined through analysis of the total neutron attenuation cross 
section spectra for all nuclides of interest. Assuming an initial neutron energy, En, of 2.5 MeV 
for a D-D source and 14.1 MeV for a D-T source, and provided the user knows the mass of the 
nuclides in the scatter target, the necessary scatter angle required for a desired final scatter 
neutron energy can be calculated with (Whetstone and Kearfott, 2015): 
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 Because an interrogation target has unknown concentrations of H, C, N, and O, several 
transmission measurements are required (Raas et al., 2005). In order to get the greatest 
theoretical contrast in transmission and accurately determine the mass attenuation coefficients of 
the elements of interest, transmission measurements should be conducted at energies where there 
is a large difference between the various nuclides’ attenuation cross sections. Adopting the 
nomenclature from the previous work of other researchers, the neutron count rate in the detector 
for each measurement should be a function of the product of the mass attenuation cross section 
and mass thickness for each nuclide (Chen et al., 2001; Chen and Lanza, 2002). This results in a 
set of equations:  
 
𝑎𝑎1,1𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑎𝑎1,2𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑎𝑎1,3𝑥𝑥3+ . . . +𝑎𝑎1,𝑛𝑛𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 = 𝑏𝑏1 
𝑎𝑎2,1𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑎𝑎2,2𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑎𝑎2,3𝑥𝑥3+ . . . +𝑎𝑎2,𝑛𝑛𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 = 𝑏𝑏2 
𝑎𝑎3,1𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑎𝑎3,2𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑎𝑎3,3𝑥𝑥3+ . . . +𝑎𝑎3,𝑛𝑛𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 = 𝑏𝑏3 
⋮ 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,1𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,2𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,3𝑥𝑥3+ . . . +𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 = 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 
⋮ 
𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,1𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,2𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,3𝑥𝑥3+ . . . +𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 = 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚,   (7.3) 
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 where ai,j represents the mass attenuation coefficient at neutron energy i of nuclide j, xj represents 
the density thickness of nuclide j, and bi is the neutron transmission at energy i, as determined by 
the negative logarithm of the ratio of the neutron count rate in the detector when a transmission 
target is and is not present. If the values of ai,j are known, least squares fitting is used to find the 
optimal solution to this set of equations, providing estimates of the mass thickness of each 
nuclide, with the only constraint being that the number of measurements, and hence number of 
equations, m, must be larger than the number of nuclides that are being solved for, n. The final 
result is an estimate of the relative amounts of H, C, N, and O present in the sample.  
Compared to the work by Raas et al. (2005), the range in energy of the neutrons produced 
using the VENES system will be significantly broader due to the systematic uncertainty 
discussed in Ch. 5 (Whetstone and Kearfott, 2015). This is a result of the varied neutron 
interaction locations in both the start and stop detector creating an array of neutron scatter angles 
and energies. Although this system cannot precisely tune the neutron energy to a specific 
resonance peak or valley, it can still be used to determine the average attenuation across a fairly 
narrow range of neutron energies. 
 The VENES system has several advantages over larger accelerators used for neutron 
transmission measurements. It is much smaller, allowing for its potential use at airports where 
space is limited and accelerators do not fit (National Research Council, 1999). It also provides a 
broader range of possible neutron energies than a similar system by Raas et al. (2005), providing 
access to additional resonance peaks and valleys. Finally, the robustness and ease of use of the 
generator allows for its use in mobile or static applications by a variety of personnel (Chichester 
et al., 2007). The purpose of this work is to examine the applicability of the VENES system for 
use with FNRR when searching for conventional explosives. 
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 Materials and Methods 
Neutron transmission measurements 
Laboratory experiments, similar to those analyzed in Ch. 6, were performed with the 
purpose of understanding the neutron transmission properties of several materials within the 
VENES system. In this experiment, however, transmission targets were placed between the start 
and stop detectors. The transmission materials consisted of various hydrogenous materials 
including melamine, which is often used as an explosive surrogate. The experimental setup was 
nearly identical to the previous chapter. A portable sealed-tube D-D neutron generator1 served as 
the source, which was assumed to be isotropic and create 2 x 106 neutrons per second. The start 
detector, which also served as the scatter target, was a 25.4 mm long, 12.7 mm radius cylinder of 
stilbene2, which has a hydrogen-to-carbon ratio of 0.714. The detectors were connected to a 
photo-multiplier tube (PMT) assembly3. The two stop detectors were each EJ-309 liquid 
scintillators4, with hydrogen-to-carbon ratios of 1.25, contained within 127 mm long cylinders 
with a 63.5 mm radius and connected to PMTs5. The detector assemblies were connected to a 12-
bit, 250-MHz, eight-channel digitizer6 to process the pulses. A 137Cs source was used to calibrate 
all three detectors before each measurement. In order to keep the Compton edge consistent, the 
detector voltage was adjusted as needed. The start detector voltage was kept around 1300 V, the 
stop-1 detector stayed around 1110 V, and the stop-2 detector was kept near 1350 V. 
1 MP 320 D-D neutron generator (Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc., Waltham, MA 02451) 
2 Stilbene crystal (Proteus, Inc., Chagrin Falls, OH 44022) 
3 H10580 PMT assembly (Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., Hamamatsu City, Japan) 
4 EJ-309 liquid scintillator (Eljen Technology, Sweetwater, TX 79556) 
5 XP4512B PMT (Photonis Technologies S.A.S., Merignac, France) 
6 V1720 digitizer (CAEN, Viareggio, Italy) 
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 As seen in Fig. 7.2 and 7.3, the start detector was placed with its front face parallel to and 
touching the side of the neutron generator, with its cylindrical axis aligned with the center of the 
generator’s beam target, allowing the generator’s source plane to bisect the start detector along 
the cylindrical axis. Two stop detectors, which were both placed at a π/4 radians scatter angle 
relative to the start detector, but on opposite sides of the source plane, were used to improve the 
counting statistics while decreasing measurement time. The stop-1 detector was positioned 
towards the front of the generator, which was shorter, while the stop-2 detector was positioned 
closer to the back of the generator, which housed most of the electronics. The distance between 
the centers of the front faces of the start and stop detectors was 1.00 m. The center of the 
generator and all detectors were approximately 1.24 m above the concrete floor. The closest wall 
to the neutron source was approximately 1.4 m away. The stop-2 detector was the closest to a 
wall at about 1.1 m. The generator was supported by a metal frame and the detectors were 
attached to metal ring stands that were set on concrete blocks. Identical materials, used as 
transmission targets, were placed 0.50 m between the start and each stop detector. Photographs 
of the experiment can be seen in Fig. 7.4-6. 
When the generator was powered on and producing D-D neutrons, the same TOF 
measurements were performed as in Ch. 6. In this setup, only neutrons that interacted in multiple 
detectors were recorded. The arrival times of the light pulses created from neutron interactions in 
two separate scintillator detectors were used to determine the TOF of the neutron between those 
detectors. This provides a strong indication of the neutron’s energy after its interaction in the first 
detector. The leading edge of the light pulse was used to determine timing information for TOF 
measurements. The digitizer had a sampling period of 4.0 ns, but that was reduced using linear 
interpolation between light collection data points, resulting in an approximated timing resolution 
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 of 1.0 ns. Measurements were conducted both with no transmission target present and also with 
commercially available paper, melamine, vegetable oil, or water used as individual transmission 
targets, with the center of their volume aligned with the stop detectors’ cylindrical axis. In the 
case of the water and vegetable oil, which were irregularly shaped, the larger volume of the base 
was positioned to be the transmission target. The physical properties of those materials can be 
seen in Table 7.1.  
As in Ch. 6, the results of the measurements were post-processed using pulse shape 
discrimination (PSD) software in order to eliminate gamma ray pulses from the detector signal 
and organize the data (Detection for Nuclear Nonproliferation Group, 2014a). A personally 
developed MATLAB7 script was then used to calculate the neutron TOF between the start 
detector and both stop detectors, create a histogram based on the tallied TOF measurements, 
convert the TOF histogram to a neutron energy histogram, fit a Gaussian curve to the results, and 
use that curve to generate a line of best fit for the TOF data. An example can be found in 
Appendix B. The post-processing was necessary due to the nonlinear relationship between 
neutron energy and TOF: En’~1/TOF1/2. The TOF line of best fit is then used to determine the 
histogram maximum, mode, and asymmetric full width at half maximum (FWHM). To maintain 
consistency, the same region of interest (ROI), based on the unattenuated neutron spectrum, was 
used to determine neutron counts in the presence of all transmission targets, regardless of the 
properties of the resultant curve. Once the total coincident neutron count rates for each 
transmission target was determined in both stop detectors, they were divided by the total 
unattenuated neutron count rate to calculate the transmission ratios of the various targets. 
7 computer program MATLAB (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA 01760-2098, 2006). 
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 In order to benchmark future simulations, the neutron transmission measurements were 
simulated using a modified Monte Carlo simulation tool, Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP)8 
PoliMi9. This allows for precise tracking, on an individual neutron basis, of secondary particles 
resulting from neutron interactions, and provides an opportunity for accurate TOF simulations. 
The setup, which contained air and a concrete floor extending a radius of 3.0 m, included a 
model of the neutron generator provided by the manufacturer and models of the detectors, PMTs, 
and all the housing materials (Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc., 2014; Detection for Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Group, 2014b). An example of the MCNP PoliMi input can be found in 
Appendix A. Simulated neutrons that interacted in the start detector and then made their way to 
one of the stop detectors had their interaction information saved, including the time of each 
interaction and the energy deposited. The results of the simulations were post processed using 
MPPost10 to more accurately model the light pulses created from neutron interactions in the 
detectors. The simulated pulses and their timing information were then analyzed by a MATLAB 
program that performed essentially the same function as the program used on the laboratory data, 
outputting TOF and estimated neutron energy histograms with associated line of best fit and 
Gaussian curves. Again, an ROI was determined based on the simulated unattenuated 
measurement. This was then used to calculate the transmission rates for the various materials. 
The initial simulations were conducted with the same positioning for the generator and 
detectors as in the laboratory and with the same transmission targets, seen in Table 7.2. The 
elemental ratios and densities for all the materials were obtained from McConn et al. (2011). 
8 computer code Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport version 5 (Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 
87545, 2006). 
9 computer code MCNPX-PoliMi v2.0 (Polytechnic of Milan, Milano, Italy and the University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor, MI, USA). 
10 computer code MPPost v2.1.0 (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA) 
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 However, when recreating experiment in MCNP PoliMi, the densities measured in the lab and 
found in Table 7.1 were used in place of the densities provided. Due to a lack of knowledge of 
their precise composition, the paper target was approximated as wood and the vegetable oil was 
approximated as lard. The isotropic point source was placed at the center of the generator on the 
source plane, using the MCNP built-in D-D Gaussian neutron energy distribution function to 
approximate the fusion source. 
Fast neutron resonance radiography 
The next set of MCNP PoliMi simulations was designed to determine if FNRR may be 
performed using the VENES system. An arrangement similar to the previous simulations was 
used, with the same generator and detector models. However, the start detector was moved so 
that it was still aligned along the source plane, but now the center of the detector crystal was 0.25 
m from the point source to reduce systematic uncertainty and narrow the neutron energy range. 
The center of the stop detector was 1.00 m from the center of the start detector and the angle was 
varied so that the detected scattered neutrons would have energies that aligned with various 
regions in the carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen total neutron attenuation spectra. The D-T scatter 
angles were 1.301, 1.208, 1.150, 1.097, 1.047, 0.967, 0.835, 0.736, 0.439 radians, which 
correspond to neutron energies of 1.00, 1.78, 2.35, 2.94, 3.53, 4.55, 6.35, 7.75, and 11.55 MeV, 
respectively. To investigate an alternative method of obtaining neutrons at 1.00 and 1.78 MeV, 
simulations were also run with a D-D source and scatter angles of 0.886 and 0.566 radians.  
Again, the built-in functions were used to simulate the Gaussian energy distribution of 
the D-D and D-T source. However, in order to reduce the required computational resources, the 
simulated source only produced neutrons that were directed towards the start detector. The 
neutron point source emitted neutrons in a cone whose apex was 0.140 radians. Assuming that 
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 only neutrons initially directed at the start detector would contribute a signal to the TOF 
spectrum, this improves simulation run times significantly. All normalized simulated values 
reported as “per source particle” assume an isotropic source and are corrected by approximately 
a factor of 820, which is the ratio of 4π steradians to the solid angle defined by the source cone. 
Compared to isotropic simulations in Ch. 6, there is no significant difference in the peak size or 
background.  
The same calibration and test methods as discussed in Raas et al. (2005) were 
implemented in these simulations. As seen in Table 7.2, the calibration transmission targets are 
graphite, polyethylene, water, and melamine. For the purposes of these simulations, it is assumed 
the calibration targets’ thicknesses, densities, and compositions are well known. The first step of 
the simulated measurements was to obtain the neutron count rates at each scatter angle with no 
transmission target present. Then, the graphite block was used to estimate carbon’s neutron 
attenuation coefficient at each scatter angle via the new detector count rate. Once these were 
determined, the polyethylene target was simulated at all scatter angles. Since the carbon 
attenuation coefficients had already been calculated from the graphite transmission target, it was 
possible to determine the hydrogen attenuation coefficients via transmission count rates. Once 
these were estimated, simulated measurements of the water calibration target allowed calculation 
of the oxygen attenuation coefficients at all angles. Finally, the nitrogen attenuation coefficients 
were determined via transmission measurements of melamine.  
Both the calibration and test transmission targets, which provided a good representation 
of low atomic number materials and are described in Table 7.2, had a height and width of 0.15 
m, were centered along the cylindrical axis of the stop detectors, and were placed 0.50 m from 
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 the center of both the start and stop detector. Every transmission target had a thickness of 0.05 m, 
which was expected to reduce neutron transmission by approximately a factor of two.  
The test transmission targets were simulated at each scatter angle and transmission 
measurements were performed using a set ROI based on the mode of the unattenuated TOF 
spectrum. The calculated attenuation coefficients and transmission target count rates were 
inserted in to Eq. 7.3. The composition, thickness, and density of the transmission targets were 
treated as unknowns. A MATLAB least squares fitting function was used to determine the 
relative nuclide abundance in each material tested, with the only constraint being that no values 
were allowed to be negative. 
In order to better understand the effect of counting uncertainty on the determination of 
atom fractions, random normalized uncertainty with a standard deviation of 5.0% was added to 
each transmission ratio. The least squares method was again used to estimate the atom fractions 
of H, C, N, and O. This was repeated 10,000 times for each transmission target and the standard 
deviation in atom fraction for each nuclide was found. 
Results 
Neutron transmission measurements 
The laboratory transmission measurement data can be seen in Table 7.3, with paper 
having the highest transmission ratio, and water the lowest. The table also includes the calculated 
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). The requirement for a neutron to interact in both the start and stop 
detector, when combined with gamma ray PSD, results in a greatly reduced signal background. 
However, there is still some background throughout the entire TOF range that is the result of two 
different source neutrons coincidentally interacting in both detectors within a several hundred 
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 nanosecond time frame. This background was accounted for when determining transmission 
ratios.  
As illustrated in Fig. 7.7, the mode and FWHM for the unattenuated peak defined the 
ROI used to determine the total neutron counts in the stop detectors, with only histogram bins 
completely within the FWHM being used. The ROI was defined as 58 – 73 ns. The individual 
stop detector TOF spectra are also visible in the figure and vary significantly from one another, 
having modes of 65 and 62 ns, heights of 9.8 x 10-8 and 6.2 x 10-8 neutrons per source particle, 
and FWHMs of 16.2 and 14.8 ns, respectively. It was anticipated they would be much closer in 
shape and size. Their differing peak modes result in an increased FWHM for the combined peak 
than would otherwise be expected. All count rate determinations were performed based solely on 
the combined peak FWHM. The TOF spectra for all transmission targets are presented in Fig. 
7.8. 
The simulated transmission TOF spectra can be seen in Fig. 7.9. The transmission data, 
which is based on an ROI of 57 – 73 ns, is presented in Table 7.4 and includes a calculation of 
the differences relative to the laboratory measurements. The SNR was not calculated because 
only a single neutron was simulated at a time, eliminating the possibility for two coincident 
neutrons to interact in the start and stop detector within a short time frame. This reduced the 
simulated system background to zero. All other sources of noise, such as improperly 
discriminated gamma rays, potential dark current, or contributions from naturally occurring 
background radiation, were also not present. The transmission results varied significantly 
compared to the previous measurements. The spectra for the stop-1 and stop-2 detectors were 
nearly identical, with both having peak modes of 63 ns and peak heights of 1.9 x 10-7 neutrons 
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 per source particle. The estimated FWHM was 17.6 ns for the start-1 detector and 18.0 ns for the 
stop-2 detector. 
Fast neutron resonance radiography 
After the initial simulations with no transmission target, it was decided that the D-T 
scatter at 1.30 and 1.21 radians, which scattered neutrons at energies of approximately 1.00 and 
1.78 MeV, respectively, were unsuitable for FNRR measurements, at least in the configuration 
used. The TOF spectra were much broader than higher energy scattered neutrons, with modes 
near 35 ns, instead of the predicted 73 and 55 ns. The irregular spectra were composed primarily 
of contributions from both neutron elastic and inelastic scatter off carbon nuclei in the start 
detector. When combined with the decreased likelihood of the desired neutrons reaching the 
detector due to their low energy, the expected TOF peak was not discernable above the noise. 
This problem persisted, even when the simulated start detector threshold was increased in an 
attempt to eliminate all contributions from neutron scatter off carbon. As seen in Fig. 7.10, this 
issue was also evident in the 1.15 radian, 2.35 MeV scatter. However, by increasing the start 
detector threshold to nearly 2 MeV, the expected TOF peak became much more definitive, 
allowing for its use in the simulated NRR measurements. 
The peak information, at all scatter angles, for the simulations with no transmission target 
can be seen in Table 7.5. ROIs were applied consistently to each transmission measurement, 
even if the peak shape had been altered, with the ROI centered around the unattenuated peak 
mode for each neutron energy. Calculations were performed using count rates from ROIs that 
contained 1, 3, and 5 histogram bins, with each bin being 1.0 ns wide. The results from the 3 bin 
calculations are presented here because that width provided better statistics than a single bin, but 
did not greatly exceed the FWHM for some of the higher energy scattered neutron peaks. The 
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 statistical uncertainty for the 3 bin ROI count rate was below 1.2% for every transmission target 
simulation. It should be noted that the results from the 1 bin and 5 bin calculations did not vary 
significantly compared to the 3 bin ROI. The absolute difference between what was presented 
and the calculated atom fractions for the 1 and 5 bin ROIs was 0.021 or less. 
The simulated transmission ratios for the calibration targets can be seen in Table 7.6. 
These were used to calculate the various cross sections at each neutron energy, as seen in Table 
7.7 and provided values for ai,j in Eq. 7.3. The transmission ratios for the test targets, which were 
used as bi, are presented in Table 7.8. A least squares fit determined the optimal values for xj, 
estimating the total elemental composition and density of the transmission target. The results of 
those calculations can be found in Table 7.9. The atom fraction estimated standard deviations, 
after randomized uncertainty was added to the transmission ratios, can be seen in Table 7.10. 
 
Discussion 
Neutron transmission measurements 
There were some discrepancies between the measured transmission data and the 
simulations. One issue complicating the stop-2 signal was that the ring stand and clamp holding 
the start detector in place was positioned between it and the stop-2 detector, as seen in Fig. 7.6. 
This material was not modeled in the MCNP simulations presented. When a 10 mm sheet of iron 
was modeled in roughly the same location, the stop-2 peak was similarly depressed, but the peak 
mode was unchanged. The difference between the stop-1 and stop-2 modes was most likely due 
to slight variations in their locations relative to the start detector. As explained in Ch. 6, even 
though every effort was taken to accurately measure the placement of the stop detectors, a 
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 difference of a couple centimeters or a fraction of a radian can result in a TOF difference of 
multiple nanoseconds. 
Similarly, although the dimensions and mass of the transmission targets could be 
measured directly, it was more difficult knowing precisely what was in the containers. Vegetable 
oil and paper had to be approximated as their closest counterparts, wood and lard, respectively, 
because accurate descriptions of their compositions could not be found. In conjunction with this, 
each transmission target had different types of containers, which were not modeled. They were 
all some type of plastic, but the water and vegetable oil containers were fairly thin, while 
melamine’s container was thicker. As seen in Fig. 7.1, misrepresenting the H, C, and O 
composition can result in significantly different transmission ratios at 1.25 MeV. Fortunately, 
FNRR can correct for some of these issues, since it uses multiple measurements of the same 
target to determine its composition. To a degree, unknown quantities that are not canceled out by 
the transmission ratios will become a constant factor in the calculations and should not 
negatively affect the system of equations or its ability to be solved by the least squares method. 
The inherent background suppression of TOF measurements provides a strong SNR for 
transmission targets with lower density thickness. However, there are still some coincident 
neutron contributions to the TOF background. The continued decrease in SNR as the target 
density thickness increased was not unexpected, but it indicates a limit to the effectiveness of 
transmission measurements, particularly at lower neutron energies. Further reduction in the 
coincident neutron background could be possible with application of previously demonstrated 
shielding material around the neutron generator or stop detectors (Whetstone and Kearfott, 
2011). 
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 Fast neutron resonance radiography 
The results of the FNRR simulations were very encouraging. The method, when paired 
with the VENES system, managed to correctly identify nearly all the elements present in each 
transmission target. The only minor exception was the 0.003 nitrogen atomic fraction missed in 
the paper target. The largest absolute difference between the calculated and actual atomic 
fraction was only 0.013 for all targets. Just as promising, the only nuclide that was not present 
and misidentified was nitrogen with erroneous 0.006 and 0.005 estimated atomic fractions in the 
toluene and vegetable oil targets, respectively. This lack of misidentification is especially 
important for limiting false alarms. Fortunately, the average nitrogen atomic fraction in 
conventional explosives is over 0.20, so the size of the differences seen in the simulations should 
not be of major concern (National Research Council, 2004). The method also correctly identified 
the density thickness of the transmission target, which could be information that is valuable to 
personnel searching for contraband. 
Preliminarily, there was concern that the relatively broad energy spectrum from the 
scattered neutrons seen in Ch. 6 would not be precise enough to align with the resonance peaks 
of interest. This appears to be unfounded. Many of the tested neutron energy regions of the 
attenuation cross sections were roughly consistent across a fairly broad range, allowing for some 
variation while still interacting with the peaks and valleys of the attenuation spectrum. 
Furthermore, the method for calculating the individual cross sections was not limited to neutrons 
of a single energy. Without any additional work or calculations, the method provided an accurate 
cross section that was precisely weighted to the neutron energy spectrum presented by the 
VENES system. This allowed it to essentially self-correct for any neutron energy variation 
encountered during measurements at a given scatter angle. 
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 Even though the investigated system included air, ground, generator and detector 
housings, and realistic detector responses and neutron energy spectra, it is important to 
remember that the calculated atom fractions are the result of simulations. Ch. 6 helped confirm 
that MCNP PoliMi could accurately model the shape of the TOF peaks and the basic behaviors 
of neutrons produced via VENES. However, measurements in the real world can have additional 
sources of uncertainty, such as poor counting statistics or systematic issues. Although some of 
this may be corrected for when calculating count rate ratios, the laboratory results will almost 
certainly be different than the more idealized simulated results.  
 As seen in Table 7.10, the random perturbations inserted into each of the transmission 
ratios used in the system of linear equations led to significant standard deviations. This is not 
entirely unexpected, as the inclusion of nine different uncertainties will make estimation of the 
atomic fractions via least squares method more difficult. The deviation in atom fraction values 
resulting from uncertainties of this magnitude could potentially obscure the relatively high 
characteristic nitrogen and oxygen content of explosives. This analysis illustrates the need for 
careful and accurate neutron counting when implementing the VENES system. Reducing the 
neutron energy spectra at a given angle via smaller detector volumes, or placing larger distances 
between the detectors, may limit the deviation introduced by the uncertainty. The smaller 
neutron energy range would allow for a tighter focus on the resonant attenuation peaks and 
valleys, leading to greater differentiation between the cross sections of the nuclides and provide 
more contrast at the different neutron energies. This, unfortunately, would come at the cost of 
counting efficiency. 
 Calculations were also performed using only neutrons derived from the D-T source, 
meaning that the equations pertaining to transmission measurements at 1.00 and 1.78 MeV were 
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 not included. The results were nearly identical, with the magnitude of the atom fraction 
differences being the same as those presented here. This would allow for implementation of 
FNRR with the VENES system using a single neutron source. The primary drawback is that 
when introducing uncertainty to the transmission measurements, the standard deviation of the 
atom fraction uncertainty increases anywhere between 0.005 and 0.111. This is not unexpected, 
given that the number of equations used for least squares fitting has been reduced, but must be 
accounted for when determining how to implement the system. 
Future work 
As seen in the earlier neutron transmission laboratory experiment, measurements are 
always more complicated in the real world. Still, the accuracy with which the simulated VENES 
system was able to accurately identify atomic ratios when paired with FNRR warrants further 
investigation.  
The primary drawback to this method is the relatively low efficiency of the VENES 
system due to the requirement that source neutrons must first interact in the start detector before 
they can contribute to the stop detector signal. The simulated count rates in the largest TOF 
histogram bins ranged between 10-8 and 10-10 counts per source neutron. Given that the source 
strength of the MP 320 D-T generator is approximately 1 x 108 neutrons per second, count times 
in this arrangement could last on the order of minutes to hours at each scatter angle. Fortunately, 
several D-T generators with increased neutron output are being developed. Currently, generators 
of various sizes with outputs ranging between 1012 and 1013 D-T neutrons per second are being 
advertised (Phoenix Nuclear Labs, 2015). Additionally, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
has patented a fusion generator design that can theoretically produce up to 1014 or more D-T 
neutrons per second (Leung, 2005; Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 2015). Improved 
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 neutron output rates at or near this magnitude would help decrease count times while 
accommodating some decreased efficiency associated with the reduction of systematic 
uncertainties. 
In addition to finding a stronger neutron source or increasing the ROI, the count time can 
be decreased by modifying the simulated setup and reducing the distance between detectors or 
increasing the detector size. This would improve detection efficiency, but also further broaden 
the neutron energy spectrum. Given the preliminary results, this may be an acceptable tradeoff. 
Similarly, multiple start and stop detectors could be used at once, provided the slight variation in 
scatter angle and neutron energies between different detectors does not significantly impact the 
nuclide detection capabilities. Additional research is necessary to determine the limits of detector 
size and positioning relative to the scattered neutron energy spectrum. 
Not all potential interrogation targets are composed entirely of H, C, N, and O, so future 
work is warranted to see how the method responds to other nuclides. Perhaps, as was suggested 
previously, a fifth generic nuclide should be included in Eq. 7.3 that has a set cross section and is 
treated as an amalgam of all other elements (Chen et al., 2001). Alternatively, this method could 
work as secondary screening after a primary method, such as x-ray interrogation, has flagged 
suspicious hydrogenous material. 
Conclusions 
As seen in the neutron transmission measurements, the VENES system has many 
qualities that allow it to work well with FNRR. It can discriminate signals from many of the 
background neutrons, produce neutrons over a broader range of energy than other systems 
previously tested, and is relatively cheap, robust, and portable.  
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 The preliminary results from simulated VENES FNRR measurements show an excellent 
agreement between the calculated and actual elemental abundances. Further investigation of this 
method should continue, with particular focus paid to confirming the simulated results via 
laboratory measurements, increasing the system’s efficiency, and determining how the system 
responds to materials containing elements in addition to H, C, N, and O. 
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 Figures 
 
Fig. 7.1: The attenuation cross sections for 1H, C, 14N, and 16O between 0 and 15 MeV (NNDC, 2015). 
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Fig. 7.2: A close, top-down view of the arrangement for the neutron transmission measurements.   
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Fig. 7.3: A broad, top-down view of the laboratory arrangement for the neutron transmission 
measurements.
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Fig. 7.4: A picture of the laboratory setup for the unattenuated neutron transmission measurements, with the stop-1 detector in the 
foreground and start detector and D-D generator to the left. 
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Fig. 7.5: A picture of the laboratory setup for the paper neutron transmission measurements, 
behind the stop-1 detector, facing the paper transmission target and D-D generator. 
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Fig. 7.6: A picture of the laboratory setup for the vegetable oil neutron transmission measurements, with the stop-2 detector in the 
foreground and start detector and D-D generator located to the right. 
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Fig. 7.7: The TOF spectra from the unattenuated laboratory neutron transmission measurement. It illustrates how the ROI was 
determined and the discrepancy between the two stop detector spectra. 
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Fig. 7.8: The combined TOF spectra for the various neutron transmission measurements performed in the laboratory. 
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Fig. 7.9: The combined TOF spectra for the various simulated neutron transmission measurements. 
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Fig. 7.10: The simulated unattenuated TOF spectra of roughly 2.4 MeV neutrons with a high and low start detector threshold. 
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 Tables 
Table 7.1: The physical properties of the transmission targets used in the laboratory 
measurements. 
Transmission 
target 
Depth 
(mm) 
Width 
(mm) 
Height 
(mm) 
Density 
(kg/m3) 
Paper 49 216 279 757 
Melamine 120 120 200 868 
Vegetable oil 137 151 140 959 
Water 145 145 92 1000 
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 Table 7.2: The elemental composition of the simulated transmission targets for both the neutron 
transmission and FNRR measurements. The densities provided were used during the FNRR 
simulations (McConn et al., 2011). 
Transmission target 
Atom fractions Density 
(kg/m3) H C N O 
Test material 
     Acetone 0.600 0.300 0 0.100 790
Ammonium nitrate 0.444 0 0.222 0.333 1720 
Methanol 0.667 0.167 0 0.167 791 
Sucrose 0.489 0.267 0 0.244 850 
Paper 0.464 0.324 0.003 0.209 757 
Toluene 0.533 0.467 0 0 867 
Vegetable oil 0.621 0.345 0 0.034 959 
Calibration material 
     Graphite 0 1.000 0 0 1700 
Polyethylene 0.667 0.333 0 0 930 
Water 0.667 0 0 0.333 1000 
Melamine 0.389 0.278 0.333 0 1350 
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 Table 7.3: Results from the laboratory D-D transmission measurements. 
Transmission 
target 
Total 
counts 
ROI Counts 
per minute 
% 
uncertainty   Ratio 
% 
uncertainty   SNR 
% 
uncertainty 
None 96549 248 0.32 
 
- - 
 
24.9 1.2 
Paper 83067 138 0.35 
 
0.559 0.47 
 
19.8 1.1 
Melamine 17956 28.5 0.75 
 
0.115 0.81 
 
8.5 1.7 
Vegetable oil 9695 9.50 1.0 
 
0.0384 1.1 
 
3.6 1.7 
Water 8254 8.09 1.1  0.0327 1.1  3.2 1.8 
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 Table 7.4: Results from the simulated D-D neutron transmission measurements. 
Transmission 
target 
ROI counts 
per source 
particle 
% 
uncertainty Ratio 
% 
uncertainty 
% difference 
vs laboratory 
data 
None 5.31 x 10-6 0.31 - - - 
Paper 7.90 x 10-7 0.56 0.149 0.64 73.4 
Melamine 8.28 x 10-7 0.55 0.156 0.63 -35.5 
Vegetable oil 9.72 x 10-8 1.60 0.0183 1.6 52.3 
Water 1.12 x 10-7 1.49 0.0212 1.5 35.2 
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 Table 7.5: Unattenuated peak information for simulated FNRR measurements. 
En' 
(MeV) 
Predicted 
peak 
mode (ns) 
Observed 
peak 
mode (ns) 
ROI counts 
per particle 
% 
Uncertainty 
Estimated 
FWHM (ns) 
D-D 
     1.00 72.3 70 9.45 x 10-8 0.11 12.3 
1.78 54.2 54 2.28 x 10-7 0.07 6.8 
D-T 
     2.35 47.2 40 2.55 x 10-9 0.69 6.7 
2.94 42.2 39 1.43 x 10-8 0.29 6.7 
3.53 38.5 38 3.29 x 10-8 0.19 7.2 
4.55 33.9 34 5.17 x 10-8 0.15 6.7 
6.35 28.7 29 7.81 x 10-8 0.12 4.7 
7.75 26.0 26 9.40 x 10-8 0.11 3.6 
11.55 21.3 22 1.12 x 10-7 0.10 2.4 
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 Table 7.6: The simulated neutron transmission ratios across a 3.0 ns ROI for the calibration materials. 
  Calibration material transmission ratios 
En' 
(MeV) Graphite 
% 
uncertainty Polyethylene 
% 
uncertainty Water 
% 
uncertainty Melamine 
% 
uncertainty 
1.00 0.343 0.6 0.123 1.0 0.108 1.1 0.259 0.7 
1.78 0.457 0.3 0.218 0.5 0.276 0.4 0.329 0.4 
2.35 0.525 1.2 0.390 1.3 0.483 1.2 0.490 1.2 
2.94 0.441 0.5 0.306 0.9 0.359 0.8 0.408 0.8 
3.53 0.395 0.4 0.296 0.6 0.334 0.6 0.394 0.5 
4.55 0.501 0.3 0.373 0.4 0.433 0.4 0.451 0.4 
6.35 0.643 0.2 0.485 0.4 0.541 0.4 0.554 0.4 
7.75 0.547 0.2 0.484 0.5 0.576 0.5 0.542 0.5 
11.55 0.602 0.4 0.582 0.4 0.614 0.4 0.603 0.4 
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 Table 7.7: Calculated attenuation cross sections at various energies, based on simulated 
transmission measurements of calibration targets and a 3.0 ns ROI. 
En' 
Attenuation cross sections (b) 
H C N O 
1.00 3.99 2.51 1.61 5.33 
1.78 2.90 1.84 1.97 1.90 
2.35 1.60 1.51 1.29 1.15 
2.94 2.01 1.92 1.62 2.12 
3.53 1.96 2.18 1.66 2.64 
4.55 1.66 1.62 1.64 1.69 
6.35 1.30 1.03 1.29 1.08 
7.75 1.11 1.42 1.32 1.09 
11.55 0.76 1.19 1.26 1.40 
 
240 
 
  
Table 7.8: The simulated neutron transmission ratios across a 3.0 ns ROI for the interrogation materials. 
  Test material transmission ratios 
En' 
(MeV) Acetone 
% 
uncertainty 
Ammonium 
nitrate 
% 
uncertainty Methanol 
% 
uncertainty Paper 
% 
uncertainty 
1.00 0.103 1.1 0.220 0.8 0.168 0.9 0.324 0.6 
1.78 0.253 0.5 0.361 0.4 0.319 0.4 0.500 0.3 
2.35 0.448 1.2 0.533 1.2 0.509 1.2 0.648 1.1 
2.94 0.322 0.9 0.439 0.8 0.407 0.8 0.547 0.7 
3.53 0.292 0.6 0.422 0.5 0.389 0.5 0.523 0.5 
4.55 0.382 0.4 0.506 0.4 0.476 0.4 0.612 0.3 
6.35 0.492 0.4 0.611 0.4 0.581 0.4 0.707 0.4 
7.75 0.515 0.5 0.608 0.5 0.595 0.5 0.696 0.4 
11.55 0.534 0.5 0.678 0.4 0.659 0.4 0.738 0.4 
 
  Test material transmission ratios 
En' 
(MeV) Sucrose 
% 
uncertainty Toluene 
% 
uncertainty 
Vegetable 
oil 
% 
uncertainty 
1.00 0.262 0.7 0.247 0.7 0.147 0.9 
1.78 0.449 0.4 0.359 0.4 0.257 0.5 
2.35 0.611 1.1 0.514 1.2 0.431 1.3 
2.94 0.502 0.7 0.430 0.8 0.340 0.8 
3.53 0.476 0.5 0.414 0.5 0.326 0.6 
4.55 0.570 0.4 0.496 0.4 0.408 0.4 
6.35 0.672 0.4 0.606 0.4 0.521 0.4 
7.75 0.666 0.5 0.582 0.5 0.516 0.5 
11.55 0.708 0.4 0.666 0.4 0.603 0.4 
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 Table 7.9: The calculated elemental composition of the simulated interrogation targets using a 3.0 ns ROI. 
  Atom fractions Total 
density 
thickness 
(kg/m2) 
% 
difference 
Transmission 
target H 
% 
difference C 
% 
difference N 
% 
difference O 
% 
difference 
Acetone 0.597 0.5 0.303 -1.1 0.000 NA 0.099 0.5 39.9 -1.09 
Ammonium 
nitrate 0.455 -2.3 0.000 NA 0.213 4.0 0.332 0.4 84.2 2.04 
Methanol 0.668 -0.2 0.160 4.2 0.000 NA 0.172 -3.2 39.7 -0.27 
Paper 0.453 2.3 0.331 -2.1 0.000 100.0 0.216 -3.2 39.0 -2.94 
Sucrose 0.482 1.4 0.262 1.6 0.000 NA 0.256 -4.6 43.5 -2.41 
Toluene 0.520 2.5 0.474 -1.6 0.006 NA 0.000 NA 44.7 -3.18 
Vegetable oil 0.617 0.6 0.340 1.4 0.005 NA 0.038 -10.1 48.6 -1.40 
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 Table 7.10: The atomic fraction standard deviation for each nuclide after a normal, randomized 
uncertainty distribution with 5.0% standard deviation was introduced to each neutron 
transmission ratio in Eq. 7.3. 
  
Transmission target 
Atom fraction standard deviation 
H C N O 
Test material 
    Acetone 0.101 0.128 0.096 0.070 
Ammonium nitrate 0.077 0.087 0.085 0.054 
Methanol 0.094 0.090 0.067 0.064 
Paper 0.138 0.158 0.116 0.098 
Sucrose 0.122 0.132 0.097 0.085 
Toluene 0.087 0.141 0.108 0.050 
Vegetable oil 0.074 0.115 0.090 0.051 
Calibration material 
    Graphite 0.038 0.128 0.105 0.036 
Melamine 0.076 0.152 0.127 0.043 
Polyethylene 0.064 0.103 0.080 0.038 
Water 0.068 0.034 0.029 0.055 
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 CHAPTER 8: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INTO 
ALTERNATIVE APPLICATIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS 
FOR THE VARIABLE ENERGY NEUTRON ELASTIC 
SCATTER TIME-OF-FLIGHT SYSTEM 
 
Abstract 
 Several Monte Carlo simulations were conducted to investigate application of the 
variable energy neutron elastic scatter (VENES) system to active neutron interrogation methods 
to search for conventional explosives. Both fast neutron analysis (FNA) and neutron backscatter 
simulations were performed with the VENES system serving as the source of tagged neutrons. 
The results of the preliminary simulations are encouraging and demonstrate clear neutron TOF 
dependence, allowing for discrimination of approximately 85% and 96% of the noise associated 
with undesirable neutron interactions during time-tagged VENES FNA and neutron backscatter 
measurements, respectively. Application of previous shielding designs to the VENES system 
was also investigated in order to evaluate its effectiveness in reducing total neutron flux in the 
stop detector.  The simulated flux from a D-T source was reduced by approximately a factor of 
four after application of 0.20 m thick of either pure polyethylene or layered steel and 
polyethylene shielding material around the generator. Combined VENES active neutron 
interrogation methods and alternative source, detector, and interrogation target arrangements 
were also discussed. Although the VENES system is relatively inefficient, especially when 
conducting FNA and neutron backscatter measurements, the benefits of its adaptability and 
tagged neutron variability provide motivation to continue its development. 
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 Introduction 
The work in Ch. 7 demonstrated via simulation that the newly developed variable energy 
neutron elastic scatter (VENES) system can be applied to fast neutron resonance radiography 
(FNRR). However, as discussed in Ch. 2, there are other methods of active neutron interrogation 
used to search for the unique ratios of H, C, N, and O found in conventional explosives that may 
also benefit from the variable energy, time-tagged neutrons provided by the VENES system 
(Whetstone and Kearfott, 2014). 
The ability to adjust the scattered neutron energy, combined with the portability and ease 
of use of the VENES system, permits potential application to a variety of active neutron 
interrogation methods. Similar to associated particle imaging (API), the system notes the time 
the source neutron interacts in the start detector/scatter target, allowing for application of a 
timing window when searching for secondary radiation (Chichester et al., 2005). 
One active interrogation method the VENES system could be applied to is fast neutron 
analysis (FNA), where the interrogating neutrons inelastically scatter off the nuclei of the 
unknown material, creating characteristic gamma rays that are unique to the nuclides present. 
The inelastic collisions of interest occur in C, N, and O. The cross sections for all these 
interactions are significantly smaller than the total attenuation cross sections and have thresholds 
above 2 MeV. Furthermore, like total attenuation cross sections, they also vary with neutron 
energy, but instead trend upwards as energy increases. By measuring the flux of the 
characteristic gamma rays at one or more neutron energies, an estimate of the relative amounts of 
C, N, and O can be determined (Sudac et al., 2011). The characteristic gamma ray energy for 
inelastic scatter is: 4.43 MeV for 12C; 1.64, 2.31, and 5.11 MeV for 14N; and 6.13 MeV for 16O 
(Buffler, 2004). 
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 FNA using the VENES system can be conducted independently, or in conjunction with 
FNRR measurements, as a second form of verification. If used with FNRR, FNA can be applied 
during some or all of the fixed neuron energy interrogations, as long as the scattered neutron 
energy is above the inelastic scatter threshold for each nuclide.  The only component that would 
need to be added is a gamma ray detector facing the interrogation target. Depending on the size 
of the interrogation target, the inelastic scatter gamma ray signal may be significantly smaller 
than the transmission signal, resulting in either longer count times, or more statistical uncertainty 
associated with the photon signature. However, this could be somewhat counteracted by 
detecting gamma rays at multiple neutron energies, since the photon energy does not change and 
the inelastic scatter cross sections are fairly consistent above their thresholds. 
Another benefit of using the VENES system for FNA measurements is that the start 
detector/scatter target provides timing information that can be used to discriminate much of the 
undesirable signal that results from secondary gamma rays produced via neutron interactions in 
the environment (Sudac et al., 2011). These tagged neutrons can then be used for FNA. Gamma 
rays that are detected within a certain timing window after a neutron interaction in the start 
detector would be counted, resulting in a cleaner signal for analysis. 
The VENES system could also serve as the source of neutrons for the explosives 
detection method designed by Lehnert and Kearfott (2105). In addition to searching for 
transmission neutrons and characteristic gamma rays via FNA, the system also detects elastically 
scattered neutrons at various angles. The information gathered from the gamma ray and neutron 
detectors is then used to form flags that are evaluated by an algorithm, which ultimately helps 
characterize the unknown material within a cargo container as inert or a threat. The flexibility of 
VENES, which allows for selection of the incident neutron energy via manipulation of the scatter 
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 angle used, provides the opportunity to choose new neutron energies where there is greater 
contrast between interaction probabilities of the various nuclides of interest. This is a significant 
improvement compared to the deuterium-tritium generator originally suggested. 
The flags that are used for identification include both total backscatter neutron counts, as 
well as those above certain energy thresholds determined via pulse height distributions (PHDs) 
within organic liquid scintillators (Lehnert and Kearfott, 2014). Substituting time-of-flight (TOF) 
measurements for PHD measurements, provided the interrogation target is small enough to limit 
TOF uncertainties to a reasonable magnitude, may increase the method’s efficiency. This is 
because many neutrons of a given energy do not create pulse heights equivalent to their energy, 
resulting in their possible discrimination, whereas TOF measurements are the same, regardless of 
the energy deposited in the stop detector. 
Unfortunately, there are some potential drawbacks to using VENES in conjunction with 
Lehnert and Kearfott’s (2014) flag based explosives detection method. Neutron TOF is an 
indirect measurement of energy and is dependent on distance traveled between the start and stop 
detectors. This, when combined with the systematic uncertainty associated with the VENES 
system discussed in Ch. 5, means that differentiation of elastic scatter peaks from C, N, and O 
will most likely be difficult (Whetstone and Kearfott, 2015). For instance, D-T neutrons that 
initially have their energy reduced by the VENES system to 7.75 MeV, then backscatter off the 
target material at an angle of 5π/6 radians, have final energies of 5.7, 5.9, and 6.1 MeV when 
scattering off of C, N, and O, respectively. Without small detector volumes and relatively large 
distances between detectors limiting systematic uncertainty to less than 0.1 MeV, the 
“monoenergetic” neutron peaks proposed by Lehnert and Kearfott (2014) will not be possible. 
However, the threshold measurements are still possible using neutron TOF as a means of 
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 discriminating neutrons that interacted multiple times in the environment or interrogation target 
and have longer TOFs.  
The VENES system could also be improved by the addition of shielding to the system. 
As seen in the laboratory measurements of Ch. 7, minimizing the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is 
important when trying to determine transmission through an interrogation target, particularly 
when the transmission rate is low. The SNR effectively limits the maximum density thickness of 
material that can be interrogated. Any reduction in SNR has the potential to improve fast neutron 
resonance radiography measurements. The nature of TOF measurements allows the system to 
discriminate many of the neutrons that interact in the start detector, interact somewhere in the 
environment, and eventually find their way to the stop detector. The primary cause of the 
existing SNR appears to be from coincident neutrons, previously emitted by the source, 
interacting in the stop detector within the timing window of a different source neutron interacting 
in the start detector. Therefore, source shielding that limits the emission isotropic of neutrons at 
angles other than towards the start detector should reduce the SNR. As discussed in Ch. 3, it also 
has the added benefit of reducing the potential dose rate to any nearby personnel (Whetstone and 
Kearfott, 2011). 
Detector shielding, similar to what was presented in Ch. 4, could also benefit the VENES 
system. Depending on the gamma ray detector used in FNA, it may be necessary to protect it 
from the high neutron flux near the generator, or secondary gamma rays generated from neutron 
interactions in locations other than the interrogation target. Similarly, backscatter stop detectors 
used during NES will be close to the isotropic neutron source and start detector, necessitating 
significant neutron shielding to allow differentiation between the backscatter signal and system 
noise.  
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 The work presented in this chapter focuses on initial evaluations of FNA and neutron 
backscatter as future applications for the VENES system, as well as application of previously 
designed source and detector shielding methods. Additionally, discussion of alternative source 
and detector arrangements to maximize system efficiency is included. 
Materials and Methods 
 All investigations were performed using Monte Carlo methods via Monte Carlo N-
Particle (MCNP)1 PoliMi2. This allowed for precise accounting of all particle interactions and 
realistic TOF measurements. Similar to previous chapters, the source was assumed to be an 
isotropic point source within a sealed-tube neutron generator3 (Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc., 
2014). It was modeled using the MCNP built-in Gaussian fusion neutron energy distributions. 
However, in order to reduce simulation time, the simulated source only emitted neutrons directed 
towards the start detector. All values reported as per source particle assume an isotropic source 
and are normalized by the inverse of the solid angle fraction defined by the neutron beam cone. 
The universe was a sphere with a 4.0 m radius and the environment consisted of air with a 
concrete floor (McConn et al., 2011). The center of the detectors and source were located 1.23 m 
above the floor.  
The simulated neutron detectors were either a liquid organic scintillator4 that was a 127.0 
mm long cylinder with a 63.5 mm radius, or a plastic organic scintillator5 that was 25.4 mm long 
1 computer code Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport version 5 (Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 
87545, 2006). 
2 computer code MCNPX-PoliMi v2.0 (Polytechnic of Milan, Milano, Italy and the University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor, MI, USA). 
3 MP 320 D-T neutron generator (Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc., Waltham, MA 02451) 
4 EJ-309 liquid scintillator (Eljen Technology, Sweetwater, TX 79556) 
5 Stilbene crystal (Proteus, Inc., Chagrin Falls, OH 44022) 
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 with a 12.7 mm radius. Both models included photomultiplier tube assemblies and associated 
detector housing (Detection for Nuclear Nonproliferation Group, 2014). The start detector, which 
was used to determine the beginning of a neutron’s TOF after the neutron interacted in it, was 
aligned facing the generator, with its cylindrical axis parallel to the floor and coincident with the 
generator source plane. It was placed with the center of its detector volume 0.25 m away from 
the isotropic point source, which was located at the front center of the accelerator beam target. 
The stop detector, whose pulse signaled the end of the TOF measurement, was moved around 
depending on the simulated application. 
 Results from the simulations were post processed via MPPost6 to better estimate the light 
response function of the scintillators and help determine simulated TOF measurements. 
Personally developed MATLAB7 scripts were then used to analyze the results. 
FNA 
 Similar to the FNRR measurements in Ch. 7, the FNA simulations consisted of the plastic 
organic scintillator as the start detector. The neutron TOF stop detector was a liquid organic 
scintillator and was located 1.0 m from the start detector at an angle, ψ, such that neutrons that 
underwent a single elastic scatter in the start detector and were directed towards the stop detector 
would have an incident energy of roughly 7.75 MeV. This is above the threshold for the 
characteristic gamma rays of C, N, and O. The D-T source emitted neutrons in a cone whose 
apex subtended a solid angle of 0.0153 steradians. A transmission target that was 0.30 m tall, 
0.30 m wide, and 0.20 m thick was placed halfway between the detectors.  
6 computer code MPPost v2.1.0 (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA) 
7 computer program MATLAB (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA 01760-2098, 2006). 
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 In order to examine the possibility of FNA application to the VENES system, an 
inorganic sodium iodine, or NaI(Tl), scintillator, based on the work by Sudac et al. (2009), was 
simulated 0.50 m from the center of the interrogation target. Since it was assumed the production 
of secondary gamma rays is isotropic, the gamma ray detector could be located at any angle. It 
was initially placed at an angle of 3π/4 radian backscatter to provide a full view of the 
interrogation target while allowing for use of collimation material to shield it from neutrons and 
secondary gamma rays in the generator and start detector. However, this required placing the 
gamma ray detector closer to the generator and start detector and the resultant increase in flux, 
even with collimating material present, dominated the gamma ray spectra.  The detector signal 
was much cleaner at the π/4 radian forward scatter position, due to geometric attenuation, and no 
collimating material was needed. This detector location was used for all FNA simulations. The 
simulated NaI(Tl) detector had a large volume to increase the fraction of gamma rays detected. It 
was a cylinder facing the interrogation target with a length and radius of 0.20 m. It had 0.500 
atom fractions of sodium and iodine and a density of 3,667 kg m-3 (McConn et al., 2011). A 
timing window was used to limit the gamma ray signal, increasing the likelihood that they were 
from an interaction in the interrogation target. It should be noted that although a NaI(Tl) detector 
was used in the simulations, similar TOF principles could be applied to any gamma ray 
spectrometer, provided it has sufficient timing resolution and can be used near a neutron source. 
Ammonium nitrate, melamine, methanol, polyethylene, and sucrose were all simulated as 
interrogation targets, as was an arrangement where there was no interrogation target present 
(McConn et al., 2011). A schematic of the setup can be seen in Fig. 8.1. 
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 Neutron backscatter 
 Several simulations were run to examine the ability of the VENES system to detect 
elastic neutron backscatter. The interrogation target was placed 1.00 m from the start detector. A 
backscatter/stop detector was placed 1.00 m from the interrogation target at a scatter angle of 
5π/6 radians relative to the expected incident neutron path. The distance between the 
interrogation target and detectors was chosen in order to provide a longer flight path over which 
neutrons of varying energies could potentially be distinguished via TOF. It also allowed for 
discrimination of neutrons that interacted in the start detector and traveled towards the stop 
detector without first interacting in the interrogation target. Those neutrons have a shorter TOF 
compared to neutrons that scattered off the interrogation target.  
The larger liquid organic scintillator was used as the start and stop detector. The larger 
start detector increased the likelihood of source neutrons being directed towards the interrogation 
target, but also broadened the possible energy of the scattered neutrons. To account for the 
increased size of the start detector, the apex of the emitted neutron cone was increased to 0.3790 
steradians. The interrogation target was nearly the same as in the FNA simulations, but 0.10 m 
thick. The location of the interrogation target was varied such that initially scatter neutrons had 
expected energies of 3.53 and 7.75 MeV. The neutron energies were chosen because of their 
broad, relatively constant, contrasting attenuation scatter cross sections for C, N, and O. The 
simulated arrangements included melamine and methanol interrogation targets, as well as an 
arrangement with no interrogation target present (McConn et al., 2011). 
 It was quickly discovered that neutrons that interacted in the start detector and not in the 
interrogation target, instead either first scattering off the floor or traveling directly towards the 
stop detector, dominated the simulated TOF signal. Adjusting threshold settings in MPPost did 
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 not sufficiently solve the problem. Therefore, a shield was added that surrounded the stop 
detector. This significantly reduced the contribution from neutrons that did not interact with the 
interrogation target and allowed for investigation of the neutron backscatter method. Since 
gamma ray signal was not a concern, 0.20 m thick polyethylene shield was used. It extended 0.10 
m beyond the front face of the stop detector to limit the detector’s field of view. An example of 
the simulated arrangement can be seen in Fig. 8.2. 
Shielding 
 An arrangement similar to the FNA simulations was used to evaluate the neutron shields’ 
effectiveness. The variations in design included removal of the NaI(Tl) and interrogation targets 
and increasing the distance between the center of the generator and start detector from 0.25 m to 
0.27 m. This was done to permit 0.20 m of detector shielding to be applied, while keeping the 
start detector outside of the shield volume. The shield surrounded the generator and was 0.20 m 
thick at all locations. The only exception was a cylinder of air with a radius of 70 mm that 
extended from the edge of the generator, along the source plane, to the edge of the shield closest 
to the start detector. This provided an unshielded path for source neutrons initially directed at the 
start detector. The generator, shield, and detector setup can be seen in Fig. 8.3. The source 
neutron cone present in previous simulations was replaced with an isotropic source to provide a 
better approximation of the neutron flux surrounding the generator.  
 Since the neutron TOF background is primarily the result of pulses from two different, 
coincident neutron interactions in the start and stop detector, it was assumed that the relative flux 
in the stop detector would provide a good approximation of the TOF background during 
simulation. The total flux average over the volume of the stop detector was estimated using an 
F4 tally in MCNP. The detector flux was determined without a generator shield, a shield 
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 consisting entirely of polyethylene, and a layered shield that was modeled after the layered shield 
from Ch. 3, with an inner 0.05 m layer of polyethylene, then 0.05 m of steel, then 0.05 m of 
polyethylene, and finally an outer layer 0.05 m of steel (Whetstone and Kearfott, 2011). One set 
of simulations was conducted both with a D-T source and the stop detector at a scatter angle of 
0.967 radians relative to the start detector, resulting in scattered neutrons with an approximate 
energy of 4.53 MeV. The other set had a deuterium-deuterium (D-D) source with the stop 
detector at 0.566 radians and neutrons with expected scatter energies of 1.78 MeV. 
Results 
After simulations, the FNA results were processed. The total number of counts in the 
gamma ray detector versus the combined neutron and gamma ray TOF can be seen in Fig. 8.4. 
The time required for a neutron to elastically scatter off a hydrogen nucleus in the start detector, 
inelastically scatter in the interrogation target, and then have the characteristic gamma ray reach 
the stop detector is about 14 ns. The earlier peak at 4 ns is a result of the creation of 
characteristic gamma rays in the start detector. The peak around 22 ns is from interactions in the 
neutron generator. The final peak is from neutrons interacting in the floor. Based on the expected 
gamma ray arrival time and Fig. 8.4, the TOF region of interest (ROI) for examining the gamma 
ray spectra was 11 to15 ns. The resultant spectra for all the interrogation targets can be seen in 
Fig. 8.5 with a simulated gamma ray energy resolution of 0.020 MeV. 
The backscatter TOF spectra can be seen in Fig. 8.6 and 8.7. For neutrons initially 
scattered at 7.75 MeV, the expected TOF is approximately 56 ns, assuming elastic scatters in the 
center of the start detector, interrogation target, and stop detector. This corresponds to the peak 
seen in the figure. A similar peak is present around 80 ns in the spectra for neutrons initially 
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 scattered at 3.53 MeV. The large peak centered near 20 ns is from neutrons that interacted in the 
start and stop detectors without first scattering in the interrogation target. After accounting for 
the TOF signal when no interrogation target is present, melamine to methanol ratios were 
calculated using the counts in the neutron backscatter peaks. The ROI was 60 to 70 ns for the 
7.75 MeV scattered neutrons and 72 to 82 ns for the 3.53 MeV scattered neutrons. The resultant 
values were 0.495 + 0.018 and 0.516 + 0.016, respectively. 
 The total average flux in the stop detector was estimated for both sets of shielding 
simulations. The results can be seen in Table 8.1. With a D-D source, the flux in the stop detector 
was reduced by 91% and 97% for the layered and pure polyethylene shield designs, respectively. 
Both shields reduced the detector flux from a D-T source by approximately 75%. 
Discussion 
VENES applications 
The VENES system provides an alternative means of generating tagged neutrons for 
active interrogation, using readily available equipment while also providing the means to change 
the expected energy of those tagged neutrons. This flexible solution can potentially be applied to 
a wide variety of explosives detection methods.  
The simulations using tagged neutrons from the VENES system for FNA and neutron 
backscatter measurements were encouraging. Without thorough optimization of the detector 
setup or laboratory measurements to help benchmark the simulations, it is difficult to draw any 
specific conclusions from the work. However, general trends can be observed. In the FNA 
simulations, the distinct TOF distribution of total gamma ray counts provides an opportunity for 
discrimination. By using the combined TOF of the scattered neutron and secondary gamma ray, 
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 the noise in the signal can be reduced. This allows for better contrast between the gamma ray 
spectra for the assorted interrogation targets. The differences in peak occurrence and magnitude 
amongst the gamma ray spectra, seen in Fig. 8.5, demonstrate a potential method for confirming 
the presence of explosive materials. The method has had success previously using a generator 
with API (Sudac et al., 2009; Sudac et al., 2011). As seen in Fig. 8.4, the VENES system appears 
to be an adaptable means of generating tagged neutrons to narrow the gamma ray detector timing 
window. The simulated arrangement avoids many secondary gamma rays from neutron 
interactions in locations other than the interrogation target, reducing noise in the time-tagged 
gamma ray spectra by approximately 80 – 90%. This number would be different in laboratory 
measurements due to the nearly isotropic source and coincident gamma rays created by neutron 
interactions in the environment, but the overall signal will still be improved. The method could 
possibly be refined through implementation of PHD in the start detector. Since the neutron 
energy deposited in the detector should be its initial energy minus its scattered energy, the signal 
in the gamma ray detector could be further discriminated if the start detector pulse height does 
not correlate to a neutron scatter towards the interrogation target. 
Similarly, the obvious neutron backscatter TOF peaks seen in Fig. 8.6 and 8.7 confirm 
potential application of the VENES system for neutron backscatter measurements and offer a 
viable alternative to PHD when measuring neutron backscatter (Lehnert and Kearfott, 2015). As 
seen in the TOF spectra, there is a clear difference between the number of detected neutrons for 
the two interrogation targets. The distinction occurs in the peaks centered near the expected TOF 
for a neutron that undergoes single elastic scatter in both the start detector and interrogation 
target. In its current arrangement, and by utilizing the ROI, approximately 95 – 98% of the time-
tagged neutrons would be discriminated, eliminating much of the signal that was a result of one 
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 or more neutron scattering events in locations other than the interrogation target. Again this 
number would vary in practice due to coincident neutrons in the stop detector. However, the 
system will still be able to distinguish single backscatter events from most of the other neutrons 
detected. The neutron signal within the timing window can be analyzed, either for a change in 
total backscatter events or, if the interrogation target was small and the start or stop detector were 
sufficiently far away, to search for characteristic peaks in the TOF spectra. If this method were 
successfully adapted, it would allow for determination of neutron interrogation explosives 
detection flags without the need for direct measurement of neutron energy. 
Unfortunately, compared to FNRR measurements, the detection efficiency for both FNA 
and neutron backscatter measurements using the VENES system is relatively low. This is a 
consequence of searching for secondary radiation and has always been true, regardless of the 
neutron source used. However, given that the VENES system efficiency is already comparatively 
less than other sources, such as linear accelerators or API generators, use of the VENES system 
for FNA and neutron backscatter measurements would most likely only be justifiable in certain 
scenarios, such as when long count times are allowed, a powerful neutron source is available, or 
there are no readily accessible alternatives to produce tagged neutrons. 
Another option would be to combine the FNA and neutron backscatter methods with 
other measurements, similar to what was suggested by Lehnert and Kearfott (2015). In their 
system, nearly monoenergetic neutrons from a sealed-tube D-T source are used to conduct 
neutron transmission, FNA, and neutron backscatter measurements in order to determine whether 
an interrogation target was a threat or benign. Additional detectors can be applied to the VENES 
FNRR method explored in Ch. 7 to allow for a comparable setup, permitting FNA and neutron 
backscatter measurements during each transmission measurement. This system would be an 
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 improvement over previous work because tagged neutrons can now have their energy reliably 
varied without the need for a large particle accelerator. This permits the opportunity for multiple 
measurements at different neutron energies in order to gain additional information about the 
interrogation target.  
Further work is needed to determine how the ability to vary the energy of the tagged 
neutrons during FNA or neutron backscatter measurements can best be utilized. Given that the 
neutron interaction cross sections fluctuate with neutron energy, it may be possible to find an 
optimum combination of incident neutron energies that helps in determining the relative 
elemental abundances of the interrogation target. Conversely, it may be that FNA and neutron 
backscatter measurements are simply used as a secondary check for FNRR measurements, 
helping to confirm the presence of a nuclide, or eliminate some ambiguity during analysis.  
Deployed system suggestions 
Although it provides flexibility in choosing incident neutron energy, the VENES system 
reduces the usable neutron production rate compared to the same D-D or D-T source in a 
traditional setup. Given that many active neutron interrogation applications need to be conducted 
quickly, this could be a serious concern. Fortunately, the VENES arrangement previously 
presented can be improved.  
The shield designs discussed in Ch. 3, and adapted for simulation here, significantly 
reduce the neutron flux in the stop detector. As seen in Table 8.1, for D-D neutrons, the 
polyethylene source shield was approximately three times more effective at reducing neutron 
flux in the stop detector compared to the steel and polyethylene layered shield. However, when a 
D-T generator was simulated, the detector fluxes were similar. Therefore, in the current 
arrangement, a polyethylene shield is the better choice. It is lighter than, and at least as effective 
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 as, the layered design. However, as discussed in Ch. 3, this may not always be the case with 
thicker shields or if dose rates to surrounding personnel are a concern.  
The reduced stop detector flux will improve the SNR and permit shorter count times with 
better statistics. In the current arrangement, source shield space was limited by the start detector 
location. In future applications, additional shielding material could be possible. However, the 
tradeoffs between increased system size and mass compared to improvements in the SNR must 
be carefully weighed. The transmission stop detector could also have detector shielding applied, 
but given that it is essentially facing the neutron source and start detector, it is unlikely that 
shielding around its side and back would have as significant an impact as the source shielding. 
In all the laboratory measurements and simulations discussed, a single start detector was 
used to scatter neutrons and a single stop detector was placed at the predetermined distance and 
scatter angle. On occasion, a second stop detector was placed at the same scatter angle and 
distance in a symmetric location to improve counting statistics. In both instances, the single start 
detector presented a relatively small volume in which the source neutrons could elastically 
scatter.  
Enlarging the start detector volume would increase the likelihood of source neutron 
interactions, but as discussed in Ch. 5, also increase the systematic uncertainty related to the 
scattered neutron energies. This can be avoided, however, by using an array of smaller start 
detectors arranged to create a single large scatter target. The location of each scattered neutron 
interaction would be known more precisely than in a single large detector, minimizing 
uncertainty while still increasing the relative likelihood of interactions. The face of the detector 
would be pointed up with the PMT and detector housing directed at the ground, removing them 
from the desired flight path of the scattered neutrons. This allows for the start detectors to be 
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 tightly packed in a horizontal plane. Similarly, an array of relatively small stop detectors can be 
used to create a large target for transmission neutrons without sacrificing systematic uncertainty. 
This arrangement would also be beneficial if attempting to determine a two-dimensional 
elemental map of a large interrogation object. It would allow smaller, discretized transmission 
measurements of the interrogation target (Raas et al., 2005). Additionally, the VENES system 
arrangement could benefit from the symmetry associated with the nearly isotropic nature of 
neutron generation and elastic scatter. This would permit for the placement of multiple start and 
stop detectors around a single neutron generator, resulting in interrogation of multiple objects at 
the same time. 
A permanent VENES system would also benefit from an arrangement that would assist in 
quickly changing the stop detector and interrogation target location relative to the scatter target. 
This can be done with a set of tracks allowing for their quick rotation about the center of the 
system. The stop detector and transmission target can then be locked in place to assure an 
accurate scatter angle and assumed neutron travel distance. A schematic drawing of the proposed 
arrangement, with arrays for the start and stop detectors, FNA and neutron backscatter detectors, 
and source and detector shields, can be seen in Fig. 8.8. An alternative FNRR arrangement can 
be seen in Fig. 8.9. In it, the stop detector and interrogation target location are fixed and multiple 
start detectors are positioned independently. Source neutrons interacting in each start detector 
must undergo elastic collisions at different angles to arrive in the stop detectors. This permits for 
interrogation at multiple neutron energies simultaneously, and potentially quicker evaluations. 
For the first VENES arrangement, there will be slight variations in scatter angle and neutron 
path. In the second arrangement, the neutron paths through the interrogation target vary 
significantly based on their scatter angle. These variations will have to be accounted for when 
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 interrogating unknown targets, but if properly addressed, the VENES efficiency could be 
considerably increased. 
Ultimately, application of the VENES system will be determined through evaluation of 
the tradeoffs between the ability to vary the incident neutron energy and the reduction in 
efficiency associated with the preliminary neutron elastic scatter. For FNRR, where no other 
portable systems exist that can change the incident neutron energy, the reduction in efficiency 
should be acceptable. FNA and neutron backscatter measurements, on the other hand, are 
inherently less efficient, making use of the VENES system for those individual measurements 
less likely. However, as discussed previously, the approximately two order of magnitude 
increases to the SNR through TOF discrimination and source shielding will improve the detector 
signal. Improvements to overall system efficiency, via optimization of detector arrangements, 
and potentially new explosives detection flags at different incident energies will also benefit the 
VENES system. This should allow for FNA and neutron backscatter measurements to be 
conducted in conjunction with the multiple transmission measurements necessary for FNRR.  
Conclusions 
Optimized source, detector, and interrogation target placement, combined with 
appropriate shielding, can make the VENES system, in certain circumstances, a viable 
alternative to other neutron sources. Preliminary investigation has explored the potential to apply 
the VENES system to several explosives detection methods. The ease of use of the system, 
combined with the commercial availability and relatively low cost of its components, allows for 
adaptation of the VENES system to a variety of applications. Furthermore, when compared to 
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 traditional sealed-tube D-T and D-D generators, the flexibility of the tagged neutron energy 
provides many additional opportunities for exploration via active neutron interrogation.  
In simulations, the VENES system showed promise for use with both FNA and neutron 
backscatter measurements. Even with careful detector and shield placement, the inherent 
inefficiency of the system may limit the practical application of FNA and neutron backscatter as 
standalone approaches. However, combining FNA and neutron backscatter with FNRR 
measurements conducted by the VENES system could create a viable alternative to current 
active neutron interrogation methods. This would increase the potential information available to 
investigators, and provide a secondary confirmation of the interrogation object’s composition. 
The ability to change the tagged neutron energy allows for the development of new detection 
methods and algorithms not previously available with traditional sealed-tube neutron generators. 
Further work is warranted to investigate implementation of the VENES system with current 
active neutron interrogation methods. 
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 Figures 
 
Fig. 8.1: A top-down view representing the geometry used in the FNA simulations. 
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Fig. 8.2: A top-down view representing the geometry used in the neutron backscatter 
simulations. 
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Fig. 8.3: A top-down view representing the geometry used in the generator shielding simulations.
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Fig. 8.4: The simulated TOF distribution for total gamma ray counts in a single NaI(Tl) detector. 
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Fig. 8.5: The simulated gamma ray energy spectra in a single NaI(Tl) detector for multiple different interrogation targets using a TOF 
ROI from 11 – 15 ns. 
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Fig. 8.6: The neutron backscatter TOF spectra with neutrons initially scattered at approximately 7.78 MeV. 
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Fig. 8.7: The neutron backscatter TOF spectra with neutrons initially scattered at approximately 3.53 MeV. 
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Fig. 8.8: A proposed VENES system arrangement with tracks that allows for quick, precise rotation of the interrogation target and stop 
detectors about the start detector. 
272 
 
  
Fig. 8.9: An alternative VENES system arrangement that allows for simultaneous measurements at multiple neutron energies using 
several start detectors at different locations. 
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 Table 
Table 8.1: The estimated average flux in the stop detector for two different generator shields and 
neutron sources, as determined by an MCNP PoliMi F4 tally. Statistical uncertainties were all 
below 1%. 
Source 
Shield 
arrangement 
Average simulated 
neutron flux (mm-2 
source particle-1) 
D-D 
Unshielded 5.11 x 10-8 
Layered 4.67 x 10-9 
Polyethylene 1.52 x 10-9 
   
D-T 
Unshielded 6.21 x 10-8 
Layered 1.34 x 10-8 
Polyethylene 1.58 x 10-8 
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 CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
Research Summary 
 The use of conventional explosives against people and property continues to be a serious 
threat. As discussed in Ch. 2, there are a variety of methods used to search for hidden explosives, 
including several different active neutron interrogation techniques. Despite its advantages, such 
as the relatively high penetrability of neutrons and the ability to determine the elemental 
composition of objects, active neutron interrogation has failed to find wide-spread deployment. 
This is, in part, a consequence of the complications associated with shielding neutrons and either 
a lack of variability in neutron energy, or alternatively, large, complicated, and expensive 
neutron production equipment. Improvements in traditional active neutron interrogations systems 
can have wide-spread benefits across several explosives detection techniques. The research 
presented in this work explored new designs for generator and detector shielding, as well as 
developed a novel method for altering the energy of neutrons from a nearly monoenergetic 
source. The purpose was to design an adaptable active neutron interrogation system using 
currently available technology that was relatively simple and could be applied to several 
different explosives detection methods. 
 Initial research, presented in Ch. 3, evaluated many different neutron shielding designs, 
via Monte Carlo simulation, to help limit the unattenuated emission of nearly isotropic source 
neutrons and reduce the flux and potential dose to personnel around the generator. The final 
design was a multi-layered steel and polyethylene shield that reduced the estimated dose 
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 opposite the shield opening by roughly two orders of magnitude. The work was expanded in Ch. 
4, with a similar simulated shielding design applied to detectors in an active neutron 
interrogation system. The layered design helped limit the field of view and reduce the neutron 
and photon flux in detectors by several orders of magnitude. The chapter also contained 
discussion of a way to design and build the generator and detector shields which allowed for 
portability and adjustability with quick construction and disassembly via modular 
implementation of the various shield layers. 
 The work in Ch. 5 focused on developing a new method by which it was possible to 
reliably change the energy of neutrons. Current generators produce neutrons clustered around a 
single energy and either cannot have that energy adjusted, such as with sealed-tube deuterium-
deuterium and deuterium-tritium generators, or are large accelerators that are costly and difficult 
to operate. Given that the likelihood of neutron-nucleus interactions are dependent on the nuclide 
and vary significantly with neutron energy, the added flexibility of a variable energy neutron 
source provides significantly more options for active interrogation applications. The method, 
which employs a portable sealed-tube generator as the source, produces neutrons within a 
specific energy range via single elastic scatter off a target containing nuclides of known mass. 
The neutron’s final energy is determined by the scatter nuclide mass and neutron scatter angle, 
allowing for the user to choose their interrogating neutron energy. This is accomplished via 
manipulation of the composition of the scatter target and the interrogation object’s location 
relative to the incident direction of source neutrons on the scatter target. The elastic scatter 
method showed promise in idealized simulations with multiple scatter targets. However, more 
realistic simulations and a laboratory experiment revealed accurate neutron energy information 
would be required to properly discriminate source neutrons that interacted elsewhere in the 
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 environment. Furthermore, analysis of the systematic uncertainty associated with the discrete 
volumes of the scatter target and neutron detector revealed limits to the precision of the scattered 
neutron energy. 
 The idea of using elastic scatter to reliably change neutron energy was further expanded 
in Ch. 6. In order to confirm the scattered neutron energy and help discriminate neutrons that did 
not interact in the scatter target, an organic scintillator time-of-flight (TOF) spectrometry system 
was adapted to serve as both the scatter target and neutron detector for active interrogation 
applications. A single organic scintillator served a dual purpose as both the TOF start detector 
and scatter target, providing accurate timing information and signaling when neutrons scattered 
off its hydrogen nuclei. If the scattered neutrons were then detected by the stop detector, their 
TOF and approximate energy could be determined. This was confirmed in both laboratory 
measurements and simulations. Neutrons that were detected in the stop detector and did not have 
a corresponding signal in the start detector were neglected, greatly improving the stop detector 
signal. By using the variable energy neutron elastic scatter (VENES) system, it became possible 
to identify scattered neutrons of specific energies and use them for active neutron interrogation 
applications. The energy range of scattered neutrons identified by the stop detector was 
dependent on the distances between the source, start detector/scatter target, and stop detector as 
well as the volume of the detectors. Increased energy precision was possible, but came with the 
consequence of decreased system efficiency. 
 In Ch. 7, the VENES system was applied to the fast neutron resonance radiography 
(FNRR) method of active neutron interrogation. Due to the differing neutron attenuation cross 
sections for H, C, N, and O in the 1 to 14 MeV range, it is possible to determine the atomic 
fractions of unknown targets by measuring the neutron transmission rates through the 
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 interrogation target at various energies. Traditionally, large particle accelerators are used to 
generate near-monoenergetic neutrons. Laboratory experiments and simulations were conducted 
to determine if the VENES system could be a viable alternative. The results were promising, 
with simulated elemental composition estimates accurate to within several hundredths of an atom 
fraction. As expected, the introduction of measurement uncertainty increased the average error in 
the estimated atom fractions, emphasizing the need for precise measurements. The signal-to-
noise ratio of the VENES system during transmission measurements was also explored, 
revealing the existence of an upper density thickness limit for interrogation objects. 
 Finally, in Ch.8, alternative active neutron interrogation applications for the VENES 
system were explored. Preliminary investigations showed a significant TOF dependence for both 
fast neutron analysis (FNA) and neutron backscatter when using neutrons from the VENES 
system. Although both methods require neutrons to interact in the interrogation target, resulting 
in a reduction in efficiency, they can be combined with a VENES FNRR measurement system to 
provide additional, independent methods of investigation. It was also demonstrated that the use 
of source and detector shields can reduce the neutron flux in the stop detector, with the ultimate 
goal of improving the signal-to-noise ratio.  
 In general, the VENES system improves active neutron interrogation methods that search 
for conventional explosives. The flexibility in potential neutron energy expands the avenues of 
investigation for established interrogation techniques while also providing accurate neutron 
energy and timing information. The VENES system is also a strong alternative to large, 
expensive accelerator sources when neutrons of specific and varied energies are required. It may 
have a lower efficiency compared to other sources, but the VENES system’s portability and ease 
of use may allow it to fit certain applications, such as mobile inspections or situations where 
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 space is limited. Furthermore, it can be constructed with readily available, relatively inexpensive 
components, expanding the potential reach of active neutron interrogation techniques for 
explosives detection. 
Future Work 
 There are three general directions on which further research should focus. The first is 
refining the VENES system. The equipment simulated and tested in the laboratory proved the 
system works. However, it still needs to be optimized. Alternative detectors and neutron sources 
should be explored. Similarly, relative detector sizes and locations need to be tested to help 
characterize and evaluate the variation in scattered neutron energy and correlated tradeoffs in 
system efficiency. Finally, testing in realistic scenarios should be conducted to better understand 
sources of measurement uncertainty. 
Many aspects of the VENES system will need to be adjusted, based on the particular 
application. Therefore, it is important to further investigate how the system can be applied to 
various active neutron interrogation scenarios. Simulated FNRR measurements were 
encouraging, but actual measurements must be conducted to determine the viability of 
combining VENES with FNRR. Both FNA and neutron backscatter measurements also showed 
promise with preliminary simulations, but much more work is needed to determine if use of the 
VENES system, given its relatively low efficiency, is appropriate for these active interrogation 
methods. If so, laboratory measurements must be performed in order to optimize the detector 
signal, with particular emphasis on determining the ideal energies required for scattered neutrons 
incident on the interrogation target. All methods should be tested with a variety of interrogation 
materials and inhomogeneous arrangements. 
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 Finally, alternative applications for the VENES system could be explored. This work has 
focused on improving active neutron interrogation methods to find conventional explosives. 
However, these same techniques could be applied to search for narcotics, which tend to also be 
comprised of light nuclides and have unique elemental ratios. There are other fields that may 
benefit from an inexpensive, portable, easy-to-use neutron source that can vary the energy of its 
neutrons and perform TOF spectroscopy. One example would be neutron imaging. The 
flexibility of the VENES system could be ideal for imaging objects of various dimensions and 
adjusting the scattered neutron energy based on the object’s size and density. Alternatively, it 
could be transported to image more permanent objects that cannot be easily moved themselves. 
Further research should be conducted to find additional applications for the VENES system. 
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 APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Example Monte Carlo Simulation Inputs 
Isotropic neutron source shield evaluation 
c Cylindrical shielding geometry w/ alternating layers of steel and polyethylene 
1 1 -0.0012 -1 2 -3 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $opening 
2 2 -0.94 -1 2 3 -5 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $polyethylene cylinder 
3 2 -0.94 -2 4 -5 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $polyethylene plate 
4 3 -7.86 -1 4 5 -7 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $steel cylinder 
5 3 -7.86 -4 6 -7 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $steel plate 
6 2 -0.94 -1 6 7 -9 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $polyethylene cylinder 
7 2 -0.94 -6 8 -9 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $polyethylene plate 
8 3 -7.86 -1 8 9 -11 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $steel cylinder 
9 3 -7.86 -8 10 -11 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $steel plate 
10 2 -0.94 -1 10 11 -13 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $polyethylene cylinder 
11 2 -0.94 -10 12 -13 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $polyethylene plate 
12 3 -7.86 -1 12 13 -15 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $steel cylinder 
13 3 -7.86 -12 14 -15 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $steel plate 
50 1 -0.0012 -50 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
52 1 -0.0012 -52 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
54 1 -0.0012 -54 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
56 1 -0.0012 -56 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
58 1 -0.0012 -58 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
70 1 -0.0012 -70 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
72 1 -0.0012 -72 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
74 1 -0.0012 -74 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
76 1 -0.0012 -76 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
78 1 -0.0012 -78 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
1000 1 -0.0012 -1000 #(-1 14 -15) 50 52 54 56 58 
               70 72 74 76 78 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
1001 0 1000 imp:n=0 imp:p=0 
 
1 py 50 
2 py 0.0001 
3 cy 16 
4 py -5 
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 5 cy 21 
6 py -30 
7 cy 46 
8 py -35 
9 cy 51 
10 py -40 
11 cy 56 
12 py -45 
13 cy 61 
14 py -50 
15 cy 66 
50 sy 150 25 
c 51 s 0 138.58 57.40 25 
52 s 0 106.066 106.066 25 
c 53 s 0 57.40 138.58 25 
54 sz 150 25 
c 55 s 0 -57.40 138.58 25 
56 s 0 -106.066 106.066 25 
c 57 s 0 -138.58 57.40 25 
58 sy -150 25 
70 sy 500 25 
72 s 0 353.55 -353.55 25 
74 sz -500 25 
76 s 0 -353.55 -353.55 25 
78 sy -500 25 
1000 so 1000 
 
mode p n 
m1 6012 .0001 7014 .755 8016 .232 18000 .013  $air 
m2 1001 4 6000 2 $polyethylene 
m3 26000 -.998 8016 -0.002 $1018 steel 
sdef POS=0 0 0 PAR=1 ERG=14.1 
nps 10000000 
de715: 2.5E-8 1E-7 1E-6 1E-5 1E-4 1E-3 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 1.5 2 3 4 5  
       6 7 8 10 14 17 20 
df715: 19E-12 22.2E-12 22.4E-12 18.4E-12 14.2E-12 12.4E-12 19E-12 39.8E-12  
       101.2E-12 192E-12 302E-12 558E-12 728E-12 750E-12 738E-12 836E-12 878E-12  
       804E-12 830E-12 888E-12 928E-12 962E-12 1040E-12 1280E-12 1320E-12  
f715:n 0 150 0   0 
c 
de725: 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 
       1 1.5 2 3 4 5 6 8 10 
df725: 0.077E-12 0.85E-12 1E-12 0.79E-12 0.63E-12 0.54E-12 0.50E-12 0.53E-12  
       0.61E-12 0.89E-12 1.2E-12 1.8E-12 2.38E-12 2.93E-12 3.44E-12 4.38E-12  
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        5.2E-12 7E-12 8.6E-12 11.2E-12 13.6E-12 15.7E-12 17.9E-12 22.3E-12  
       26.4E-12 
f725:p 0 150 0   0 
de735: 2.5E-8 1E-7 1E-6 1E-5 1E-4 1E-3 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 1.5 2 3 4 5  
       6 7 8 10 14 17 20 
df735: 19E-12 22.2E-12 22.4E-12 18.4E-12 14.2E-12 12.4E-12 19E-12 39.8E-12  
       101.2E-12 192E-12 302E-12 558E-12 728E-12 750E-12 738E-12 836E-12 878E-12  
       804E-12 830E-12 888E-12 928E-12 962E-12 1040E-12 1280E-12 1320E-12   
f735:n 0 106.066 106.066   0 
c 
de745: 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 
       1 1.5 2 3 4 5 6 8 10 
df745: 0.077E-12 0.85E-12 1E-12 0.79E-12 0.63E-12 0.54E-12 0.50E-12 0.53E-12  
       0.61E-12 0.89E-12 1.2E-12 1.8E-12 2.38E-12 2.93E-12 3.44E-12 4.38E-12  
       5.2E-12 7E-12 8.6E-12 11.2E-12 13.6E-12 15.7E-12 17.9E-12 22.3E-12  
       26.4E-12 
f745:p 0 106.066 106.066   0 
de755: 2.5E-8 1E-7 1E-6 1E-5 1E-4 1E-3 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 1.5 2 3 4 5  
       6 7 8 10 14 17 20 
df755: 19E-12 22.2E-12 22.4E-12 18.4E-12 14.2E-12 12.4E-12 19E-12 39.8E-12  
       101.2E-12 192E-12 302E-12 558E-12 728E-12 750E-12 738E-12 836E-12 878E-12  
       804E-12 830E-12 888E-12 928E-12 962E-12 1040E-12 1280E-12 1320E-12   
f755:n 0 0 150   0 
c 
de765: 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 
       1 1.5 2 3 4 5 6 8 10 
df765: 0.077E-12 0.85E-12 1E-12 0.79E-12 0.63E-12 0.54E-12 0.50E-12 0.53E-12  
       0.61E-12 0.89E-12 1.2E-12 1.8E-12 2.38E-12 2.93E-12 3.44E-12 4.38E-12  
       5.2E-12 7E-12 8.6E-12 11.2E-12 13.6E-12 15.7E-12 17.9E-12 22.3E-12  
       26.4E-12 
f765:p 0 0 150   0 
de775: 2.5E-8 1E-7 1E-6 1E-5 1E-4 1E-3 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 1.5 2 3 4 5  
       6 7 8 10 14 17 20 
df775: 19E-12 22.2E-12 22.4E-12 18.4E-12 14.2E-12 12.4E-12 19E-12 39.8E-12  
       101.2E-12 192E-12 302E-12 558E-12 728E-12 750E-12 738E-12 836E-12 878E-12  
       804E-12 830E-12 888E-12 928E-12 962E-12 1040E-12 1280E-12 1320E-12  
f775:n 0 -106.066 106.066   0 
c 
de785: 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 
       1 1.5 2 3 4 5 6 8 10 
df785: 0.077E-12 0.85E-12 1E-12 0.79E-12 0.63E-12 0.54E-12 0.50E-12 0.53E-12  
       0.61E-12 0.89E-12 1.2E-12 1.8E-12 2.38E-12 2.93E-12 3.44E-12 4.38E-12  
       5.2E-12 7E-12 8.6E-12 11.2E-12 13.6E-12 15.7E-12 17.9E-12 22.3E-12  
       26.4E-12 
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 f785:p 0 -106.066 106.066   0 
de795: 2.5E-8 1E-7 1E-6 1E-5 1E-4 1E-3 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 1.5 2 3 4 5  
       6 7 8 10 14 17 20 
df795: 19E-12 22.2E-12 22.4E-12 18.4E-12 14.2E-12 12.4E-12 19E-12 39.8E-12  
       101.2E-12 192E-12 302E-12 558E-12 728E-12 750E-12 738E-12 836E-12 878E-12  
       804E-12 830E-12 888E-12 928E-12 962E-12 1040E-12 1280E-12 1320E-12  
f795:n 0 -150 0   0 
c 
de805: 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 
       1 1.5 2 3 4 5 6 8 10 
df805: 0.077E-12 0.85E-12 1E-12 0.79E-12 0.63E-12 0.54E-12 0.50E-12 0.53E-12  
       0.61E-12 0.89E-12 1.2E-12 1.8E-12 2.38E-12 2.93E-12 3.44E-12 4.38E-12  
       5.2E-12 7E-12 8.6E-12 11.2E-12 13.6E-12 15.7E-12 17.9E-12 22.3E-12  
       26.4E-12 
f805:p 0 -150 0   0 
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 Realistic shielding simulation with detector rotated π/2 radians relative to source shield opening 
c Cylindrical detector shielding geometry w/ alternating layers of steel 
c and polyethylene and polyethylene source shield 
c 
c ------DETECTOR AND SHIELDING ------- 
c 
1 1 -0.0012 -1 imp:n=32 imp:p=32 $opening 
2 2 -0.94 1 12 -2 imp:n=32 imp:p=32 $polyethylene cylinder 
3 3 -7.86 2 -3 imp:n=32 imp:p=32 $steel cylinder 
4 2 -0.94 3 -4 imp:n=16 imp:p=16 $polyethylene cylinder 
5 3 -7.86 4 -5 imp:n=16 imp:p=16 $steel cylinder 
6 2 -0.94 5 -6 imp:n=8 imp:p=8 $polyethylene cylinder 
7 3 -7.86 6 -7 imp:n=8 imp:p=8 $steel cylinder 
8 3 -7.86 7 -8 imp:n=4 imp:p=4 $steel cylinder 
9 3 -7.86 8 -9 imp:n=4 imp:p=4 $steel cylinder 
10 3 -7.86 9 -10 imp:n=2 imp:p=2 $steel cylinder 
11 2 -0.94 10 -11 imp:n=2 imp:p=2 $polyethylene cylinder 
12 4 -0.959 -12 imp:n=32 imp:p=32 
c 
c ------------------------------------- 
c 
20 5 -0.808 -20 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $Scatter material 
c 
c ----- SOURCE SHIELDING ----------- 
c 
101 1 -0.0012 -101 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $opening 
102 2 -0.94 101 -102 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $polyethylene cylinder 
103 2 -0.94 102 -103 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $steel cylinder 
104 2 -0.94 103 -104 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $polyethylene cylinder 
105 2 -0.94 104 -105 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $steel cylinder 
106 2 -0.94 105 -106 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $polyethylene cylinder 
107 2 -0.94 106 -107 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $steel cylinder 
108 2 -0.94 107 -108 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $steel cylinder 
109 2 -0.94 108 -109 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $steel cylinder 
110 2 -0.94 109 -110 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $steel cylinder 
111 2 -0.94 110 -111 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $polyethylene cylinder 
c 
c ------------------------------------ 
c 
500 6 -1.75 -500 -1000 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ground 
501 7 -2.08 -501 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $concrete 
502 7 -2.08 -502 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $concrete 
503 7 -2.08 -503 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $concrete 
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 504 7 -2.08 -504 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $concrete 
505 7 -2.08 -505 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $concrete 
506 7 -2.08 -506 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $concrete 
1001 1 -0.0012 11 20 111 -510 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
1002 1 -0.0012 500 511 -1000 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
1003 0 1000 imp:n=0 imp:p=0 
 
c 
c ------DETECTOR AND SHIELDING ------- 
c 
1 RCC 0 50 0    0  -37.3 0    12.7 
2 RCC 0 50 0    0  -55 0    17.7 
3 RCC 0 50 0    0  -60 0   22.7 
4 RCC 0 50 0    0  -65 0   27.7 
5 RCC 0 50 0    0  -70 0   32.7 
6 RCC 0 50 0    0  -75 0   37.7 
7 RCC 0 50 0    0  -80 0   42.7 
8 RCC 0 50 0    0  -85 0   47.7 
9 RCC 0 50 0    0  -90 0   52.7 
10 RCC 0 50 0   0  -95 0   57.7 
11 RCC 0 50 0   0 -100 0   62.7 
12 RCC 0 12.7 0   0 -12.7 0    12.7 
c 
c ------------------------------------- 
c 
20 SY     100                 25 
c 
c ----- SOURCE SHIELDING ----------- 
c 
101 RCC 0 100 65    0  0 50   13.4 
102 RCC 0 100 65    0  0 55   18.4 
103 RCC 0 100 65    0  0 60   23.4 
104 RCC 0 100 65    0  0 65   28.4 
105 RCC 0 100 65    0  0 70   33.4 
106 RCC 0 100 65    0  0 75   38.4 
107 RCC 0 100 65    0  0 80   43.4 
108 RCC 0 100 65    0  0 85   48.4 
109 RCC 0 100 65    0  0 90   53.4 
110 RCC 0 100 65    0  0 95   58.4 
111 RCC 0 100 65    0  0 100  63.4 
c 
c ----- SOURCE SHIELDING ----------- 
c 
500 px -100 
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 501 RPP -100 150  -215 415  -165 -150 
502 RPP -100 150  -215 415  400 415 
503 RPP -100 150  -215 -200  -150 400 
504 RPP -100 150   400 415  -150 400 
505 RPP  150 165   -215 415  -165 415 
506 RPP -100 -85   -200 400  -150 400 
510 RPP -85 150   -200 400   -150 400 
511 RPP -100 165   -215 415  -165 415 
1000 so 1000 
 
mode p n 
Print 10 40 50 100 110 126 140 
m1 6012 .0001 7014 .755 8016 .232 18000 .013  $air 
m2 1001 4 6000 2 $polyethlene 
m3 26000 -.998 8016 -0.002 $1018 steel 
m4 1001 5 6000 4 $EJ-309 
m5 7014 1 $Nitrogen 
m6 1001 0.2938 6012 0.0187 8016 0.5045 13027 0.0259 14028 & 
0.1354 19000 0.0143 26056 0.0027 $ soil EPA GR 12 standard 
m7 1001.42c -0.0056   8016.42c -0.4981   14000.42c -0.3151   20000.42c  
     -0.0829   11023.42c -0.0171   12000.42c -0.0026   13027.42c -0.0457  
     16032.42c -0.0013   19000.42c -0.0192   26000.42c -0.0124 $concrete 
sdef POS=0 100 114.999 PAR=1 ERG=2.5 
nps 2000000000 
E0 .000000025 .001 .01 .1 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 69I 15 20 
f14:n 12 
f24:p 12 
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 Ideal neutron scatter simulation 
c Scatter off graphite block 
11 0 -11 50 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
12 0 -12 50 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
13 0 -13 50 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
14 0 -14 50 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
15 0 -15 50 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
16 0 -16 50 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
17 0 -17 50 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
18 0 -18 50 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
19 0 -19 50 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
20 0 -20 50 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
21 0 -21 50 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
22 0 -22 50 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
30 1 -2.25 -30 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
50 0 30 -50 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
100 0 -100 #11 #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 
      #21 #22 50 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
101 0 100 imp:n=0 imp:p=0 
 
11 sz 304.8 78 
12 s 152.4 0 263.965 78 
13 s 263.965 0 152.4 78 
14 sx 304.8 78 
15 s 263.965 0 -152.4 78 
16 s 152.4 0 -263.965 78 
17 sz -304.8 78 
18 s -152.4 0 -263.965 78 
19 s -263.965 0 -152.4 78 
20 sx -304.8 78 
21 s -263.965 0 152.4 78 
22 s -152.4 0 263.965 78 
30 RCC -7 0 0    14 0 0    20 
50 so 304.8 
100 so 1000 $the universe 
 
Print 10 40 50 100 110 126 140 
mode n 
m1 6012 1 $carbon 
sdef POS=-50 0 0 PAR=1 ERG=14.1 VEC=1 0 0 DIR=D1    
si1 H 0.966 1   $cosine of angle needed 
sp1 0 1 
nps 100000000 $number of histories 
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 e0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 69I 15 20 
cut:n j 0.2 
f111:n 11 
f121:n 12 
f131:n 13 
f141:n 14 
f151:n 15 
f161:n 16 
f171:n 17 
f181:n 18 
f191:n 19 
f201:n 20 
f211:n 21 
f221:n 22 
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 Realistic neutron scatter simulation 
c Cylindrical detector shielding geometry w/ alternating layers of steel  
c and polyethylene and polyethylene source shield 
c 
c ------DETECTOR AND SHIELDING ------- 
c 
1 1 -0.0012 -1 imp:n=32 imp:p=32 $opening 
2 2 -0.94 1 12 -2 imp:n=32 imp:p=32 $polyethylene cylinder 
3 3 -7.86 2 -3 imp:n=32 imp:p=32 $steel cylinder 
4 2 -0.94 3 -4 imp:n=16 imp:p=16 $polyethylene cylinder 
5 3 -7.86 4 -5 imp:n=16 imp:p=16 $steel cylinder 
6 2 -0.94 5 -6 imp:n=8 imp:p=8 $polyethylene cylinder 
7 3 -7.86 6 -7 imp:n=8 imp:p=8 $steel cylinder 
8 3 -7.86 7 -8 imp:n=4 imp:p=4 $steel cylinder 
9 3 -7.86 8 -9 imp:n=4 imp:p=4 $steel cylinder 
10 3 -7.86 9 -10 imp:n=2 imp:p=2 $steel cylinder 
11 2 -0.94 10 -11 imp:n=2 imp:p=2 $polyethylene cylinder 
12 4 -0.959 -12 imp:n=32 imp:p=32 $detector 
c 
c ------------------------------------- 
c 
20 5 -0.808 -20 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $Scatter material 
c 
c ----- SOURCE SHIELDING ----------- 
c 
101 1 -0.0012 -101 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $opening 
102 2 -0.94 101 -102 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $polyethylene cylinder 
103 2 -0.94 102 -103 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $steel cylinder 
104 2 -0.94 103 -104 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $polyethylene cylinder 
105 2 -0.94 104 -105 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $steel cylinder 
106 2 -0.94 105 -106 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $polyethylene cylinder 
107 2 -0.94 106 -107 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $steel cylinder 
108 2 -0.94 107 -108 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $steel cylinder 
109 2 -0.94 108 -109 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $steel cylinder 
110 2 -0.94 109 -110 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $steel cylinder 
111 2 -0.94 110 -111 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $polyethylene cylinder 
c 
c ------------------------------------ 
c 
500 6 -1.75 -500 -1000 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ground 
501 7 -2.08 -501 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $concrete 
502 7 -2.08 -502 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $concrete 
503 7 -2.08 -503 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $concrete 
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 504 7 -2.08 -504 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $concrete 
505 7 -2.08 -505 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $concrete 
506 7 -2.08 -506 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $concrete 
1001 1 -0.0012 11 20 111 -510 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
1002 1 -0.0012 500 511 -1000 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 
1003 0 1000 imp:n=0 imp:p=0 
 
c 
c ------DETECTOR AND SHIELDING ------- 
c 
1 1 RCC 0 50 0    0  -37.3 0    6.35 
2 1 RCC 0 50 0    0  -55 0    11.35 
3 1 RCC 0 50 0    0  -60 0   15.35 
4 1 RCC 0 50 0    0  -65 0   21.35 
5 1 RCC 0 50 0    0  -70 0   25.35 
6 1 RCC 0 50 0    0  -75 0   31.35 
7 1 RCC 0 50 0    0  -80 0   35.35 
8 1 RCC 0 50 0    0  -85 0   41.35 
9 1 RCC 0 50 0    0  -90 0   45.35 
10 1 RCC 0 50 0   0  -95 0   51.35 
11 1 RCC 0 50 0   0 -100 0   55.35 
12 1 RCC 0 12.7 0   0 -12.7 0    6.35 
c 
c ------------------------------------- 
c 
20 RCC   0 100 -18.5   0 0 37         20 
c 
c ----- SOURCE SHIELDING ----------- 
c 
101 RCC 0 100 239.2    0  0 50   13.4 
102 RCC 0 100 239.2    0  0 55   18.4 
103 RCC 0 100 239.2    0  0 60   23.4 
104 RCC 0 100 239.2    0  0 65   28.4 
105 RCC 0 100 239.2    0  0 70   33.4 
106 RCC 0 100 239.2    0  0 75   38.4 
107 RCC 0 100 239.2    0  0 80   43.4 
108 RCC 0 100 239.2    0  0 85   48.4 
109 RCC 0 100 239.2    0  0 90   53.4 
110 RCC 0 100 239.2    0  0 95   58.4 
111 RCC 0 100 239.2    0  0 100  63.4 
c 
c ---------------------------------- 
c 
500 px -100 
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 501 RPP -100 150  -215 415  -165 -150 
502 RPP -100 150  -215 415  400 415 
503 RPP -100 150  -215 -200  -150 400 
504 RPP -100 150   400 415  -150 400 
505 RPP  150 165   -215 415  -165 415 
506 RPP -100 -85   -200 400  -150 400 
510 RPP -85 150   -200 400   -150 400 
511 RPP -100 165   -215 415  -165 415 
1000 so 1000 
 
mode n 
Print 10 40 50 100 110 126 140 
m1 6012 -.0001 7014 -.755 8016 -.232 18000 -.013  $air 
m2 1001 4 6000 2 $ polyethylene 
m3 26000 -.998 8016 -0.002 $1018 steel 
m4 1001 5 6000 4 $EJ-309 
m5 7014 1 $Nitrogen 
m6 1001 0.2938 6012 0.0187 8016 0.5045 13027 0.0259 14028 & 
     0.1354 19000 0.0143 26056 0.0027 $ soil EPA GR 12 standard 
m7 1001.42c -0.0056   8016.42c -0.4981   14000.42c -0.3151   20000.42c  
     -0.0829   11023.42c -0.0171   12000.42c -0.0026   13027.42c -0.0457  
     16032.42c -0.0013   19000.42c -0.0192   26000.42c -0.0124 $concrete 
sdef POS=0 100 289.199 PAR=1 ERG=D1 
SP1 -4  -14.1  -1 
nps 10000000000 
cut:n j 0.2 
*tr1 0 -44.6 250.45   0 90 90   90 60 150 
e0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 69I 15 20 
f14:n 12 
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 Fast neutron resonance radiography measurement simulation 
Laboratory D-T FNRR Experiment with generator and detector models and 7.75 MeV neutron  
C scatter 
C 
C max line length 
C 
C  CELLS ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
c 
c ************************** Neutron Lab *************************************** 
c 
8  1 -2.08   -15 -5080                                imp:N,P=1 $ floor   
c 20      27 -7.87      -20                           imp:N,P=1 $ Steel plate representing ring stand and 
clamps 
121   3   -1.70  120 -121 122 -123 124 -125    trcl=3 imp:N,P=1 $ Transmission target, stop-1 
122   3   -1.70  120 -121 122 -123 124 -125    trcl=5 imp:N,P=1 $ Transmission target, stop-2 
35 2 -0.0012 -5080 15  
     #201 #203 #204 #206 #207 #208 #209 #210 #211 #218 #219 #213 #214 #215  
     #216 #217 #221 #222 #223 
     #401 #403 #404 #406 #407 #408 #409 #410 #411 #418 #419 #413 #414 #415  
     #416 #417 #421 #422 #423 
     #306 #307 #309 
     #121 #122 (904914:906907:-905901) $ #301 #303 #304 #308 
                                                      imp:N,P=1  $ Name 122B 
c                                                                   
c *************Stop 1 5"x5" EJ-309 Liquid Scintillation Detector**************** 
C 
201     21   -2.70    201 -202  -209           trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ Al endcap 
203     21   -2.70    202 -232  208  -209      trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ Al external wall 
204     21   -2.70    203 -205   209  -212     trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ Al wall 
206     23   -0.935   202 -232  -208           trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ detector 
207     25   -2.23    232 -205  -209           trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ pyrex window 
208     21   -2.70    204 -214  212 -213       trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ Al ring 
209     21   -0.001   205 -231 -210            trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ PMT big 
210      2   -0.0012  205 -231  210 -211       trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ air around PMT 
211     26   -8.747   205 -221  211 -212       trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ mu metal wall 
218     21   -0.001   231 -227 -234            trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ PMT small 
219      2   -0.0012  231 -221  219 -211       trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ air around PMT 
221     26   -8.747   215 -227  219 -220       trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ mu metal wall 
222      2   -0.0012  221 -227  234 -219       trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ air around PMT 
213     21   -0.001   227 -217 -219            trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ air or Al in tube 
214     21   -2.70    216 -227  220 -235       trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ Al wall 
223     21   -2.70    227 -217  219 -235       trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ Al wall 
215     21   -2.70    217 -218 -235            trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ Al endcap 
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 216      2   -0.0012  221 -215  219 -228       trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ air around PMT 
217     26   -8.747   221 -215  219  228 -229  trcl=3 imp:N,P=1      $ mu metal wall 
C 
c *************Stop 2 5"x5" EJ-309 Liquid Scintillation Detector**************** 
C 
401     21   -2.70    201 -202  -209           trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ Al endcap 
403     21   -2.70    202 -232  208  -209      trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ Al external wall 
404     21   -2.70    203 -205   209  -212     trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ Al wall 
406     23   -0.935   202 -232  -208           trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ detector 
407     25   -2.23    232 -205  -209           trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ pyrex window 
408     21   -2.70    204 -214  212 -213       trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ Al ring 
409     21   -0.001   205 -231 -210            trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ PMT big 
410      2   -0.0012  205 -231  210 -211       trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ air around PMT 
411     26   -8.747   205 -221  211 -212       trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ mu metal wall 
418     21   -0.001   231 -227 -234            trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ PMT small 
419      2   -0.0012  231 -221  219 -211       trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ air around PMT 
421     26   -8.747   215 -227  219 -220       trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ mu metal wall 
422      2   -0.0012  221 -227  234 -219       trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ air around PMT 
413     21   -0.001   227 -217 -219            trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ air or Al in tube 
414     21   -2.70    216 -227  220 -235       trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ Al wall 
423     21   -2.70    227 -217  219 -235       trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ Al wall 
415     21   -2.70    217 -218 -235            trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ Al endcap 
416      2   -0.0012  221 -215  219 -228       trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ air around PMT 
417     26   -8.747   221 -215  219  228 -229  trcl=5 imp:N,P=1      $ mu metal wall 
c 
c ****************Start 1 1"x1" Stilbene Scintillation Detector******************** 
C 
306      28   -1.16     302 -332 -308          trcl=7 imp:N,P=1      $ Stilbene detector 
307      25   -2.23     332 -305 -310          trcl=7 imp:N,P=1      $ pyrex window 
309      21   -0.001    305 -331 -310          trcl=7 imp:N,P=1      $ PMT big 
C 
C *******MP 320 Neutron Spectrum and Energy *************************************** 
c 
C Removed at request of the manufacturer 
C 
5002 0 5080 imp:p=0 imp:n=0 
 
C   
c SURFACES -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
C 
c ************************** Neutron Lab *************************************** 
c 
15 pz    -123       $floor line 
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 c 20 BOX   -1.8 -10 -2   -0.707 -0.707 0   0 0 4   -11.3 11.3 0 $ Steel barrier, represents ring 
stand and clamp 
120 PX -52.5        $ transmission target 
121 PX -47.5        $ transmission target 
122 PY -7.5         $ transmission target 
123 PY  7.5         $ transmission target 
124 PZ -7.5         $ transmission target 
125 PZ  7.5         $ transmission target 
c                                                                                
c ****************5"x5" EJ-309 Liquid Scintillation Detector******************** 
c (Some surfaces may not be used or may be repeated) 
c 
201      PX   0 
202      PX   0.16002 
203      PX   11.8 
204      PX   12.6 
232      PX   12.67 
205      PX   13.35 
208      CX   6.33998 
209      CX   6.5 
210      CX   6.35 
C      Surface cards for the PMT 
211      CX   6.8984 
212      CX   7 
213      CX   8.2 
214      PX   14.6 
231      PX   21.95 
215      PX   32.2 
216      PX   34.7 
227      PX   35.4 
217      PX   37.63998 
218      PX   37.8 
234      CX   4.2 
219      CX   4.3984 
220      CX   4.5 
235      CX   4.7 
221      PX   29.3 
C      Surface cards for the conical part of the PMT  
228      KX   37.3  0.743162901  
229      KX   37.42 0.743162901  
c 
c ****************1"x1" Stilbene Scintillation Detector******************** 
c (Some surfaces may not be used or may be repeated) 
c 
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 301      PX   0 
302      PX   0.16 
303      PX   2.065 
304      PX   2.70 
332      PX   2.70 
305      PX   3.45 
308      CX   1.27 
309      CX   1.43 
310      CX   1.77 
C      Surface cards for the PMT 
312      CX   1.93 
313      CX   2.43 
314      PX   3.335 
331      PX   13.54 
c 
C *******MP 320 Neutron Spectrum and Energy ************************************ 
c 
c Removed at the request of the manufacturer 
c 
5080 so 300 
 
C  
c ANALYSIS --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
C 
MODE N 
dbcn 13j 
PRDMP 2j 1 4 
nps 1e9 
print 10 40 50 100 110 126 140  
SDEF POS 0 25 0  ERG=D1  PAR=1 VEC= 0 -1 0 DIR=D2   
SP1 -4  -14.1  -1                     $Gaussian fusion distribution for DT 
sI2  H 0.99756 1                      $cosine of half angle needed (4 degress), = 1/83.1888 of 
isotropic source 
sP2  0 1 
C 
c ************************** Neutron Lab *************************************** 
c 
m1    1001.42c       -0.0056  $ concrete 
      8016.42c       -0.4981 14000.42c       -0.3151 20000.42c       -0.0829  
      11023.42c      -0.0171 12000.42c       -0.0026 13027.42c       -0.0457  
      16032.42c      -0.0013 19000.66c       -0.0192 26000       -0.0124 
m2    6012.42c       -0.0001  $ air 
      8016.42c       -0.2097 7014.70c        -0.7809 18000.42c       -0.0093 
m3    6012.42c        1.00    $ graphite 
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 c 
c 
c ****************5"x5" and 1"x1" EJ-309 Liquid Scintillation Detector*********** 
C  
m21     13027.70c   1        $ Al     
m23      1001.66c   0.555     
        6000.70c   0.445     $ EJ-309 liquid scintillator 
m24      7014.70c   1        $ nitrogen 
m25      5011.70c  -0.040064  
        8016.70c  -0.539562  
       11023.70c  -0.028191  
       13027.70c  -0.011644  
       14000.21c  -0.377220  
       19000.66c  -0.003321  $ pyrex 
m26     28000.50c   0.8        
       42000.66c   0.05      
       14000.21c   0.005     
       29063.70c   0.0002    
       26056.70c   0.1448    $ mu-metal 
m27     26056.70c   1        $ iron 
M28     1001.70c  .4615      $ Stilbene 
       6012.42c  .5385 
       PLIB = 04p 
c 
C *******MP 320 Neutron Spectrum and Energy ************************************ 
C 
c Removed at the request of the manufacturer 
c 
C -------------------------------------------------------------- 
C                          Translations 
c -------------------------------------------------------------- 
c  
*tr3   62.85   -69.88  0      47.85  137.85  90    42.15  47.85  90  $ Stop 1 5x5 EJ 309 detector 
*tr5  -62.85   -69.88  0     132.15  137.85  90    42.15 132.15  90  $ Stop 3 5x5 EJ 309 detector 
*tr7    0        1.27  0      90      180    90     0     90     90  $ Start 1 1x1 Stilbene detector 
*tr9    0        25    0      90       90     0     j      j      j   0  90 90   $ Generator translation 
c 
c ======Advanced Options========= 
c 
PHYS:P 0 1 1 0 1  
c EMCPF: Upper Energy Limit for Detailed Phys 
c IDES:  Electron Production by Photons 0/1: will produce e- in MODE E or Brem photons 
c         in the case of a thick target brem model/will not as per 
c NOCOH: Coherent Scattering 0/1:will/will not 
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 c ISPN:  Photonuclear Reactions 1/0/-1 biased/none/analog 
c NODOP: Doppler Broadening 0/1:will/will not 
c 
PHYS:N J 20 
c 
CUT:P 2J 0 
c Time - Lower Energy Cutoff - Weight 
c 
Cut:N J 0.01 
c 
c =========PoliMi Options========== 
c 
IPOL  0 1 1 1 J 2 3 306 206 406  
c 
c (1) Neutron-photon source type, with correct multiplicity 
c (2) Neutrons from induced fission 
c (3) Photon correlation 
c (4) Time delay in photon emission following a fission event 
c (5) Not used 
c (6) Collisions print out only for histories with events giving energy 
c     released in at least N det cells 
c (7) Number of cells for which collision data printout is required 
c (8) Cell numbers for collision data printout 
c 
RPOL J 2e-3 
c (1) neutron rxn energy cutoff 
c (2) photon Rxn energy cutoff 
FILES 21 DUMN1 
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 Appendix B: Data Analysis 
MATLAB input to process experimental time-of-flight data 
%********************************************** 
% DualRead TOF Data Preparation               * 
% TWO Stop Detectors                          * 
% By Zach Whetstone                           * 
% 04/16/2015                                  * 
%********************************************** 
  
clear all 
  
% Start the clock 
tic; 
  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%% USER INPUT REQUIRED - CHANGE AS NEEDED %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
CreateNewHistogram = 1; % 1 if YES, anything else if NO. If yes, the TOF data 
% will be used to create a new histogram based on values entered below 
CreateNewGaussFit = 1;  % 1 if YES, anything else if NO. If yes, program will 
% iteratvely find the best Gaussian fit to energy data based on values  
% entered below 
FstBRStart = 0; % start of first TOF range to estimate background (ns) 
FstBrStop = 25; % end of first TOF range to estimate background (ns) 
SndBRStart = 225; % start of second TOF range to estimate background (ns) 
SndBrStop = 250; % end of second TOF range to estimate background (ns) 
dt = 1;      % fixed pulse time step (ns), if loading saved histograms, must 
% match their bin width, otherwise, set as needed for new histogram 
  
%******* Needed if creating a new histogram *********** 
nrfolders = 13; % number of folders with TOF data sets 
MeasTimePerFold = 30; %Measurement time per data set/folder (minutes) 
tofMin= -150;   %(ns), if loading saved histograms, must match 
tofMax= 350;   %(ns), if loading saved histograms, must match 
St1Offset = -44.0;  %(ns) 
St2Offset = -39.3; %(ns) 
sizeSt1TOF = 141468; % Estimate of the size of the Stop1 data set, used to 
% preallocate 
sizeSt2TOF = 87669; % Estimate of the size of the Stop2 data set, used to 
% preallocate 
NPS = 2e6; %neutrons per second from the generator 
d = 105.54; %distance between center of start and stop detectors (cm) 
  
%******* Needed if creating a new Gaussian fit *********** 
AGuess = 1e-7; % Guess at height of combined data Gaussian curve 
BGuess = 1.38; % Guess at center energy location of Gaussian curve 
CGuess = 0.40; % Guess at width of energy Gaussian curve 
  
BInterval = 0.01; % Iterative steps for guessed b values 
BWidth = 0.4; % Width of b values tested... BGuess +/- BWidth/2 
CInterval = 0.01; % Iterative steps for guessed c values 
CWidth = 0.2; % Width of c values tested... CGuess +/- CWidth/2 
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GaussStart = 54; % Begining of Gaussian Fit Data in TOF histograms 
GaussStop = 78; % End of Gaussian Fit Data in TOF histograms 
  
%******* Predetermined Gaussian variables *********** 
% To be filled in after successful Gaussian fit 
% Stop 1 
aSt1 = 2.4145e-6; % a1 = a in Gaussian dist 
bSt1 = 1.27; % b1 = b in Gaussian dist 
cSt1 = 0.42; % c1 DOES NOT = c in Gaussian dist. c = c1/2^0.5 
  
% Stop 2 
aSt2 = 1.3276e-6;  
bSt2 = 1.40;  
cSt2 = 0.44;  
  
% Total 
aTot = 3.6590e-6;  
bTot = 1.32;  
cTot = 0.44;  
  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% END USER INPUT SECTION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Reading and organizing of PSD data  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
MeasTime = nrfolders * MeasTimePerFold; 
SourceParticles = MeasTime*60*NPS; 
     
if CreateNewHistogram == 1 
     
    Det1TOF = zeros(1,sizeSt1TOF); 
    Det2TOF = zeros(1,sizeSt2TOF); 
    TOFticker1 = 0; 
    TOFticker2 = 0; 
     
    for xxx = 1 : nrfolders 
        current_path = pwd; 
        detector0 = 'timed0'; 
        detector1 = 'timed1'; 
        detector2 = 'timed2'; 
        file_name0 = [current_path '\' num2str(xxx) '\' detector0]; 
        file_name1 = [current_path '\' num2str(xxx) '\' detector1]; 
        file_name2 = [current_path '\' num2str(xxx) '\' detector2]; 
        start = importdata(file_name0); 
        stop1 = importdata(file_name1); 
        stop2 = importdata(file_name2); 
        nrpulses0 = size(start,1); 
        nrpulses1 = size(stop1,1); 
        nrpulses2 = size(stop2,1); 
        aaa = 1; 
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         for bbb = 1 : nrpulses0 
            if start(bbb,1) ~= -999 
                while stop1(aaa,4) ~= start(bbb,4) 
                    aaa = aaa + 1; 
                    if aaa > nrpulses1 
                        aaa = bbb; 
                        break 
                    end 
                end 
                if stop1(aaa,4) == start(bbb,4) && stop1(aaa,1) ~= -999 
                    TOFticker1 = TOFticker1 + 1; 
                    Det1TOF(TOFticker1) = stop1(aaa,1) - 
start(bbb,1)+St1Offset; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
         
        aaa = 1; 
         
        MaxPulses = max(nrpulses0,nrpulses2); 
        MinPulses = min(nrpulses0,nrpulses2); 
         
        for ccc = 1 : nrpulses0 
            if start(ccc,1) ~= -999 
                while stop2(aaa,4) ~= start(ccc,4) 
                    aaa = aaa + 1; 
                    if aaa > nrpulses2 
                        aaa = ccc; 
                        break 
                    end 
                end 
                if stop2(aaa,4) == start(ccc,4) && stop2(aaa,1) ~= -999 
                    TOFticker2 = TOFticker2 + 1; 
                    Det2TOF(TOFticker2) = stop2(aaa,1) - 
start(ccc,1)+St2Offset; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
        fprintf('\n   Folder %1.0f of %2.0f finished in %3.2f 
minutes\n',xxx,nrfolders,cputime/60) 
         
    end 
     
    TotTOF = zeros(1,TOFticker1+TOFticker2); 
    TotTOF(1,1:TOFticker1)=Det1TOF(1,1:TOFticker1); 
    TotTOF(1,TOFticker1+1:TOFticker1+TOFticker2)=Det2TOF(1,1:TOFticker2); 
     
    xaxis= tofMin:dt:tofMax; 
     
    [St1TOF,xaxis] = hist(Det1TOF,xaxis); 
    [St2TOF,xaxis] = hist(Det2TOF,xaxis); 
    [TotTOF,xaxis] = hist(TotTOF,xaxis); 
     
    saving_path = [current_path '\']; 
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     name = 'St1_TOF'; 
    saving_path_name = [saving_path name ]; 
    save(saving_path_name, 'St1TOF'); 
     
    name = 'St2_TOF'; 
    saving_path_name = [saving_path name ]; 
    save(saving_path_name, 'St2TOF'); 
     
    name = 'Tot_TOF'; 
    saving_path_name = [saving_path name ]; 
    save(saving_path_name, 'TotTOF'); 
     
else   
    load('St1_TOF.mat'); 
    load('St2_TOF.mat'); 
    load('Tot_TOF.mat'); 
    xaxis= tofMin:dt:tofMax; 
end 
  
St1TOFPercentUncer = (St1TOF.^0.5)./St1TOF; 
St1TOF = St1TOF/SourceParticles; 
St1TOFUncert = St1TOF.*St1TOFPercentUncer; 
  
St2TOFPercentUncer = (St2TOF.^0.5)./St2TOF; 
St2TOF = St2TOF/SourceParticles; 
St2TOFUncert = St2TOF.*St2TOFPercentUncer; 
  
TotTOFPercentUncer = (TotTOF.^0.5)./TotTOF; 
TotTOF = TotTOF/SourceParticles; 
TotTOFUncert = TotTOF.*TotTOFPercentUncer; 
  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Converting TOF data to neutron energy data 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
MaxX = max(xaxis); % ns 
MinX = min(xaxis); % ns 
xaxisE(1) = 0.5*1.675e-27*((d/dt)^2*1e14/1.602e-19*1e-6); 
start = abs(MinX)/dt+1; 
xTOFGauss = dt:dt:MaxX; 
  
for xxx = 1:(MaxX/dt) % output(Max,1) 
    xaxisE(xxx) = 0.5*1.675e-27*((d/(dt*xxx))^2*1e14/1.602e-19*1e-6);   
% Convert TOF bins to Energy (MeV) 
end 
  
St1E(1) = St1TOF(start+1)/xaxisE(1); 
St1EUncert(1) = St1TOFUncert(start+1)/xaxisE(1); 
St2E(1) = St2TOF(start+1)/xaxisE(1); 
St2EUncert(1) = St2TOFUncert(start+1)/xaxisE(1); 
TotE(1) = TotTOF(start+1)/xaxisE(1); 
TotEUncert(1) = TotTOFUncert(start+1)/xaxisE(1); 
  
for yyy = 2:(MaxX/dt) % output(Max,1) 
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    St1E(yyy) = St1TOF(start+yyy)/(xaxisE(yyy-1) - xaxisE(yyy));  
% Normalize bins by their width 
    St1EUncert(yyy) = St1TOFUncert(start+yyy)/(xaxisE(yyy-1) - xaxisE(yyy)); 
    St2E(yyy) = St2TOF(start+yyy)/(xaxisE(yyy-1) - xaxisE(yyy));  
% Normalize bins by their width 
    St2EUncert(yyy) = St2TOFUncert(start+yyy)/(xaxisE(yyy-1) - xaxisE(yyy)); 
    TotE(yyy) = TotTOF(start+yyy)/(xaxisE(yyy-1) - xaxisE(yyy));  
% Normalize bins by their width 
    TotEUncert(yyy) = TotTOFUncert(start+yyy)/(xaxisE(yyy-1) - xaxisE(yyy)); 
     
end 
  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Gaussian fitting of neutron energy data 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
if CreateNewGaussFit == 1 
    xaxisFit = transpose(xaxisE(GaussStart:GaussStop)); 
    BInterval2 = 0.001; 
    BWidth2 = 0.02; 
    CInterval2 = 0.001; 
    CWidth2 = 0.02; 
     
    xxx = 1; 
    count = 0; 
    iterations = BWidth/BInterval*CWidth/CInterval+400; 
    Parameters = zeros(iterations,12); 
     
    yFitSt1 = transpose(St1E(GaussStart:GaussStop)); 
    yFitSt2 = transpose(St2E(GaussStart:GaussStop)); 
    yFitTot = transpose(TotE(GaussStart:GaussStop)); 
     
    for BTemp1 = (BGuess-BWidth/2):CInterval:(BGuess+BWidth/2) 
        for CTemp1 = (CGuess-CWidth/2):CInterval:(CGuess+CWidth/2) 
            optionsStop = fitoptions('gauss1', 'StartPoint', [AGuess BTemp1 
CTemp1]); 
            optionsTot = fitoptions('gauss1', 'StartPoint', [AGuess/2 BTemp1 
CTemp1]); 
            [GaussSt1,GoFSt1] = fit(xaxisFit,yFitSt1,'gauss1',optionsStop); % 
get parameters for Gaussian fit and Goodness of Fit data 
            [GaussSt2,GoFSt2] = fit(xaxisFit,yFitSt2,'gauss1',optionsStop); 
            [GaussTot,GoFTot] = fit(xaxisFit,yFitTot,'gauss1',optionsTot); 
            Parameters(xxx,1:3) = coeffvalues(GaussSt1); 
            Parameters(xxx,4) = GoFSt1.rsquare; 
            Parameters(xxx,5:7) = coeffvalues(GaussSt2); 
            Parameters(xxx,8) = GoFSt2.rsquare; 
            Parameters(xxx,9:11) = coeffvalues(GaussTot); 
            Parameters(xxx,12) = GoFTot.rsquare; 
            xxx = xxx + 1; 
        end 
    end 
     
    %------------- Stop1 ---------------- 
    [~,Row] = max(Parameters(:,4)); 
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     ABestSt1 = Parameters(Row,1); 
    BSt1_2 = Parameters(Row,2); 
    CSt1_2 = Parameters(Row,3); 
    yyy = xxx; 
     
    for BTemp2 = (BSt1_2-BWidth2/2):BInterval2:(BSt1_2+BWidth2/2) 
        for CTemp2 = (CSt1_2-CWidth2/2):CInterval2:(CSt1_2+CWidth2/2) 
            options = fitoptions('gauss1', 'StartPoint', [ABestSt1 BTemp2 
CTemp2]); 
            [GaussSt1,GoFSt1] = fit(xaxisFit,yFitSt1,'gauss1',options);  
% get parameters for Gaussian fit and Goodness of Fit data 
            Parameters(xxx,1:3) = coeffvalues(GaussSt1); 
            Parameters(xxx,4) = GoFSt1.rsquare; 
            yyy = yyy + 1; 
        end 
    end 
     
    [St1RSqd,Row] = max(Parameters(:,4)); 
    aSt1 = Parameters(Row,1); 
    bSt1 = Parameters(Row,2); 
    cSt1 = Parameters(Row,3); 
    ESt1FWHM = cSt1*2^0.5*(2*log(2))^0.5; % accounting for c = c1/2^0.5 
     
    %------------- Stop2 ---------------- 
    [~,Row] = max(Parameters(:,8)); 
    ABestSt2 = Parameters(Row,5); 
    BSt2_2 = Parameters(Row,6); 
    CSt2_2 = Parameters(Row,7); 
    yyy = xxx; 
     
    for BTemp2 = (BSt2_2-BWidth2/2):BInterval2:(BSt2_2+BWidth2/2) 
        for CTemp2 = (CSt2_2-CWidth2/2):CInterval2:(CSt2_2+CWidth2/2) 
            options = fitoptions('gauss1', 'StartPoint', [ABestSt2 BTemp2 
CTemp2]); 
            [GaussSt2,GoFSt2] = fit(xaxisFit,yFitSt2,'gauss1',options);  
% get parameters for Gaussian fit and Goodness of Fit data 
            Parameters(xxx,5:7) = coeffvalues(GaussSt2); 
            Parameters(xxx,8) = GoFSt2.rsquare; 
            yyy = yyy + 1; 
        end 
    end 
     
    [St2RSqd,Row] = max(Parameters(:,8)); 
    aSt2 = Parameters(Row,5); 
    bSt2 = Parameters(Row,6); 
    cSt2 = Parameters(Row,7); 
    ESt2FWHM = cSt2*2^0.5*(2*log(2))^0.5; % accounting for c = c1/2^0.5 
     
    %------------- Total ---------------- 
    [~,Row] = max(Parameters(:,8)); 
    ABestTot = Parameters(Row,5); 
    BTot_2 = Parameters(Row,6); 
    CTot_2 = Parameters(Row,7); 
    yyy = xxx; 
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     for BTemp2 = (BTot_2-BWidth2/2):BInterval2:(BTot_2+BWidth2/2) 
        for CTemp2 = (CTot_2-CWidth2/2):CInterval2:(CTot_2+CWidth2/2) 
            options = fitoptions('gauss1', 'StartPoint', [ABestTot BTemp2 
CTemp2]); 
            [GaussSt2,GoFSt2] = fit(xaxisFit,yFitTot,'gauss1',options);  
% get parameters for Gaussian fit and Goodness of Fit data 
            Parameters(xxx,9:11) = coeffvalues(GaussTot); 
            Parameters(xxx,12) = GoFTot.rsquare; 
            yyy = yyy + 1; 
        end 
    end 
     
    [TotRSqd,Row] = max(Parameters(:,12)); 
    aTot = Parameters(Row,9); 
    bTot = Parameters(Row,10); 
    cTot = Parameters(Row,11); 
    ETotFWHM = cTot*2^0.5*(2*log(2))^0.5; % accounting for c = c1/2^0.5; 
     
    X = zeros(4,6); 
    GaussianEnergyValues = num2cell(X); 
     
    GaussianEnergyValues{1,1} = 'Data Set'; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{1,2} = 'a'; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{1,3} = 'b'; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{1,4} = 'c'; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{1,5} = 'FWHM'; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{1,6} = 'r^2'; 
     
    GaussianEnergyValues{2,1} = 'Stop 1'; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{2,2} = aSt1; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{2,3} = bSt1; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{2,4} = cSt1; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{2,5} = ESt1FWHM; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{2,6} = St1RSqd; 
     
    GaussianEnergyValues{3,1} = 'Stop 2'; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{3,2} = aSt2; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{3,3} = bSt2; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{3,4} = cSt2; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{3,5} = ESt2FWHM; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{3,6} = St2RSqd; 
     
    GaussianEnergyValues{4,1} = 'Combined'; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{4,2} = aTot; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{4,3} = bTot; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{4,4} = cTot; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{4,5} = ETotFWHM; 
    GaussianEnergyValues{4,6} = TotRSqd; 
     
    GaussianEnergyValues 
  
end 
  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Create Gaussian curves and lines of best fit 
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 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
St1EGauss(1) = aSt1*exp(-((xaxisE(1)-bSt1)/cSt1)^2); 
St1TOFGauss(1) = aSt1*exp(-(((0.5*1.675e-27*(d/xTOFGauss(1))^2*1e14/1.602e-
19*1e-6)-bSt1)/cSt1)^2)*xaxisE(1); 
  
St2EGauss(1) = aSt2*exp(-((xaxisE(1)-bSt2)/cSt2)^2); 
St2TOFGauss(1) = aSt2*exp(-(((0.5*1.675e-27*(d/xTOFGauss(1))^2*1e14/1.602e-
19*1e-6)-bSt2)/cSt2)^2)*xaxisE(1); 
  
TotEGauss(1) = aTot*exp(-((xaxisE(1)-bTot)/cTot)^2); 
TotTOFGauss(1) = aTot*exp(-(((0.5*1.675e-27*(d/xTOFGauss(1))^2*1e14/1.602e-
19*1e-6)-bTot)/cTot)^2)*xaxisE(1); 
  
for yyy = 2:(MaxX/dt) % output(Max,1) 
    St1EGauss(yyy) = aSt1*exp(-((xaxisE(yyy)-bSt1)/cSt1)^2); 
    St1TOFGauss(yyy) = aSt1*exp(-(((0.5*1.675e-
27*(d/xTOFGauss(yyy))^2*1e14/1.602e-19*1e-6)-bSt1)/cSt1)^2)*(xaxisE(yyy-1) - 
xaxisE(yyy)); % Convert Energy Gauss Dist. to TOF Gauss Dist. 
    St2EGauss(yyy) = aSt2*exp(-((xaxisE(yyy)-bSt2)/cSt2)^2); 
    St2TOFGauss(yyy) = aSt2*exp(-(((0.5*1.675e-
27*(d/xTOFGauss(yyy))^2*1e14/1.602e-19*1e-6)-bSt2)/cSt2)^2)*(xaxisE(yyy-1) - 
xaxisE(yyy)); % Convert Energy Gauss Dist. to TOF Gauss Dist. 
    TotEGauss(yyy) = aTot*exp(-((xaxisE(yyy)-bTot)/cTot)^2); 
    TotTOFGauss(yyy) = aTot*exp(-(((0.5*1.675e-
27*(d/xTOFGauss(yyy))^2*1e14/1.602e-19*1e-6)-bTot)/cTot)^2)*(xaxisE(yyy-1) - 
xaxisE(yyy)); % Convert Energy Gauss Dist. to TOF Gauss Dist. 
end 
  
% Stop 1 
NormSt1TOF = St1TOF/max(St1TOFGauss); % normalized yaxis 
NormSt1TOFUncert = St1TOFUncert/max(St1TOFGauss);  
% adjust error bars for normalized yaxis 
NormSt1TOFGauss = St1TOFGauss/max(St1TOFGauss); 
  
% Stop 2 
NormSt2TOF = St2TOF/max(St2TOFGauss); % normalized yaxis 
NormSt2TOFUncert = St2TOFUncert/max(St2TOFGauss);  
% adjust error bars for normalized yaxis 
NormSt2TOFGauss = St2TOFGauss/max(St2TOFGauss); 
  
% Total 
NormTotTOF = TotTOF/max(TotTOFGauss); % normalized yaxis 
NormTotTOFUncert = TotTOFUncert/max(TotTOFGauss);  
% adjust error bars for normalized yaxis 
NormTotTOFGauss = TotTOFGauss/max(TotTOFGauss); 
  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Estimate FWHM of TOF lines of best fit 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
St1FrstBckgrnd = mean(St1TOF((FstBRStart+100)/dt:(FstBrStop+100)/dt)); 
St1SndBckgrnd = mean(St1TOF((SndBRStart+100)/dt:(SndBrStop+100)/dt)); 
St2FrstBckgrnd = mean(St2TOF((FstBRStart+100)/dt:(FstBrStop+100)/dt)); 
St2SndBckgrnd = mean(St2TOF((SndBRStart+100)/dt:(SndBrStop+100)/dt)); 
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 TotFrstBckgrnd = mean(TotTOF((FstBRStart+100)/dt:(FstBrStop+100)/dt)); 
TotSndBckgrnd = mean(TotTOF((SndBRStart+100)/dt:(SndBrStop+100)/dt)); 
  
[St1TOFGaussMax, St1PeakTOF] = max(St1TOFGauss); 
St1TOFHalfMax = (St1TOFGaussMax+(St1FrstBckgrnd+St1SndBckgrnd)/2)/2; 
[St2TOFGaussMax, St2PeakTOF] = max(St2TOFGauss); 
St2TOFHalfMax = (St2TOFGaussMax+(St2FrstBckgrnd+St2SndBckgrnd)/2)/2; 
[TotTOFGaussMax, TotPeakTOF] = max(TotTOFGauss); 
TotTOFHalfMax = (TotTOFGaussMax+(TotFrstBckgrnd+TotSndBckgrnd)/2)/2; 
  
for zzz = 1:(size(xaxisE,2) - 1) 
     
    if St1TOFGauss(zzz) <= St1TOFHalfMax && St1TOFGauss(zzz+1) >= 
St1TOFHalfMax 
        St1TOFFWHM1 = xTOFGauss(zzz) + dt*(St1TOFHalfMax-
St1TOFGauss(zzz))/(St1TOFGauss(zzz+1)-St1TOFGauss(zzz));  
% linear interpolation to estimate TOF at FWHM 
    end 
    if St1TOFGauss(zzz) >= St1TOFHalfMax && St1TOFGauss(zzz+1) <= 
St1TOFHalfMax 
        St1TOFFWHM2 = xTOFGauss(zzz) + dt*(St1TOFHalfMax-
St1TOFGauss(zzz))/(St1TOFGauss(zzz+1)-St1TOFGauss(zzz));  
% linear interpolation to estimate TOF at FWHM 
    end 
     
    if St2TOFGauss(zzz) <= St2TOFHalfMax && St2TOFGauss(zzz+1) >= 
St2TOFHalfMax 
        St2TOFFWHM1 = xTOFGauss(zzz) + dt*(St2TOFHalfMax-
St2TOFGauss(zzz))/(St2TOFGauss(zzz+1)-St2TOFGauss(zzz));  
% linear interpolation to estimate TOF at FWHM 
    end 
    if St2TOFGauss(zzz) >= St2TOFHalfMax && St2TOFGauss(zzz+1) <= 
St2TOFHalfMax 
        St2TOFFWHM2 = xTOFGauss(zzz) + dt*(St2TOFHalfMax-
St2TOFGauss(zzz))/(St2TOFGauss(zzz+1)-St2TOFGauss(zzz));  
% linear interpolation to estimate TOF at FWHM 
    end 
     
    if TotTOFGauss(zzz) <= TotTOFHalfMax && TotTOFGauss(zzz+1) >= 
TotTOFHalfMax 
        TotTOFFWHM1 = xTOFGauss(zzz) + dt*(TotTOFHalfMax-
TotTOFGauss(zzz))/(TotTOFGauss(zzz+1)-TotTOFGauss(zzz));  
% linear interpolation to estimate TOF at FWHM 
    end 
    if TotTOFGauss(zzz) >= TotTOFHalfMax && TotTOFGauss(zzz+1) <= 
TotTOFHalfMax 
        TotTOFFWHM2 = xTOFGauss(zzz) + dt*(TotTOFHalfMax-
TotTOFGauss(zzz))/(TotTOFGauss(zzz+1)-TotTOFGauss(zzz));  
% linear interpolation to estimate TOF at FWHM 
    end 
end 
  
St1TOFFWHM = St1TOFFWHM2 - St1TOFFWHM1; 
St2TOFFWHM = St2TOFFWHM2 - St2TOFFWHM1; 
TotTOFFWHM = TotTOFFWHM2 - TotTOFFWHM1; 
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Y = zeros(4,4); 
TOFLineOfBestFitValues = num2cell(Y); 
  
TOFLineOfBestFitValues{1,1} = 'Data Set'; 
TOFLineOfBestFitValues{1,2} = 'Peak Max'; 
TOFLineOfBestFitValues{1,3} = 'Peak Mode'; 
TOFLineOfBestFitValues{1,4} = 'Est FWHM'; 
  
TOFLineOfBestFitValues{2,1} = 'Stop 1'; 
TOFLineOfBestFitValues{2,2} = St1TOFGaussMax; 
TOFLineOfBestFitValues{2,3} = St1PeakTOF; 
TOFLineOfBestFitValues{2,4} = St1TOFFWHM; 
  
TOFLineOfBestFitValues{3,1} = 'Stop 2'; 
TOFLineOfBestFitValues{3,2} = St2TOFGaussMax; 
TOFLineOfBestFitValues{3,3} = St2PeakTOF; 
TOFLineOfBestFitValues{3,4} = St2TOFFWHM; 
  
TOFLineOfBestFitValues{4,1} = 'Combined'; 
TOFLineOfBestFitValues{4,2} = TotTOFGaussMax; 
TOFLineOfBestFitValues{4,3} = TotPeakTOF; 
TOFLineOfBestFitValues{4,4} = TotTOFFWHM; 
  
TOFLineOfBestFitValues 
  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Plotting of data 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
figure(1) 
h = errorbar(xaxis,TotTOF,TotTOFUncert,'ok','MarkerSize',5); 
errorbar_tick(h,1,'UNITS') 
hold on; 
plot(xTOFGauss,TotTOFGauss,'--k') 
h = errorbar(xaxis,St1TOF,St1TOFUncert,'or','MarkerSize',5); 
errorbar_tick(h,1,'UNITS') 
plot(xTOFGauss,St1TOFGauss,'--r') 
h = errorbar(xaxis,St2TOF,St2TOFUncert,'ob','MarkerSize',5); 
errorbar_tick(h,1,'UNITS') 
plot(xTOFGauss,St2TOFGauss,'--b') 
axis([-200 300 0 1.2*max(TotTOF)])%adjust once Gauss figured out 
set(gca,'FontSize',14) 
set(gca,'FontName','Arial') 
xlabel('time of flight (ns)') 
ylabel('Counts (per source particle)') 
legend('\pi/4 radian, 1.0 m combined time-of-flight','\pi/4 radian, 1.0 m 
combined line of best fit',... 
       '\pi/4 radian, 1.0 m stop-1 time-of-flight','\pi/4 radian, 1.0 m stop-
1 line of best fit',... 
       '\pi/4 radian, 1.0 m stop-2 time-of-flight','\pi/4 radian, 1.0 m stop-
2 line of best fit') 
hold off; 
  
figure(2) 
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 h = errorbar(xaxisE,TotE,TotEUncert,'ok','MarkerSize',5); 
errorbar_tick(h,.02,'UNITS') 
hold on; 
plot(xaxisE,TotEGauss,'--k') 
h = errorbar(xaxisE,St1E,St1EUncert,'or','MarkerSize',5); 
errorbar_tick(h,.02,'UNITS') 
plot(xaxisE,St1EGauss,'--r') 
h = errorbar(xaxisE,St2E,St2EUncert,'ob','MarkerSize',5); 
errorbar_tick(h,.02,'UNITS') 
plot(xaxisE,St2EGauss,'--b') 
axis([0 3 0 1.1*max(TotE)])%adjust once Gauss figured out 
set(gca,'FontSize',14) 
set(gca,'FontName','Arial') 
xlabel('Neutron energy (MeV)') 
ylabel('Normalized counts (per source particle/MeV)') 
legend('\pi/4 radian, 1.0 m combined neutron energy spectra','\pi/4 radian, 
1.0 m combined Gaussian fit',... 
       '\pi/4 radian, 1.0 m stop-1 neutron energy spectra','\pi/4 radian, 1.0 
m stop-1 Gaussian fit',... 
       '\pi/4 radian, 1.0 m stop-2 neutron energy spectra','\pi/4 radian, 1.0 
m stop-2 Gaussian fit') 
hold off; 
  
size(Det1TOF) 
size(Det2TOF) 
  
% Stop the clock 
elapsed_time=toc; 
mod_elapsed_time=elapsed_time/60; 
fprintf('\n\n   The total data-processing time is %6.2f 
min.\n',mod_elapsed_time) 
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